Here's an attempt to reframe the Iraq debate, not so much as to solve the problem of Iraq and the Middle East, but to solve the problem of how to have a coherent national conversation about it all.
Basically, we should try to conduct a debate that is oriented towards finding a pathway to a regional deployment and posture that is appropriate for us, while doing what good we can as far as influencing Iraqi internals.
We need to move away from aiming at perfect Iraqi outcomes, or narrow cost reduction and from all kinds of unreality, and move towards a relationship with the region that actually reflects the good we can do, that is realistic at all levels, within a greater reality which we can profoundly influence but not finally control
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First, let's imagine that US military involvement in Iraq had never happened or had ended rapidly after the invasion.
In that scenario there would be no significant number of troops inside Iraq.
Imagine also that Iraq had slid into an internal reconfiguration process somewhat along the lines of what is going on today.
If we accept the premise of valid US national interest including anti-terror operations, minimizing humanitarian disasters and a commitment to stable borders and regimes within the Middle East, then even in this hypothetical scenario we could imagine that the US would, by this stage, have put together a long term force deployment in the region.
This deployment would probably not have been located inside Iraq, but in a rather more stable area.
It would have been sized so as to conduct robust and ongoing swat-like military operations against terrorist concentrations, and also to deter genocide, aleviate humanitarian disasters and deter attempts to redraw borders and topple regimes by force.
Let's say most of America and the world would have found such a deployment to be in accord with the national interest, with historical reality, with a appropriate use of resources and with a philosophy of minimal, targeted and accountable use of force in achieving clear and well-understood outcomes.
The point of imagining this is to say that there is a significant military commitment to the Middle East that most would agree is valid, even if there were a largely hands-off relationship to many of the internal dynamics of Iraq.
So, it's not true that if one says there is limited good that can be done by the US military, as far as determining the resolution of Iraq internals, then one would necessarily not want a deployment in the region at all.
Obviously this hypothetical scenario is not the one we have today, nor one we have had or have planned during the past 4-5 years.
And the actual US posture in the region that has been going on, has been almost universally determined to be off the mark in serious ways.
From unsustainability to unreality, to excess cost for given effect, to nontransparent goals, to unwanted and problematic side-effects at all levels, it has not been what one would want it to be.
So, we can now imagine a spectrum of deployments, ranging from what we have today on the one hand, which is heavily invested in influencing the internal process and outcomes of the Iraq reconfiguration, all the way to a regional deployment which has no particular stake in those issues.
Somewhere along that spectrum of deployment possibilities lies the true, accurate force posture for the US at this time, militarily and otherwise, in the region.
And given that point on the deployment spectrum, there must be a few, optimal, minimal-cost pathways to get from here to there, from our current deployment to the ideal one.
There must be an obvious and transparent way to compare different pathways for redeploying ourselves from where we are now to where we would like to end up.
So here's the reframing: Any proposal as to what the Iraq policy should be, militarily, should be answering the question of HOW we optimally get from here to the optimal deployment, and should be evaluated on that basis.
Thus 'the surge' and any competing proposals, should not be seen primarily as themselves being proposals for optimal long-term deployments, nor as attempts to successfully resolve Iraq's internal reconfiguration in the short term.
Rather, the question is, is 'the surge' or any other option getting us directly, quickly and at a low cost, to the sort of long-term deployment that we want to have?
Or is it dancing around the point and trying to solve other problems?
Is it 'improving things' but not addressing transformation of posture?
Is it simply not addressing the point?
Is it indirectly getting us somewhere that might be ok someday, if we're lucky or is it carrying us straightforwardly to a posture we actually want to be for the long-term?
(as an aside, if we were as a nation prepared to determine and enforce a specific and viable resolution to Iraqi internal reconfiguration, one could chart such a path, but apparently there is no consensus on this sort of direct application of force to the internal Iraqi puzzle)
A key issue here is cost-minimization of any redeployment pathway: What things are included in the costs?
A low-cost pathway to an appropriate deployment, means one that minimizes cost, harm and/or expense in a number of areas:
America
- core US resources like blood and treasure
- overall readiness of the armed forces
- ability to address needs in other regions
- national unity of purpose and will aligned behind commonly understood and accepted principles of national interest
Global
- global buy-in to the legitimate use of superpower force for the good of the existence of global community
- alliances, friendships and partnerships, potential and actual
Regional
- peacemaking's success throughout the Middle East and other areas of chronic tension
- stability of borders and regimes in the region
Iraq
- the physical well-being of the Iraqi people
- the emergence of a stable sense of one or more nations in Iraq
- the emergence of political and state structures in Iraq, compatible with the actual sense of nation that arises
- etc
If we only include some costs and not others, then we can point to some success in the sense of achieving stated goals, but we still end up on a track that may be leading to too many unwanted bad side effects.
If we evaluate 'the surge' or any other policy only on the basis of minimizing certain costs, but not as far as answering whether it is moving us toward a posture we actually want to be for the long-term, then we potentially end up on a more positive path to nowhere.
We should know where we are going, and account for all costs in evaluating a best path to getting there.
The 'where we are going' part need not commit itself to obtaining goals we have no power to determine, such as a perfect world in Iraq or elsewhere.
Rather, 'where we are going' should mean, a posture or relationship to reality that makes sense.
One that is reality-based, authentic to the US, sustainable, useful, effective and thus overall appropriate.
When you have the appropriate posture, you don't necessarily secure a particular good outcome, because there are other forces in play, because life is imperfect, because you are here to play a certain role within a larger situation
.
But you do know that you are positioned in a way to do the good you can do, to not be overly involved in issues where you cannot finally help much, and that you have the wisdom to see the difference.
You thus have both sustainability, a sound basis for flexibility and the appearance and reality of being a success as far as how you face the world.
The world more than anything wants the US to succeed, not so much in creating a perfect world, but in role-modelling a appropriate relationship to the world.
When we give the appearance of being lost, confused, flailing, then regardless of outcomes, people lose trust and faith, and our future ability to make a difference is harmed.
Yet, having a policy just to have one, that is perhaps good according to some measure, or less bad than an old one in some ways, or visionary and admirable simply as far as ingenuity, still does not necessarily make the case that we really know what we are doing.
The fight against violent anti-systemic forces is as much a battle of ideas as anything, a contest to see who it is that really understands the admitedly hyper-confusing reality we are living in.
The leaders of the 21st century will be those who simply seem to understand this world the best, but who are not necessarily those who are somehow able to make it be a perfect world, or spin others into believing that they have done so.
We don't have to appear to be magicians or guarantors of the perfect, so much as extremely sensible people, in tune with the era.
The world is mature enough about the widespread challenges and instability of our era, not to expect perfect results, or a perfect ability to determine results, from the US or any leader.
But at the end of the day, American leadership -- and it is America's destiny, nature and actual practical position economically and militarily to lead -- must look like we know what we are doing as a nation, which implies a level of realism to go along with the optimism and confidence that leadership implies.
The era of spin and hype is ending, for all parties; those who lead moving forward must above all appear to be walking within the reality that is actually going on, thus demonstrating a sense of the possibility of belonging in this wild world, inspiring all to buy into a future based on cooperation and creativity.
In short, there is a US deployment in the Middle East which most would accept simply for the purpose of securing the obvious good in general at this time, that would be minimally concerned with internal reconfiguration of Iraq.
Using that as a baseline of where we should be headed, in deliberate and low-cost fashion, what pathway is the best in getting us there, which simultaneously has the maximum amount of positive influence on Iraq's internals that can actually be accomplished?
We thus get to a philosophy of minimal force, in terms of quantity, type and degree of invasiveness, to achieve the good that is realistic and relevant, appropriate to who we are, what we can actually offer and sustain.
We can get beyond a concern that change towards more limited goals and costs represents internal weakness.
We can seize instead the true high ground of the era, the strength conveyed by coming to terms with reality -- our own, that of the world and their natural relation -- and so discover and celebrate the deep goodness that exists within this reality.
We can find our place in the world, as a leader of the world, and thus inspire others to believe there is a natural place and home here for themselves as well, leading also via their own natural contribution.
We can believe in ourselves as a nation and in this world as our appropriate challenge, finding the wisdom to create not the perfect outcomes one might want, but the inspiring outcomes that are waiting to be born from the true meeting known and unknown.
If we deny what we know to be true, we fail.
If we claim as a given that which we cannot possibly know to be true, we also fail.
Both are forms of unreality.
If we find that meeting of who we are, with all its imperfectness, and the situation as it actually is, with all its infinite challenges, we do not find a perfect world, but a real, good and viable world, a world within which we can enjoy and grow.
Our Iraq posture and Middle East deployment need not be perfect, but they must become vastly more real; otherwise we have no choice but to survive off of endless hype and spin, and this meal is unsatisfying and unconvincing to ourselves and all observers.
This can still be our century, if we can finally come to terms with being ourselves, within this century as it actually is.
So, it's not that we have no deployment in the Middle East, nor that we have no concern with having a positive influence on Iraqi internals, but that there is an optimal and viable joining of those concerns.
And we should select as our present policy an optimal and efficient pathway to that joining.
Any leaders who can help define and promote such a pathway will be cheered on by the American people, regardless of what happened before, and so it should be.
But any leaders who appear, in one way or another, to simply sidestep the issue, or worse, to undermine the sort of real debate that could allow the arising and implementing of such solutions, will inevitably be viewed as not really leading.
Not really leading, which includes leading through subterfuge, is not a crime, but it's a let-down; America wants better in terms of process and result.
A solution can lose support, not only because it is at the end non-optimal, but because it does not appear to be the transparent result of a real attempt to engage the debate, with all the inconvenience that may imply.
The solution recognized as most real will be one which is most realistic and which results from the most reality-based process, from the greatest degree of genuine inclusion of real inputs.
To get this right, start with a minimal Middle Eastern deployment which we would be doing anyway, doing naturally in any case.
Then work from there incrementally, adjusting the size, type and invasiveness of force, inside and outside Iraq, including military and other forms of intervention, seeking to find an optimal point of positive influence on Iraq internals at a reasonable cost, across all dimensions of cost.
Finally, simply identify a direct, efficient and low cost pathway from where we are today, to this outcome.
Our debate on Iraq should take all this into account, and refuse to be made overally narrow or to just accept the status quo or to descend into a sense of hopelessness and inevitability of confusion and futility.
The Congress should guarantee a high-quality debate in this sense, and the president should be expected to be able to defend his policy, whatever that turns out to be, according to such standards.
We can't guarantee that everyone will agree on a policy option, but we should make an attempt to guarantee a debate worthy of the world's leading democracy; reality-based and oriented around a simple path to a deployment-posture we actually want in some ongoing fashion, doing the good we can do, regardless of achieving every particular of endstate on the ground which may be beyond our control to determine.