(Note: I'm not much of a writer [I've only posted two diaries here before, one of which was so bad I immediately deleted it], so I'll keep this brief.)
Richard Spertzel, a microbiologist and former Deputy for Research at the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, has an op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal titled, "Bruce Ivins Wasn't the Anthrax Culprit."
Follow me over the fold for a couple of excerpts.
First, a little about Spertzel from Wikipedia.
Richard O. Spertzel is an expert in the area of biological warfare. He participated in germ warfare research at United States Army Medical Unit, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland (now known as the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases). Spertzel held several positions in the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases including Deputy for Research, Deputy Commander, and Chief of the Animal Assessment Division.
So, considering he worked there, I tend to believe Spertzel when he writes, in regards to the anthrax sent to Senators Pat Leahy and Tom Daschle, that
[t]he spores could not have been produced at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, where Ivins worked, without many other people being aware of it. Furthermore, the equipment to make such a product does not exist at the institute.
Spertzel goes on to describe some unusual features about the anthrax sent to Leahy and Daschle. For example, the spores were coated in a polyglass, which he says made them "potentially more dangerous." In 2001, the FBI described the polyglass as "product not seen previously to be used in this fashion before."
In short, the potential lethality of anthrax in this case far exceeds that of any powdered product found in the now extinct U.S. Biological Warfare Program.
So, if the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases lacked the equipment necessary to produce the anthrax, how could Ivins have produced it?
[W]e should all remember that the case needs to be firmly based on solid information that would conclusively prove that a lone scientist could make such a sophisticated product.
From what we know so far, Bruce Ivins, although potentially a brilliant scientist, was not that man. The multiple disciplines and technologies required to make the anthrax in this case do not exist at Army's Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
The media seem ready to pin this on Ivins and then forget about it. We can't let that happen. There are still way too many unanswered questions.