The immediate cause of our financial meltdown is unchecked, unbridled greed. Mainstream newspapers and the business press are doing a fairly good job of explaining how the lack of regulatory oversight led us into this nightmare.
But you have to dig down one layer to find the cause of that situation. Under cover of the ideological euphemism known as the "free market" and with enormous cash investments over the past four decades, business elites have captured the regulatory organs of powerful democratic states -- nowhere more so than the United States -- and promoted their own narrow economic agendas for short-term gain.
There's an enormous amount of discussion about that in the independent media. But to drill down a layer deeper, to the bedrock of the crisis, you have to go to some deep thinkers who don't get much play in our mainstream economic discourse.
As foreign policy analyst Mark Engler notes in his new book, How to Rule the World, declining returns on traditional investments in manufacturing and industry since the 1970s go a long way toward explaining today's highly speculative economy -- pushing capital into developing countries and into bubble after speculative bubble in search of a better profit margin.
It's important to understand what's going on at all three levels, because we may have come to a fork in the road, a point at which the decisions made now may determine the future of the global economy.
We may or may not also be on the verge of another Great Depression.
The Bush Bailout: Privatizing Gains and Socializing Risk
On Saturday, hoping to stave off that dark possibility, the Bush administration proposed an unprecedented bailout for investors, a scheme that would authorize the Treasury Department to spend as much as $700 billion in tax dollars over the next two years to buy up bad securities, with little Congressional oversight save for a semiannual report on the process.
The move came after the federal government had already sunk a total of $900 billion into America's financial institutions this year, potentially bringing the total value of the Fed's tinkering to $1.6 trillion over three years.
The White House, Congressional leaders and Treasury officials are haggling over the details. Things are moving quickly, with a mammoth intervention that was unspeakable in economic circles a month ago now looking more and more inevitable.
The structure of the proposed bailout may change during those negotiations -- Democrats in Congress are pushing to save more homeowners and tie the package to some sort of limits on CEO pay for institutions that get a lifesaver -- but the deal outlined in the brief document released on Sept. 20 epitomizes the principle of privatizing gains while socializing risk. In other words, we're splitting an oil well with the Big Boys on Wall Street: They get the oil, we get the shaft.
It is, in short, a draft of what could be one of the greatest rip-offs in history. Bush, on the way out of power, is trying to create a publicly financed honeypot for the private sector on a scale never before imagined.
Those who played fast and loose with newer, ever shakier investment instruments in order to squeeze a few more bucks out of the markets' "irrational exuberance" about the housing sector would get a payday that would save their bacon. According to the New York Times, this huge pile of taxpayers' cash may even be available to foreign investors.
Home prices would continue to tank, though, as banks shed their bad loans at discounted prices to the government. Those subsidized assets would then be liquidated -- on the cheap because they're so overvalued -- to resuscitate the financial system. Rick Sharga, a senior officer with RealtyTrac, which monitors the housing market, told Reuters, "We've seen fewer and fewer properties go through the auction process because there's either little equity in them or even negative equity. So there's no incentive for people to buy them at the auctions."
Sharga added that "bank repossessions continue to grow at a pretty rapid clip," but an analyst told me recently that he knew of banks that simply weren't taking possession of foreclosed properties because they didn't want them on their balance sheets.
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