DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
All previous entries in this series can be found in this mothership.
Cross-posted at LiveJournal.
No. 17 below the fold.
Constitution Wednesday is back!!!!!!!! Well, this one might be a little different than the previous ones. This was one hard for me, so I'm going to post some parts with some ideas, but would like opinions as well, because parts of this one were just difficult.
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal.
Hamilton starts off:
AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise urged against the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America.
The phrase "the principle of legislation for the individual citizens of America" throws me. I have no idea what that means. Is he saying that the individual citizens should have the power of legislation and if so, I assume this is through election to the Congress. Help anyone?
The next passages address what I think is the temptation of the strong federal government to take power from the individual states:
Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require, I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons intrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition. Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected;
This seems to be an argument for the separation of powers between federal and local governments and Hamilton seems to be making the point that the powers naturally under the jurisdiction of local control, agriculture, local jurisprudence, etc. would not be of interest to the federal government. In essence, he says these kinds of issues are beneath the dignity of the federal government.
Next, he goes on to assume the opposite of his position and the federal authorities would want to usurp those powers. Hamilton argues that representatives of several states would be able to stop such encroachment since they have the voices of the people who would be most effected. He then makes the argument that it will always be easier for the states to encroach the powers of the federal government than vice versa since if state governments are in touch with their people, they will have the power of the people for them and can use this against the federal government.
The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
Hamilton says this necessitates the constitution to provide for protections against such encroachments by the state.
The argument then essentially boils down to which government is most efficient and prone to be an object of loyalty from the people. One argument is that of proximity. Citizens are more likely to be loyal to the local government since they are closer to it. This argument falls apart, Hamilton says, if the federal government is much better administered than the local government.
Hamilton then says the most powerful influence over citizens is the administration of justice both civil and criminal. This power of the local governments is most likely to tangibly affect the people and therefore it is perceived to be a strong force in determining how one reacts to the government.
There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes, more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government. This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
Likewise, the powers of the federal government having less direct impact on the citizenry will be somewhat inconsequential to the average person and create less of a sense of attachment to the federal government.
Hamilton then uses examples from the ancient feudal systems to illustrate the likelihood of loyalty to the local authority and the terrible outcomes if there is a conflict between a federal tyrant and local baron. He then uses the specific example of Scotland to illustrate his point:
Among other illustrations of its truth which might be cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom, uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic system of civil polity had previously established in the latter kingdom.
Braveheart, anyone?
He then argues that confederacies are like the feudal baronies which is good in that they will have the good will of the people and be able to repel encroachment by the federal government. However, this becomes problematic if there is no means for the federal government to exercise its legitimate authority.
Upcoming papers will give more examples of events that have impacted confederate governments and whose ignorance has resulted in serious political mistakes.
As I read the paper, parts of it resonated with me with regards to federal power and the current health care debate. Opponents talk about the encroachment of the government into the personal lives of citizens - "death squads" - as they distrust the distant government from doing what's best for them in the matters of health care. Supporters of a robust public option would be characterized by Hamilton as having more "affection" for the federal government and thus not feel threatened by the idea of universal coverage with a public option. In fact, many of those folks would also probably be comfortable enough with the power of the federal government to want a single payer health care system.
OK, made it through that one. Your input is greatly appreciated!!!
Next week - Federalist No. 18 The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union