One of the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent (but unrelated) anthrax attacks was a rapid increase in the number of high-containment biosafety/biodefense laboratories in the US. In October 2007, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing entitled "Germs, Viruses, and Secrets: The Silent Proliferation of Bio-Laboratories in the United States".
The Center For Disease Research And Policy at the University of Minnesota (CIDRAP) summarized the hearing:
A US House of Representatives committee today explored problems at the nation's biodefense labs, including a lack of coordinated federal oversight and even a lack of knowledge of how many high-containment labs exist.
These concerns have been highlighted recently by aggressive efforts from the Sunshine Project, a watchdog group that monitors biodefense research safety, and by other media reports.
[snip]
Testifying on behalf of the GAO, Keith Rhodes, PhD, chief technologist for the [Government Accountability Office's] Center for Technology and Engineering, said because a baseline of human error will always be present in laboratory settings, the level of safety risks will rise as the number of labs increases. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the number of BSL 4 labs has risen from 5 to 15, he said. The GAO estimated in its report that there are nearly 1,400 BSL 3 labs in the United States.
Of 12 [government] agencies the GAO surveyed, none is responsible for tracking the number of BSL 3 and BSL 4 [Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4] labs in the United States. "Consequently, no agency is responsible for determining the risks associated with the proliferation of these labs," the GAO report states.
To emphasize the importance of that last paragraph, I'm including a table from Rhodes' report (pdf) for the GAO (click to enlarge):
Federal Agencies’ Mission to Track and Know the Number of All BSL-3 and BSL-4 Labs within the US
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The report stresses that biodefense research is indeed important; however:
... unwarranted expansion without adequate oversight is proliferation, not expansion. Since the full extent of the expansion is not known, it is unclear how the federal government can ensure that sufficient but not superfluous capacity—that brings with it additional, unnecessary risk—is being created.
In other words, the rapid increase in the number of labs can lead to self-policing (and failure to report risks and accidents). Regarding accidents, here's a sobering example:
Three University of Texas facilities have recently had laboratory accidents with dangerous pathogens, including the agents of anthrax, tularemia, and shigellosis, according to a statement yesterday from the Sunshine Project, a nonprofit group that monitors biodefense research safety.
Two of the locations—University of Texas (UT) Health Science Center at Houston and UT at San Antonio—perform "select agent" work in biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) labs.
[snip]
The incidents were revealed as a result of Texas freedom-of-information requests made by the Austin-based Sunshine Project. The lab accidents involved:
- Aerosolized Bacillus anthracis, a category A bioterrorism agent, at UT Health Science Center in Houston
- Francisella tularensis, another category A bioterrorism agent, at UT at San Antonio
- Shigella, a food- or waterborne category B agent, which the Sunshine Project says may have been genetically engineered, at UT at Austin
Dr. Alan Pearson of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation also testified (pdf). His statement is very detailed, and is recommended reading; since he is an expert in biological weapons, as well as biodefense, he emphasizes the national security risk, hinted at here:
Our current biosafety and biosecurity system is plagued by significant and systemic weaknesses, inadequate oversight and transparency, and a lack of rigorous interagency needs assessment and strategic planning. Unless corrective action is taken, the risks to our nation and its people from accidental or deliberate disease outbreaks arising from our own activities and institutions will continue to rise. The US biosafety and biosecurity system needs to be made more coherent, more comprehensive, more effective, and more transparent...
Put that together with the revelation that the 2001 anthrax attacks were most likely perpetrated by a "rogue" government scientist, Pearson's testimony cannot be emphasized enough. Again, please read it (much shorter version here, pdf).
If you still aren't convinced that there's a huge problem, a recent article in the Hartford Courant revealed that the number of laboratories individuals in the US performing bioterrorism research has increased to 15,000. Not only that, but:
Among the concerns is that background checks conducted by the federal government before lab workers are allowed to work with substances such as anthrax aren't thorough enough, said Gigi Kwik Gronvall, a senior associate at the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
[snip]
Gronvall said there are other concerns in addition to inadequate background checks.
"Nobody is checking to see if people being approved to work with anthrax or other biological agents actually have the scientific skills to work with it," Gronvall said.
"Problem" is an understatement.
The legacy of the 2001 anthrax attacks is complex. We got a swift kick in the ass regarding emergency preparedness for bioweapons attacks, as well rapid detection of disease agents. Increased laboratory dedication to related research is critical.
But it's gotten out of hand. We have increased our risk for accidents and criminal activity involving potentially lethal disease organisms.
In essence, the line between defense and weapons research (intentional or unintentional) is becoming more and more blurred.
You'd think we would have learned that by now.