A U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker from the 763rd Expeditionary Refueling Squadron in-refuels a U.S.Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon from Joint Base Balad, Iraq during a combat mission over Iraq on Sept. 3, 2008. |
IN THE RUSH FOR schadenfreude over the collapse of the Bush-Cheney-neocon debacle in Iraq, certain numbers of Kossacks apparently think some major victory has been achieved through the approval of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) by the Iraqi cabinet.
Which is WRONG... unless you consider at least three more years of U.S. combat operations involvement a 'victory'...
Though the specific text of the agreement has not been publicly released, its broad outline is known. And it is a blueprint for more U.S. combat operations, and tens or hundreds of more billions wasted.
Consider...
According to the current text, Article 25 of the SOFA says the United States will withdraw from Iraq no later than Dec. 31, 2011. The agreement also states that by June 30, 2009, U.S. forces will withdraw from the cities, towns and villages as soon as Iraqi forces take over security responsibility.
But here comes the tricky part.
The agreement goes on to say that the U.S. troops that withdraw by June 30, 2009, will "regroup" in installations and areas outside the cities, towns and villages. (Basically, this is a nice way of saying that U.S. forces will withdraw to military bases away from the main population centers.) However, this withdrawal will depend on how much progress has been made regarding security. Either side, according to the SOFA, is allowed to ask for an extension or reduction in the time periods specified in the agreement for the withdrawal. Before Dec. 31, 2011, the Iraqi government is permitted to ask the U.S. government to keep forces in the country for training and support of the Iraqi military. If this request is made, a new agreement will have to be negotiated, or the Iraqi government could ask for an extension to the 2011 deadline.
Essentially, there are enough carefully worded caveats in the SOFA for the United States to watch how the situation in Iraq unfolds while keeping Iran on its toes. The United States will sustain a military force in Iraq that it deems sufficient to retain a decisive role in the region and consolidate the gains it has made in stabilizing Iraq over the past two years. From Washington’s point of view, the 2011 withdrawal date is not decisive; a lot can change between now and then, and Washington will maintain some flexibility in deciding when and how it leaves..
And while troops are there, the combat operations are to continue, albeit with an Iraqi gloss:
The final draft confirms the language of the Aug. 6 draft requiring that all US military operations be subject to the approval of the Iraqi government and coordinated with Iraqi authorities through a joint US-Iraqi committee.
Until the text is released, there is no way to be absolutely sure about what provisions it contains, but so far nothing is known about...
BASES
Left: A U.S. Army soldier of 2nd Platoon, Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, waits for a predawn convoy briefing at Forward Operating Base Loyalty in Beladiyat, eastern Baghdad, on Oct. 24, 2008.
Apparently soldiers are to withdraw from Petraeus' "neighborhood" outposts to so far publicly unspecified bases 'outside' of Iraqi cities.
Does this mean back to the 'mega-bases' around Iraq or simply more Forward Operating Bases set up just outside Iraqi cities?
EMBEDS
Left: An infantryman from Houston, assigned to Company C, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad, sweeps the back of an abandoned house with his AN/PSS-12 Mine Detector, scanning for signs of munitions caches, Nov. 9, in the Risalah community of the Rashid District. The Soldiers of "Copperhead" Co. increased their work load spanning operations across two additional muhallahs in southern Baghdad as 'surge' units redeploy after completing a 15-month deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and MND-B. The Soldiers conduct daily security operations with Iraqi army and Iraqi police units in the Hayys Jihad, Furat and Risalah to provide stability for the approximately 1.6 million citizens of the Rashid District.
All Iraqi Army battalions have embedded U.S. military 'transition teams'. Currently there are between four and five thousand embeds. Will that number stay the same? Decrease? Or will the number of embeds grow as it becomes logistically more difficult (because of the shuttering of outposts) for U.S. troops to 'accompany' Iraqi battalions on their missions? (See 'Patrols' following).
PATROLS
U.S. Airmen from Detachment 3, 732nd Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron, 716th Military Police Battalion, 18th MP Brigade while on a Police Transition Team joint patrol with Iraqi police stop and update one another as they prepare to continue movement on their joint patrol in the Al-Bayaa community, of southern Baghdad, Iraq, Nov. 7, 2008. |
The national police are supposed to be the central counterinsurgency force in Iraq. But the national police has only about 42,000 men. The projected need is at least 100,000 men. The ones in place on average have less than 3 months training. Just two reasons that 'joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols' are the norm. There is no reason to expect this to change under the SOFA, which again begets the question of just how far 'outside' the cities these troops will be based.
AIR POWER
An Apache attack helicopter from the Combat Aviation Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Multi-National Division - Baghdad, flies over a suburb of Kirkuk, Iraq, during an aviation escort mission, Nov. 5, 2008. Aside from the helicopter's attack and reconnaissance capabilities, the Apache is also routinely used to provide security for other aircraft traveling throughout Iraq |
The Iraqis have no air force. This means they are dependent on the U.S. for any large scale tactical operation for air troop transport and air combat support.
And even smaller skirmishes require air power. Last month, for instance, a riot following an IED bombing in the Abu Dsheer neighborhood of Baghdad required calling in helicopters and U.S. troops to save an overwhelmed police brigade.
ARTILLERY AND TANKS
An American M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank and a crew of Soldiers in the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, and Iraqi army crewmen of a T-72 tank perform checks in preparation for a live fire demonstration on Forward Operating Base Hammer, Oct. 31, 2008. |
Iraq's security forces are woefully deficient of artillery and tanks. Only one of the Iraqi Army's divisions is a mechanized infantry unit: the 9th Mechanized Division, based at Taji near Baghdad. Their refurbished T-72 tanks were donated by former Warsaw Pact nations.
This, along with the lack of airpower, means Iraq will be totally dependent on the U.S. against military intervention by neighbors for years to come.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Just the section headings of the April, 2008 Iraq Inspector General's report is enough to paint the picture:
-- Numerical Reports of Assigned and Trained Forces Contain Limitations
-- Substantial Numbers of Assigned and Trained Personnel Are Not Present for Duty
-- Police Recruiting Exceeds Training Capacity
-- Shortage of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers Remains a Long-Term Undertaking
-- Deficiencies in Logistics and Combat Support Require Continued Coalition Assistance
-- Additional Forces Needed by 2010 for Internal Security
-- Transitioning to a Military Force for External Security Remains a Future Goal
And all of the above is the 'best case' scenario dependent on things staying relatively calm:
New U.S. intelligence report warns 'victory' not certain in Iraq
A nearly completed high-level U.S. intelligence analysis warns that unresolved ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iraq could unleash a new wave of violence, potentially reversing the major security and political gains achieved over the last year...
U.S. officials say last year's surge of 30,000 troops, all of whom have been withdrawn, was just one reason for the improvements. Other factors include the truce declared by anti-U.S. cleric Muqtada al Sadr, the leader of an Iran-backed Shiite Muslim militia; and the enlistment of former Sunni insurgents in Awakening groups created by the U.S. military to fight al Qaida in Iraq and other extremists.
The draft NIE, however, warns that the improvements in security and political progress, like the recent passage of a provincial election law, are threatened by lingering disputes between the majority Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, Kurds and other minorities, the U.S. officials said.
Sources of tension identified by the NIE, they said, include a struggle between Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen for control of the oil-rich northern city of Kirkuk; and the Shiite-led central government's unfulfilled vows to hire former Sunni insurgents who joined Awakening groups...
The NIE findings parallel a Defense Department assessment last month that warned that despite "promising developments, security gains in Iraq remain fragile. A number of issues have the potential to upset progress."
If any of the just-under-the-surface tensions explodes again, then all bets are off. And the fate of Kirkuk in particular is a pressure cooker of roiling sectarian interests, ready to blow at any time.
CONCLUSION
So far, the media have presented the SOFA as strictly a withdrawal document, and sadly many here seem to have bought into that nonsense.
And sad to say, it just ain't so.
The current celebratory tone about the SOFA here is unwarranted. The devil is in the details, and those haven't been released yet.
The struggle to exit Iraq remains a struggle.
All pictures in the public domain.