Using a blend of anonymous and on-the-record sources, reporter Peter Baker reconstructs "How Obama Came to Plan for ‘Surge’ in Afghanistan" for the New York Times. Baker traces how the president came to make his decision from a visit to Walter Reed this summer through fall and ultimately deciding what he believes to be the best the course of action during the Thanksgiving weekend.
Baker's piece is fascinating and well written. His account "is based on dozens of interviews with participants as well as a review of notes some of them took during Mr. Obama’s 10 meetings with his national security team." Most people Baker and the other NY Times reporters interviewed agreed to do so on the condition of anonymity.
I recommend you reading the article in its entirety, but for the sake of discussion, what follows below are seven points from the article I found of particular interest.
First, President Obama was particularly frustrated by two aspects of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan: the cost of lives and the cost of treasure.
His advisers say he was haunted by the human toll as he wrestled with what to do about the eight-year-old war. Just a month earlier, he had mentioned to them his visits to wounded soldiers at the Army hospital in Washington. “I don’t want to be going to Walter Reed for another eight years,” he said then..
The cost of endless war seemed to surprise the president.
had received a memo the day before from the Office of Management and Budget projecting that General McChrystal’s full 40,000-troop request on top of the existing deployment and reconstruction efforts would cost $1 trillion from 2010 to 2020, an adviser said. The president seemed in sticker shock, watching his domestic agenda vanishing in front of him. “This is a 10-year, trillion-dollar effort and does not match up with our interests,” he said.
Second, during the review process the president kept his thoughts to himself and did not make his final decision known until "just before Thanksgiving" according to David Axelrod. One participant in the review meetings described the president as someone "between a college professor and a gentle cross-examiner."
Third, at the end of September the president dismissed any talk of withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Obama also firmly closed the door on any withdrawal. “I just want to say right now, I want to take off the table that we’re leaving Afghanistan,” he told his advisers.
Fourth, "the president erupted at the leaks with an anger advisers had rarely seen". Obama was "livid that details of the discussions were leaking out" during the review process. Some in the White House felt the leak of Gen. Stanley McChrystal report was an attempt by the military to "box in" the president.
“What I’m not going to tolerate is you talking to the press outside of this room,” he scolded his advisers. “It’s a disservice to the process, to the country and to the men and women of the military.”
But the next day, someone leaked Ambassador Karl Eikenberry's cable relaying his concern about a large troop escalation in Afghanistan. "The cable stunned some in the military. The reaction at the Pentagon, said one official, was 'Whiskey Tango Foxtrot' — military slang for an expression of shock." Such a polite way to put it.
Fifth, Obama seemed to have been ultimately swayed to escalate by Defense War Sec. Robert Gates. Obama was initially skeptical of McChrystal's request for more troops, "but the more he learned about the consequences of failure, and the more he narrowed the mission, the more he gravitated toward a robust if temporary buildup". The president was "guided in particular" by Gates.
Gates was a seasoned hand at such reviews, having served eight presidents and cycled in and out of the Situation Room since the days when it was served by a battery of fax machines. Like Mrs. Clinton, he was sympathetic to General McChrystal’s request...
Gates’s low-wattage exterior masks a wily inside player, and he knew enough to keep his counsel early in the process to let it play out more first. “When to speak is important to him; when to signal is important to him,” said a senior Defense Department official.
I think Gate's public scolding of McChrystal may have been done in part to win over the president's heart and mind. This is what happens, I think, when Democratic presidents leave Republicans in place to guide the nation's military direction. Ultimately it was Gates who came up with the 30,000 troop number.
Mr. Gates began shaping a plan that would bridge the differences. He developed a 30,000-troop option that would give General McChrystal the bulk of his request, reasoning that NATO could make up most of the difference.
Sixth, Speaker Nancy Pelosi remains unconvinced. After Obama met with Pelosi, she "was unenthusiastic and pointedly told the president that he could not rely on Democrats alone d to pass financing for the war." So to fund the escalation, Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel is working with the Republicans.
But there was back-channel contact. Mr. Emanuel was talking with Senator Lindsey Graham, Republican of South Carolina, who urged him to settle on a troop number “that began with 3” to win Republican support. “I said as long as the generals are O.K. and there is a meaningful number, you will be O.K.,” Mr. Graham recalled.
Seventh, Vice President Biden succeeded in persuading the president in narrowing the scope of America's goals in Afghanistan and to focus, in part, on Pakistan. The vice president "succeeded in narrowing the scope of the mission to protect and keep population centers and setting the date to begin withdrawal." Before each meeting on Afghanistan, the vice president would write a "separate private memo" for Obama "outlining his thoughts".
Biden quickly became the most outspoken critic of the expected McChrystal troop request, arguing that Pakistan was the bigger priority since that is where Al Qaeda is mainly located. “He was the bull in the china shop,” said one admiring administration official...
Biden asked tough questions about whether there was any intelligence showing that the Taliban posed a threat to American territory.
Biden wrote a memo arguing that two years should be enough of a "proof of concept" to know if additional troops in Afghanistan would work. As late as the Monday before Thanksgiving, Biden remained skeptical that an escalation was the correct course of action. And when the president announced his decision last weekend:
“I’m not asking you to change what you believe,” the president told his advisers. “But if you do not agree with me, say so now.” There was a pause and no one said anything.
“Tell me now,” he repeated.
Mr. Biden asked only if this constituted a presidential order.
Lastly, according to one adviser, Obama seems "totally at peace" with his decision. Again, I will encourage you to read the entire article.