Brian Lehrer of WNYC recently conducted a interview with retired Air Force Colonel and War College lecturer Sam Gardiner, and Seymour Hersh, author of the
provocative New Yorker article concerning the Bush administration's planning for military strikes against Iran. It was sobering and informed conversation among individuals with complimentary expertise and broad historical perspectives, making the central point that, not only is the Bush administration capable of pursuing the insane policy of military intervention in an effort to force disarmament and regime change, but that operational planning in support of this policy is already well-advanced.
(Cross-posted at MyLeftWind.com and hairytruth.blogspot.com)
The administration's response to Hersh's article was swift, including
Bush's widely publicized comment that talk of attacks on Iran were "wild speculation, by the way". Hersh pointed out in his interview his belief in the importance of listening closely to the president's statements, and although that requires intestinal fortitude an increasing majority lack, it is good advice. In this particular case, it is noteworthy that Bush's comments never questioned the accuracy of Hersh's reporting. In fact, according a 2001 study by a group that included several individuals Bush would later appoint to key administration positions, it turns out that the wildest of the wild speculations in the New Yorker article - the potential for the US to use preemptive tactical nuclear strikes against enemy targets - are, and should be, a central element of our military defense posture.
Most people (outside of the White House) would probably agree that the term "speculation" refers to something like conjecture. Maybe opinion. Rumor, gossip, assumption, guesswork, supposition, or hearsay could also substitute. But whatever your preferred synonym, "wild speculation" probably wouldn't be the way most folks would describe a policy position that was published over five years ago by some of the very people who are now in a position to determine whether first-strike nuclear force is in the nation's best interest.
Founded in 1981, and funded in part by a collection of hard right advocacy organizations, including the Carthage, Scaife and Olin Foundations (not to mention the US Government), the National Institute for Public Policy has long emphasized that emerging and unpredictable threats in a hostile post cold war era call for a muscular defense posture, unconstrained by the sorts of "legalistic" treaties, pacts and agreements that significantly advanced disarmament efforts after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Billing itself as a "non-profit education organization", the US's unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, early in Bush's first term, is a more accurate reflection of the Institute's intended influence on public policy.
No doubt the publication date is nothing more than coincidence, but in January, 2001, as Team Bush assumed the reigns of power, the National Institute for Public Policy issued a consensus executive report entitled, "Rationale and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control". Clearly not headline grabbing dirt, this dry treatise drew little attention outside the wonkiest of circles. And that's unfortunate because, as Hersh's recent New Yorker report briefly notes, it provides critical context for evaluating the administration's strategic perspective on emerging threats like Iran. Candid in its assessment, the reports asserts a variety of reasons for the necessity of robust nuclear arms capability, including more than a few that should be eerily familiar:
U.S. nuclear weapons may be necessary to:
Deter escalation by regional powers to the use of WMD, while the United States is defeating those powers in the conduct of a conventional war in defense of U.S. allies and security partners.
Deter regional powers or an emerging global power from WMD or massive conventional aggression against the United States or its allies.
Translated into Bushian vernacular, the idea here is that nuclear force may be necessary and justified in order to keep the "evildoers" from doing evil. And the way to do that would be to visit some serious evil on their butts.
The devil's in the details, of course, and a priori, its not always easy to decide when you need to bring out the really big guns. Fortunately, the National Institute report provides some guidance there as well:
Some hardened targets can be attacked without resort to nuclear weapons, as was demonstrated in Desert Storm... Conventional weapons, however, might not be as effective or efficient in neutralizing hardened targets. For example, although conventional weapons could be used to attack the entrances, exits, or "umbilicals"--electrical power, air supply, and communications links--of a deeply buried facility, one or more nuclear weapons might be required to destroy the facility itself.
Hmmm. According to Hersh's report, some of the prime targets in any strike against Iran would include hardened, buried nuclear facilities like the ones we know from IAEA inspections exist in Natanz. Suddenly that "wild speculation" sounds a little less wild.
But even those on the lunatic fringe appreciate that the decision to use nuclear force goes well beyond strategic, military issues, involving a complex constellation of humanitarian, ethical and political considerations, right?
... today's nonnuclear bombs and missiles may substitute for nuclear weapons in many tactical, operational, and even strategic roles. ... Conventional weapons, however, cannot entirely replace nuclear arms. Current nonnuclear strike capabilities have a number of limitations ... In some cases, conventional weapons are less effective or ineffective in comparison with the destructive power of nuclear weapons. ... To ensure that enemy facilities or forces are knocked out and cannot be reconstituted, attacks with nuclear weapons may be necessary. ... the United States may need to field simple, low-yield, precision-guided nuclear weapons for possible use against select hardened targets such as underground biological weapons facilities.
Okay, okay - so these folks believe in an unbelievably strong defense posture. But at least they're rational and disinclined to base strategic decisions on anything less than hard-core, empirically derived, known facts, rather than subjective perceptions and intuition, right?
RIGHT? Well, maybe. The following, from a section of the report entitled, "The Political-Psychological Importance of Nuclear Numbers":
Maintaining a numerical edge may usefully signal a U.S. readiness to compete with aggressive rivals, raise an entry barrier to states aiming to become major nuclear powers, and thus possibly prevent such challenges in the first instance. The latter point is important, because potential opponents may prefer to compete with the United States in nuclear arms, where the technologies are a half-century old, rather than in the nonnuclear strike systems of the "revolution in military affairs," where advantage depends on exploiting ongoing advances in information technologies. The United States is likely to desire the capability to deter authoritarian adversaries who are impressed by an opposing nuclear force with greater, rather than fewer weapons. As a study of the effects of perceptions on the behavior of political and military leaders concluded, "Authoritarian states and leaders seem to place special emphasis on large numbers, perhaps because ... dictators find in large numbers a promise or manifestation of the unlimited force they want to exercise.
Okay, you say, but still, this reflects a general neoconservative policy position published years ago, one that has nothing to do with current circumstances, and certainly no specific implications for how the administration might confront Iran in the near term. Sorry, but from a section title, "Potential Adversaries...":
Regional states of concern such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq have smaller militaries and economies, but as a result of proliferation, still may present considerable threats. Under certain circumstances, very severe nuclear threats may be needed to deter any of these potential adversaries--if they are highly motivated to challenge the United States and willing to accept high risk and costs in doing so.
Well, at least folks at the National Institute for Public Policy aren't in a position to push any nuclear buttons - at least there's that. But wait - members and signatories of the 2001 report:
Stephen Cambone, who previously served as Director of Strategic Defense Policy, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and who is currently the Under-Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in the Bush administration.
Stephen Hadley, who was personal diplomatic representative under then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, and national security advisor in the current administration.
Robert Joseph, previously the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is the current Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
"Wild speculation" my hairy ass.