If you're in favor of escalating the US military presence in Afghanistan, here's what you're signing on for - an open-ended and probably decades-long commitment to "armed social work":
The real decision America must face in regard to Afghanistan is not the precise number of troops that should be sent but rather the mission they are given to perform.
Last January, when Obama took office, there was a broad national consensus on this subject. On the one hand, there was universal agreement that US forces should prevent Al Qaeda from ever again using Afghanistan as a base for training camps or other terrorist facilities. Quite the contrary, there was wide approval of the goal of completely dismantling and destroying Al Qaeda as an organization.
Although it was not always explicitly stated, it was quite obvious that this would require preventing the Taliban from taking control of (1) the capital city of Kabul and several other major urban areas and (2) a number of key infrastructure installations like major airports, electric power stations and national highways. The commitment to destroy Al Qaeda also clearly implied the need to establish and maintain a certain number of observation posts, forward operating bases and other "in country" forces adequate to provide intelligence about terrorist activity in various regions of the country. Most Americans were entirely in agreement with this approach.
On the other hand, there was absolutely no support for the ambitious "nation building" and cultural reprogramming of the kind the Bush-Cheney administration tried in Iraq –- a vast investment of soldiers, funds and resources aimed at transforming Iraq into a pro-American, free market utopia....
the issue has become additionally and deeply confused in recent weeks because the influential military doctrine called "counterinsurgency" suggests a fundamentally different mission and strategy from the one described above. The current version of this doctrine is embodied in FM-3-24 – the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
Counterinsurgency sounds like a strategy for rooting out small terroristic groups that are trying to infiltrate and overthrow a friendly government. To the average person it sounds reasonable and prudent as an approach to dealing with dangerous terrorists. In fact, however, it means something much different and very specific to those in the know.
FM - 3-24 defines counterinsurgency operations as nothing less than "armed social work" and bluntly asserts that such campaigns cannot win unless they succeed in protecting the civilian population and rebuilding the economy. The manual specifically lists four major objectives (1) Security from intimidation, coercion, violence and crime; (2) Provision of basic economic needs, (3) Provision of essential services such as water, electricity, sanitation and medical care; (4) Sustainment of key social and cultural institutions
Just within the category of "essential services", the detailed list of the objectives needed for success is startling –
• criminals detained
• timely response to property fires
• water treatments plants functioning
• electrical plants open
• power lines intact
• all schools open, staffed, supplied
• roadways and bridges open
• hospitals and clinics open and staffed
• trash collected regularly
• sewage system operating
There are similarly detailed lists for security, governance and economic development. The manual energetically argues that nothing less than extensive "armed social work" of this kind can defeat an insurgency. As it dramatically states: "The decisive battle is for the people’s minds...lasting victory comes from a vibrant economy, political participation and restored hope"
As Vega points out at The Democratic Strategist, this is basically the role the British military took on in India and other British colonies in the 19th-20th centuries.
As John Nagl (one of the authors of the FM-3-24, the Counterinsurgency Field Manual) acknowledges, the counterinsurgency strategy calls for at least a 1-to-50 ratio of security forces to civilians in the area of conflict. For Afghanistan, that means an eventual commitment of 600,000 troops to successfully implement the strategy. Nagl thinks that this will require reinstating the draft and raising taxes, but that these are sacrifices Americans will be willing to make.
So the military strategists are fully aware that that's the kind of commitment that will be needed to "win" in Afghanistan. Are most Americans aware that that's what they'll be signing on for if they support escalating the war according to General McChrystal’s plan?
As Vega notes, there are good alternatives to this plan:
Counterinsurgency is so widely discussed these days that it often seems as though there are no alternative military doctrines and strategies to consider. But in fact alternatives do exist. During the 1990s the US had substantial experience with various kinds of "peacekeeping" operations – military actions that used limited numbers of troops to achieve limited aims. In the case of the Balkans, for example, peacekeeping operations were employed to prevent the military takeover of key cities, to separate combatants, and to carry out certain humanitarian interventions.
Peacekeeping operations have their own extensive literature of military doctrine and strategy. One basic source is the manual "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations – Principles and Guidelines." General Wesley Clark’s books Waging Modern War and Winning Modern Wars also provide further information.
I've only quoted a small part of James Vega's excellent analysis of this and the other major problems with the counterinsurgency strategy being proposed for dealing with Afghanistan. I hope you'll go and read the whole thing: Part 1 and Part 2.
UPDATE: As reader mll points out in comments, the draft Vega says Nagl refers to may not be for Americans but for Afghans.