Okay, this is coming in real-time from the Supreme Court of the United States so information is going to be limited initially but I wanted to post the holding of the Court as soon as it was announced. I will update and give some analysis as the opinion is released and more is learned. Heller is being announced last of the three decisions today, meaning that a senior Justice is the author of the opinion.
The Holding in District of Columbia v. Heller is affirmed by a 5-4 meaning that the 2nd Amendment DOES grant individuals the right to bear arms. This is not consistent with the Court's holding in United States v. Miller 307 U.S. 174 (1939), not what I expected and a bad decision. Opinion author is Scalia.
For those who do not know that background of this case, and because I wrote this diary as a BREAKING diary, which means that the opinion of the Court was not even issued when this diary was published, please go to Scotus Wiki which has all the detail and history of the case.
Copy of the Opinion is here. Scalia writing for the majority, joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito. Dissenting opinion authored by Stevens, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Dissenting Opinion by Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
So basically this is what happend: The syllabus is here which has three ultimate (and what appears to be somewhat limited) holdings.
- The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a
firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for
traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.
- Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited.
It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any
manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, con-
cealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment
or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of fire-
arms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those
“in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition
of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.
- The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to
self-defense) violate the Second Amendment. The District’s total ban
on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an
entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the
lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scru-
tiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this
prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense
of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional
muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the
home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible
for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and
is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument
that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbi-
trarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy
his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement.
Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment
rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and
must issue him a license to carry it in the home.
Justice Stevens authored the main dissent which is basically predicated on the premise that the 2nd Amendment does not grant individual rights, but grants collective rights for militia purposes.
The question presented by this case is not whether the
Second Amendment protects a “collective right” or an
“individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be
enforced by individuals. But a conclusion that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right does not tell us
anything about the scope of that right. . . . . . .
The Second Amendment was adopted to protect the
right of the people of each of the several States to main-
tain a well-regulated militia. It was a response to con-
cerns raised during the ratification of the Constitution
that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias
and create a national standing army posed an intolerable
threat to the sovereignty of the several States. Neither
the text of the Amendment nor the arguments advanced
by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limit-
ing any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian
uses of firearms. Specifically, there is no indication that
the Framers of the Amendment intended to enshrine the
common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution.
Justice Breyer authored the second dissent whereby he agrees with Justice Stevens first point but also states that:
The majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent
reasons. The first reason is that set forth by JUSTICE
STEVENS—namely, that the Second Amendment protects
militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. These
two interests are sometimes intertwined. To assure 18th-
century citizens that they could keep arms for militia
purposes would necessarily have allowed them to keep
arms that they could have used for self-defense as well.
But self-defense alone, detached from any militia-related
objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.
The second independent reason is that the protection
the Amendment provides is not absolute. The Amendment
permits government to regulate the interests that it
serves. Thus, irrespective of what those interests are—
whether they do or do not include an independent interest
in self-defense—the majority’s view cannot be correct
unless it can show that the District’s regulation is unrea-
sonable or inappropriate in Second Amendment terms.
This the majority cannot do.