Is the Republic going to splinter? Are the clerics going down? I doubt these things.
But some kind of sacrificial lamb looks increasingly likely. And who would this lamb be? You guessed it--the goose!
Let me briefly break down some more divisions of Iran, as I have in the past.
There are three generations of Republican Iran. 1) The clerics and revolutionaries of the 70s we recognize. 2) Of course, the young adults of today, who are the largest generation in Iran. I understate: imagine that under-30 comprised a large majority of the US public in 2005, cause it did in Iran. And Ahmadinejad alienated them bitterly.
- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself rose from a middle generation: those who fought in Iran-Iraq for a decade. The young adults during the tumultuous, dangerous 1980s. Iran was very frightened, very bloody. Now middle-aged, they were slightly too young to see much action during the Revolution but--having paid their dues in a million-body conflict--also share power with the revolutionaries via the military and the Majlis, Iran's Parliament.
This includes the Pasdaran, former and current military-intelligence who've rapidly been accumulating power over the years. Pasdaran compromise over 1/3 of the Majlis. These people apply a materialist philosophy and aspire to venal goals. Ahmadinejad, counted among the Pasdaran, can thank their influence for his presidency. Last summer, Reza Aslan wrote:
It is the Pasdaran that controls Ahmadinejad, not the mullahs. Indeed, it was precisely fear of the Pasdaran’s rising political and economic influence that led to the "anybody but Ahmadinejad" coalition we saw in this election, wherein young, leftist students and popular reformists like Mohammad Khatami joined together with conservative mullahs and "centrists" like Rafsanjani to push back against what they consider to be the rampant militarization of Iranian politics. There is a genuine fear among these groups that Iran is beginning to resemble Egypt or Pakistan, countries in which the military controls the apparatus of government.
Unlike the Pasdaran, the Revolution called not for earthly things but the idealistic. Unfortunately for the high-minded clerics, their next-door neighbor was Saddam Hussein, and his western allies didn't appreciate Iran's political experiment. When Iraq stormed across Iran's southwest border--charged by Saudi Arabia and the Reagan-era Pentagon--it unleashed a wave that would rack up a million dead. Paranoia soon reigned, and Iran rooted out those who were against the Revolution. Or so the government thought.
Imagine that Bush's presidency had lead to this kind of present public uproar just after his re-election, or just after Florida 2000. We saw in 2008 that Wall Street wasn't necessarily as much partisan with its money as it was securing a winner--business will switch sides in pursuit of money. What would have happened if all the oil, securities, insurance, medical--all major industry--saw Bush as a risk instead of their back door? Well, Ahmadinejad's allies had better be worried.
In some ways Ahmadinejad is becoming a Marie Antoinette--a bitterly despised symbol of all that's wrong with Iran. There are royalists all over the globe today who've re-imagined such figures (like the Tsar and Tsarina) through film. But the Queen was not a likable or innocent person. She made many boneheaded choices that reverberated throughout France and brought the economy to its knees. Ahmadinejad is now held responsible for Iran's inflation in 2008 when Arab nations had oil prosperity. Responsible for Iran's surging, high unemployment. An obvious difference between Ahmadinejad and Marie Antoinette is that the latter was just a figurehead without a real office. Ahmadinejad has much more power.
But the President also has many divisions. With his shadow loyalties demanding of him Ahmadinejad isn't quite the strong-man the media portrays. So the exit point is probably something that his many high-ranking political backers are at least pondering while Tehran spirals.
The public wants to punish the theft of their voice. Who better to throw on the fire than Ahmadinejad?
Attacking the clerics is messy. For one thing, some clerics support the protesters. Secondly, if you oust them you could quickly wind up with a military dictatorship--and let's not forget that Pasdaran have a lot of resources and a lot of weapons. But attacking the secular power holders is problematic, too. Not just in terms of firepower. The "goons" in the streets are recruited from Iran's youth generation, leading to the kind of breathless situation that happened today, with the paramilitaries and the protesters reaching an impasse amidst all the violence:
People ask them 'why do you do this to your people?' and the riot guards ask for forgiveness, 'Bebakhshid' they can be heard to say.
This is startlingly similar to the kind of generational unity that began to appear during France's 1789 revolution. The public even forgave many aristocrats and goons of the king, at least for the while. French people not only knew something radical transpired, the very air felt electric. Their spines tingled at the sense of something unnameable. At least in Paris, the public began to think of themselves as French brothers and sisters.
Well something unnameable happened last summer and has not been stifled yet. The youth of Iran do not see themselves as Persian or Azeri--they're seeing themselves as Iranians.
I don't know what will happen next, but considering recent history we have to at least consider that protests could die down again over the winter at some point. That's the pessimistic scenario. The good news is that even then, I think Ahmadinejad isn't going to serve a full term.
Here's a prediction. It's foolish of me, and I don't normally do this. But I'm willing to make the bet here. He's a risk. I wouldn't be surprised if Mahmoud Ahmadinejad serves out two years from the elections, tops.