I realize this is the weekend and not Wednesday, but life gets in the way of blogging sometimes. ;o)
DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
All previous entries in this series can be found in this mothership.
Cross posted at LiveJournal.
No. 19 below the fold
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
For the Independent Journal.
In the previous paper, Hamilton and Madison used examples from antiquity to illustrate the downfall of confederate governments. This paper is a continuation of that theme using more contemporary examples to reinforce their views that a strong federal government was preferable for the longevity of the nation.
The German empire is used as the first example and they give a summary background of the beginning of the German nation through the rise and fall of Charlemagne. This example is no different than the numerous others that have been mentioned in previous papers in the series - a group of weak states are conquered by a strong military power. But small, local lords maintained loyalty of people in their area and this ultimately led to an increase in the influence of the small fiefs at the expense of the distant ruling power. The then present day German government evolved from that system and is described thus:
Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its members.
Hamilton and Madison then go on to describe in detail the division of authority within that German system. In fact, it sounds like a reasonable form of government, not unlike the one proposed in the United States Constitution. It turns out nothing could be further from the truth.
In reality:
The fundamental principle on which it rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
They then go on to describe the history of Germany as one of many internal wars and conflicts with foreign powers.
Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic constitution.
They state that even a unity driven by the greater self-defense is still deplorable under these circumstances - defense requires negotiations amongst the suspicious member states, the army is almost always inadequate and influenced by individual local prejudices. One solution was to divide the empire into 9 or 10 districts with some military organization. However, enforcing order between these districts by other districts confounds the internal hostility resulting in serious civil conflicts, even war.
So, why did this government survive?
The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe; --these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on a proper consolidation.
Another brief example is given of Poland. It was again a confederation of weak factions incapable of self-defense or self-government. They were at the mercy of their more powerful neighbors who had taken at the time one-third of their lands and people.
The paper closes with the example of the Swiss cantons - which they state could barely be considered a confederacy, but it was a common perception, so it is given an example here.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons.
The method for "resolving" disputes is described and then an example of the failure of this method is illustrated using the religious dispute between the Protestants and Catholics. In fact, this solution created a more undesirable outcome - different alliances with foreign powers - Protestants allied with United Provinces and the Catholics with France.
This concludes Federalist No. 19.