DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
All previous entries in this series can be found in this mothership.
Cross-posted at LiveJournal.
No. 18 below the fold.
The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (continued)
New York Packet
After a long stretch of papers by Hamilton, Madison picks up the mantle in No. 18 (with a little help from Hamilton). This paper consists of historical examples of the insufficiency confederacies. As Madison was an excellent student of government structures throughout time, he was the obvious choice to illustrate these two examples.
Madison starts with the example of the Greek republic under the Amphictyonic council. Madison states that this is a reasonable comparison to the current Confederation of American States. This council was characterized as:
The members retained the character of independent and sovereign states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members. The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath, and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
That all sounds reasonable, no? The powers of this council were greater than granted the powers given in the Articles of Confederation. And Madison admits that it all sounded good in theory. Typically when the phrase "in theory" is used, it is usually followed by "BUT in practice..." and that is again the case here. As good as it all sounded, this council fell victim to a force outlined in several previous Federalist Papers (Federalist No. 9 and Federalist No. 10) - factions. Madison notes:
The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest. Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.
Madison then details further consequences of these wars and the internal power struggles that eventually led to the fall of Greece as a power and concludes:
Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.
Madison then goes on to describe another example from Ancient Greece, the Achaean League. He characterizes this union as more intimate and better organized, but still subject to the same dissension that brought down the Amphictyons. Madison describes the organization of power thus:
The cities composing this league retained their municipal jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single one was preferred.
It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs, the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
Apparently there is not much more detail than above to describe the construction of that particular confederation and Madison laments that such insight would prove valuable to those studying the science of government.
After the fall of the Amphictyonic confederacy, the Achaeans were spared, but soon fell into discord:
The arts of division were practiced among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest; the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their tyrants.
What followed was a series of changing loyalties to whatever regional power was most influential at the time. Eventually, Rome encouraged and promoted internal discord amongst the Greek cities which led to the downfall of Greece and the rise of Rome as the central power.
Madison concludes by stating that these two examples give multiple lessons relative to the proposed Constitutional debate at hand and also illustrate that weak confederations are more susceptible to anarchy amongst themselves instead of tyranny from the head.
Next week, Federalist No. 19 - The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union