Published in print today in the New York Times Magazine, Roger Cohen provides a look into the formulation of the Obama Administration's Iran policy: the various players, and the challenges going forward in the almost certain to be difficult months ahead. His description runs long, but the comprehensive nature of it makes it well worthwhile. It certainly goes beyond the more typical one page op-ed.
Here's the link:Roger Cohen's The Making of Iran Policy
For starter's lets briefly review the Iran policy prior to Obama. When George Bush took office the Reform President of Iran, Khatami, was nearing the end of his first term. He won re-election by a landslide later in 2001, despite the fact that much of the zeal surrounding his first win in 1997 failed to translate into much reform. The conservative Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and his allies still controlled most of the power and they blocked most of what Khatami tried to do. Then 9/11 happened. In the aftermath of the attack and in the run-up to the invasion of Afghanistan, Iran actually supplied the US with intelligence and support against their mutual enemy, the Taliban. What did George Bush do in return? Well, we all remember the famous "Axis-of-Evil" speech in January of 2002. Anyone in Iran who had doubts about US intentions toward Iran certainly no longer had them. Bush dialed up the rhetoric (Loads of "Crusade" type references) and Khatami's reform movement became a permanent lame duck until the 2005 election ended the charade of reform.
In the campaign, Obama signaled the intention to pursue a very different Iran policy. He caught a great deal of flack for it, but if Roger Cohen is correct, he has not abandoned it at all despite recent events in Iran, and despite much pressure to take a stronger line in the crisis (the position of both Biden and Clinton), Obama resisted up to this point:
When I returned from Iran, I went to see one of these senior officials to ask what it had been like making that call. Painful, was his response. Every day, in the election's aftermath, the team met and conference-called. "It is difficult to weigh all the different considerations," this official told me. "But given the profoundly serious consequences of an Iranian regime that acquires a nuclear-weapons capability, the judgment in the end was that it was important to follow through on the offer of direct engagement." He noted that this offer had been "signaled clearly in the course of the campaign" by Obama, and developed since. In other words, this goes deep with the president. He's driving Iran policy. The Iran gambit lies close to the core of his refashioned global strategy, America's "new era of engagement."
NYT Magazine, Roger Cohen--The Making of Iran Policy
(emphasis added)
Furthermore, Cohen puts forth the argument, that Obama's shift in policy created much more tension in conservative Iranian ranks than any of the clearly bellicose and aggressive policies of Bush. This thesis implies that the hard-liners in Iran find much more comfort in conflict than diplomacy and rapprochement:
By contrast, a black American president of partly Muslim descent reaching out to the Islamic world--and demonstrating, by his very election, the possibility of change--had placed the Iranian regime on the defensive. One conservative Iranian official put it this way to Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "If Iran can't make nice with a U.S. president named Barack Hussein Obama who's preaching mutual respect and sending us greetings, it's pretty clear the problem lies in Tehran, not Washington.
The immediate problem going forward remains the current lack of stability in Iran, and waiting to see the position adopted by the new government when it finally forms. What signals will emerge out of Tehran in August when Ahmadinejad's new term begins? From here, Cohen pivots into an extensive exploration of Obama's policy team.
Central to Obama's team on Iran is Dennis Ross. While Cohen does a great deal to describe the merits of Ross: 1) He has survived the political changes for decades, 2) His recent move from State to NSC (after Hillary appeared to reject him as a plant on her turf, 3) His serious realpolitik credentials. I am not so sure or confident about Ross. To his credit, Cohen addresses the most significant liability for Ross related to Iran policy, "When I was in Iran in February, a conservative newspaper editor, Hossein Shariatmadari, told me, 'If you want to signal a hard line and no change toward Iran, nobody does that better for you than Ross.'" Indeed, Ross' Israeli Lobby connections border on requiring him to be registered as a foreign agent under the 1938 Foreign Agents Registration Act. Maybe Ross will be successful, I certainly hope that Obama's policy works, but if negotiations would go better if Ross stays in the US--so be it.
In the last few pages, Cohen outlines some of the larger geopolitical issues that will confront Obama's efforts to pursue a new course with Iran. Needless to say, the road ahead is complicated, risky and difficult. Even if Obama is able to move in the direction he appears to have chosen, the input and interaction from Israel, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states along with Europe, Russia and China throw a whole host of perspectives and prerogatives into the mix. These considerations remain as important as any possible bi-lateral negotiations between Iran and the US. For decades since the Iranian Revolution a "system" of relations has evolved and whether it works well or not, it is a system. Changing patterns of relations carries with it ramifications that ripple across all interested parties--changes to any system invariably upset existing balances. However, this diplomatic minefield exists for Iran as well, and if any government emerging over there chooses moderation over isolation, Obama has little choice than to pursue that opportunity.
Please take the time to read Cohen's piece. A great deal may be happening this month, and he supplies some important information and insights. I also feel compelled to write a bit on why I consider this issue so important. The election in Iran has been on my radar since January of this year, and initially I hoped for anyone but Ahmadinejad because I knew that Obama needs a diplomatic breakthrough with Iran in order to get a more stable Middle East. Our exit from Iraq will go much more smoothly, and any possible solution in Afghanistan requires Iranian participation. These are facts that we had better recognize, because otherwise we are in for a long, draining and pointless struggle. When Mousavi emerged as the most likely to possibly defeat Ahmadinejad, I read up on him and wrote about him. As time went on, I grew to sincerely like him. He's a thoughtful and calm man. If he is still hanging on, then something may be salvaged out of that situation yet. Keep in mind, though, that what emerges will be an Iranian solution and it will no doubt fail to conform to many expectations outside of Iran. It should stand. However painful it may be, Iran needs to chart their course without foreign intervention.
On the night of June 12th, I was very depressed, because the worst possible result was coming out--not only had Mousavi lost, the sanctity of the election was seriously in doubt, and that meant that in order to stay the government would have to turn to repression, and that would make Obama's job much more difficult. I am very much considering domestic US politics in this assessment as well. The Right is out there and just waiting for the opportunity to make the "We make you safer" argument. Diplomacy is hard work, and results are often uneven and take time to reveal themselves. War and agression carry the illusion of "Strength" because they seem like "action" instead of words. Here's the other item I know for certain, bombing Iran would be a disaster. If the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei axis is still there, and Israel or the US bombs, whatever popularity they lack will be instantly restored. Iranians of all political stripes are fierce nationalists--perhaps the most nationalistic of the entire ME. Yes, I do understand Israel's nervousness, but bombing will have the opposite of the desired effect--another way must be found.
Additional Reading:
An article from early last week from The Nation: Iran's Next Supreme Leader
Bani Sadr, First President of the Islamic Republic's piece in Huffington Post: Iran at the Crossroads... I'm not sure how much credibility he has in Iran, or what his impact may be, but the philosophical discussions over the legitimacy of the Islamic Regime certainly make for interesting reading.