A few years ago, Frontline aired an investigative report into the use of private contractors, including private security contractors mercenaries. link
That report was devastating in its findings, primarily that the use of private security contractors mercenaries was contributing to unrest and was taking the military away from its mission in order to protect the private security contractors mercenaries.
Crossposted from unbossed.
More recently, Frontline updated its webpage on this story to include additional information.
But [contractors] operate outside of the military command structure and have been criticized for their rough treatment of Iraqi citizens. Has their presence become a liability? And which parts of the U.S. military's mission are appropriate to oursource? Here are the views of Col. Thomas X. Hammes (Ret.) and Col. John Toolan, both of the U.S. Marines; Steven Schooner, a professor at The George Washington University Law School and an expert on government contracting; and Peter Singer, the author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry.
Democracy Now!recently aired a show that revisits the events at Nisour Square and Blackwater's role in Iraq. The transcript of that show is at that link - scroll down.
So, according to the witnesses, including this individual, the shooting of this young Iraqi medical student and his mother really began a shooting — a series of shootings in the square that would ultimately leave seventeen Iraqi civilians dead. And what he’s talking about there is that when the initial shots were fired, what happened was that this mother is sitting in the car and sees her son’s head essentially explode after being shot, and she grabs onto him. And it was an automatic car, and so what may have happened is that the car continued to sort of veer toward the Blackwater men, although aerial photos that were later obtained by the Washington Post revealed that that car hadn’t even really come anywhere close to the Blackwater operatives. That’s the allegation that the Washington Post made based on these aerial photos that they obtained.
But then, Blackwater operatives allegedly shot and fired at this woman as she was holding her son, and these cops were there, and they realized that she wasn’t getting out of the car. She was gripping her son’s body, shouting, "My son! My son! Help me!" And it became clear to the Iraqi police officers that more shots were going to come, and so they actually fled themselves, realizing that shooting was going to happen again. And so, the witnesses say that they continued shooting at this car, and it ultimately exploded, burning them inside.
More on the events at Nisour Square.
This week, GAO issued a report assessing the oversight of private security contractors mercenaries. Whether they should be used is, apparently, a question not on the table. We need them, because we do not have enough soldiers. End of story there.
Here is the issue, as GAO states it:
Both DOD and the State Department have taken steps to strengthen oversight of private security contractors (PSC) in Iraq since September 2007. However, staffing and training challenges remain for DOD. DOD has increased the number of personnel in Iraq assigned to provide oversight for DOD’s PSCs but has not developed plans or a strategy to sustain this increase.
An Army-commissioned report has specifically raised concerns about the lack of personnel available to provide sufficient contracting support to either expeditionary or peacetime missions. In the short term, DOD has increased the number of oversight personnel in Iraq by shifting existing oversight personnel from other locations into Iraq.
However, without developing and implementing a strategy for providing and sustaining an increased number of personnel dedicated to oversight of PSCs, it is not clear whether DOD can sustain this increase because of the limited number of oversight personnel in the workforce.
Moreover, while DOD has provided some training on PSCs for units deploying, the training has not been updated to reflect the changes made by DOD since September 2007 to increase oversight. As a result, military units may be unaware of their expanded oversight and investigative responsibilities.
The State Department has implemented 11 of 18 actions recommended in October 2007 by a panel tasked by the Secretary of State with reviewing that agency’s use of private security contractors in Iraq. For example, the State Department has increased the number of diplomatic security personnel stationed in Iraq to provide oversight of contractor activities and has requested and received funding to hire and train 100 additional agents to replace those who were transferred from other State Department programs in the United States to Iraq. According to State Department officials, the additional personnel will help sustain the increased number of agents in Iraq. In addition, as of June 2008, the State Department has equipped 140 of its security vehicles with video recording equipment and plans to equip an additional 93 vehicles.
The 66 page report provides details, including charts, on the process of oversight now existing in Iraq, which I will not go into here.
GAO's Conclusions
GAO sees no alternative to the use of private security contractors mercenaries, because of the shortage of military. One fundamental question that seems to be off the table here is why we have that shortage.
Given the security situation in Iraq and the shortage of available military personnel and Department of State diplomatic security personnel to provide security, private security contractors play an integral role in providing the security. The September 16, 2007, incident in Nisour Square demonstrated the importance of having in place a coordinated system of oversight and coordination over U.S. government-hired private security contractors.
Since that incident, DOD and the State Department have taken steps to increase oversight and coordination over PSCs, including establishing the Armed Contractor Oversight Division and Contractor Operations Cell systems and increasing the number of personnel devoted to PSC oversight functions in Iraq. The improvements DOD and the State Department have made may reduce the number of PSC incidents in Iraq. However, these enhancements may not eliminate incidents.
Moreover, while the increase in the number of DOD personnel devoted to PSC oversight in Iraq should improve oversight, more efforts are required to ensure that that these personnel are well-trained and qualified, and that positions are filled and sustained over time. Furthermore, unless DOD ensures that military units deploying to Iraq understand both their expanded oversight and coordination responsibilities problems in managing and overseeing PSCs may continue. By ensuring that these efforts are sustained, the U.S. government can strengthen its framework of PSC oversight and coordination in Iraq and can better prepare to respond effectively to incidents and to apply this framework to future contingency operations, should they occur, and overseas diplomatic missions in high threat areas.
Actions recommended
Given the narrow question presented, the recommendations are also limited and foreseeable.
To ensure that DOD sustains its current efforts to strengthen oversight for private security contractors in Iraq, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement a strategy to fill authorized positions for the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan and DCMA (Defense Contract Management Agency).
To ensure that units and military commanders deploying to Iraq are aware of their new oversight and coordination responsibilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the service Secretaries to update the information being provided on PSCs at unit mission-rehearsal exercises and predeployment training to include information regarding the operations of the Armed Contractor Oversight Division and the Contractor Operations Cells along with the role of military units in providing contract oversight, incident investigation, and PSC coordination procedures. Further, we recommend that DOD fully implement our 2005 recommendation by including information on PSC typical operating procedures and the military’s responsibilities to PSCs.
Stopgap measures to deal with a very bad situation, one more to credit to the "adults" who took "charge" in 2001.
The GAO report is Rebuilding Iraq: DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements GAO-08-966, July 31, 2008