I recently wrote a few diaries to keep people updated on the results of the Iraqi elections, which were being ignored elsewhere. In the process, it has become apparent to me that the widespread lack of interest for what is going on in Iraq is driven in large part not by people’s lack of interest or weariness of the topic, but by the confusion that people feel about what the proper US role in Iraq should be going forward, and what their own role and position should be.
It goes without saying that the Iraq invasion was a terrible mistake, a war crime, and that the military presence needs to end. But this doesn't end the discussion. Iraq has been devastated by US actions, losing about 10 percent of its population in the last 17 years of conflict with the US. Its society has been thrown into chaos, sectarian cleansings have reshuffled the population, and its political life is unsettled to say the least. Iraq's army, and the economy as a whole, depends entirely on US aid and support for its existence. Having created this situation, it seems obvious to me that the US has a continuing responsibility to the Iraqis. But what is this responsibility and how should it be carried out are much more complex questions, and I think a discussion of them would be very valuable at this time. Would you like to join me?
First, briefly, the results of the 2009 provincial elections in Iraq. More numbers have now come out and the picture is getting clearer. For more information and context I refer you to my previous and still relevant diaries on the elections, which set up the background to the elections and discussed the preliminary results which were largely consistent with the numbers we are getting now.
In short, Prime Minister Maliki's list won in all of the Shiite dominated provinces and in Baghdad, though with an average of around 40 percent of the vote, they will still need some coalition partners to govern. The independent lists supported by the Sadrists came in second in Baghdad, while Maliki's current governing coalition partner, the much reviled Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) came in third, which is a major loss for this party which formerly dominated the Shiite provinces. This setback is likely a result of the ISCI being successfully portrayed as an un-Iraqi agent of Iran (opponents often advertized themselves as "100 percent Iraqi" clearly implying that ISCI was not) and this appears to have been a successful strategy in light of many Iraqis’ very negative perceptions of Iran and its influence. ISCI’s Badr Organization was also widely implicated in running death squads during the 2006-2008 sectarian civil war, so they are despised by non-Shiites. Sadr’s Mahdi Army was also running death squads, but because of their fiery anti American nationalist and populist stance, they remain more viable among the general population.
There are a few ways to read the election results. Obviously people are flocking to Maliki because he has had some military successes recently and is being credited for reducing the bloodshed after the terrible sectarian civil war of 2006-2008, which redrew Iraq's ethnic map and largely drove Sunnis out of Baghdad (hence the strong showing for Shiite parties there, with the top Sunni party getting only 9 percent of the vote). This development is both good and bad. Iraq needs strong leadership right now and Maliki is far from the worst of the lot, never having been caught in anything too monstrous (some corruption and torture allegations are par for the course in Iraq). But at the same time, in a country with such a history of one party strongman rule where people are used to joining the ruling party to advance, seeing the people lining up en masse behind the current ruler is a bit disturbing. Maliki was chosen to be Prime Minister by the US precisely because, unlike ISCI or Sadr, he was a Shiite who did not have his own militia power base. Well, now he does, and he's casting himself as a strong law and order nationalist leader. The media have attempted to portray Maliki's victory as also a victory for secular forces and a loss for Iran, because Maliki's win is a loss for the ISCI, which is widely regarded as an Iranian stooge despite having exactly the same background and actually having originated as a splinter from Maliki's Dawa Party. This is clearly propaganda spin, looking to cast the results as a win for American anti Iranian interests. The Independent agrees with me (finally) that the "Maliki is now a national secular leader for all people" spin is belied by the fact that Maliki's list did not do nearly as well outside of Shiite areas.
Maliki's winning election strategy was summed up succinctly by Joost Hilterman, Middle East analyst with the International Crisis Group:
... appearing to take a tough stand against the Kurds, the Sadrists, the Awakening Councils and anyone else that the ordinary Arab citizen does not like, and using state funds to establish groups that will bring out the vote for him."
As expected, an anti-Kurdish coalition won nearly an outright majority in Nineveh province (48 percent), meaning that they can form a provincial council and select a governor without any input from the Kurds. It is clear that Kurdish influence around Mosul is about to get sharply curtailed. This is likely to ratchet up the pressure on the embattled Kurds, pushing them further on a path of antagonism with the rest of Iraq's population and fueling their persecution complex (victims of recent genocide tend to be paranoid). Denying them a referendum on Kirkuk despite the fact that it was guaranteed by the Iraqi Constitution to have happened last fall was bad enough, but now we are likely to see actual ethnic cleansing taking place in Mosul, with the Kurds being pushed out of the area now that it is no longer controlled by Kurdish forces. Moves undertaken by Maliki's government this year, such as pouring 50,000 fresh troops into Kirkuk, enlisting paramlitiary militias made up of Sunni Arabs to go into mixed areas to pressue the Kurds to leave, and, perhaps most troublingly, systematically purging Kurds from the ranks of the Iraqi Army, seem likely to stoke the tensions ever higher.
The worst news has been coming out of al Anbar province, long the slaughterhouse of the new Iraq. The hopes were highest here, because the Sunni population had boycotted the previous elections in 2005, leading to a very unrepresentative government dominated by the very corrupt Islamic Iraqi Party (IIP), and now there was finally a chance to rectify this and get a representative government in place. High voter turnouts were expected, installing popular favorites such as the tribal sheikhs of the US supported Awakening militia movement into office. This did not happen. The vote results are currently under investigation, but IIP seems to have eked out a narrow win. To get this, IIP seems to have engaged in widespread voter suppression and ballot box stuffing. Turnout in al Anbar was below 40 percent and closer to 20 percent in such critical places as Fallujah, and the Awakening leaders are now threatening all out war, a "second Darfur" if these results are not reversed in some way. The democracy thing just is not working for al Anbar, and sheikhs are ready to fight once again:
""We will form the government of Anbar anyway. An honest dictatorship is better than a fake democracy," the Awakening's leader, Sheikh Ahmed Buzaigh abu Risha, declared from his heavily guarded compound in Ramadi Wednesday. "There will be very harsh consequences if this false election stands. We won't let them form a government."
"We do not believe in these results, and we will not work with the next provincial government," a burly Sheikh Hamid Hayis said over tea in his estate's ornate meeting hall.
The tribesmen always talk big, but this is pretty ominous. The loyalties of the police in the event of a conflict in al Anbar are clearly on the side of the Awakening, and they will not defend public order if that means supporting the IIP.
An estimated 30,000 tribesmen have joined the provincial police, but most remain loyal to their tribes. Police guard Hais's compound; Abu Risha has his own loyalists in the police force.
"As Iraqi police, we have a special loyalty to the Awakening," said police Col. Saad Muhammad. "The current provincial government, controlled by the Islamic Party, they don't do anything to help us. We can see with our own eyes that the people have elected the Awakening."
So this brings us to the key question: what should be the US position in light of these events, and especially in the event actual fighting breaks out? What should Obama do if, as appears at least possible, large scale rebellion breaks out in al Anbar, or if the Kurds, having lost at the ballot box, decide to defend their position and expel the Arabs from the disputed areas of the north by force of arms? Maliki would be obliged to attempt to suppress the insurgencies, but both the Sunnis and the Kurds have powerful militias, and it is unlikely that the national forces loyal to Maliki would be able to suppress any such uprisings without massive American logistical and fire support. Giving such support to Maliki would once again embroil the US in fighting in Iraq, but withholding the support at this crucial moment may mean that the central government in Baghdad and the Iraqi Army, which we spent so much to build up, would crumble, meaning that effectively, the US would have also taken a side, against the Baghdad government.
It is therefore clear that as much as we may desire it, the US cannot stay out of Iraqi internal affairs, and continues to have a vital role to play in its continued development. However, acknowledging this, and the fact that we have a moral obligation to help, does not equate to endorsing an open ended American military presence in Iraq, nor to an endorsement of long term American imperialist domination of Iraq. Pressure can be exerted on all sides, all of which, Kurd, Sunni, Shiite, are entirely reliant on US support. The US does not need to send a team of Marines to raid Maliki's, or Abu Risha's house at night, in order to get his attention. Nor do we need to dictate exactly what the results of any particular election should be.
A visit by a State Department official warning of a cutoff in all American aid to one side or another in the event it resorts to violence, would be an enormously powerful step in constraining any such acts. Sending an American electoral commission to investigate the results in al Anbar and to recommend a new election would be as powerful as sending a brigade to patrol the streets of Fallujah. In Hillary's words, we must use smart power here, and, given the size and importance of the Baghdad American embassy, there is no doubt that some behind the scenes arm twisting is happening as we speak, but it may need to go farther if the situation deteriorates.
Setting up international monitoring of a revote in Anbar, and of a referendum on Kirkuk's future would go a long way to defusing these tense situations. It has become fairly clear that without major UN or US oversight and prodding, no referendum will ever take place in Kirkuk so long as there is any chance of the Kurds winning it and attaching Kirkuk to their autonomous region. Using the military for this would not be helpful, because how could one force a fair referendum or election trhough force of arms? As such, assuming this helpful role would not mean extending the US military presence, or delaying our withdrawal. Indeed, the fact that we have over a hundred thousand soldiers in Iraq necessitates that we stay involved, so that these troops do not find themselves in the middle of a civil war, or a worsening dictatorship, which would only delay the withdrawal. As we speak, US forces are positioned along the Kurd-Arab faultline, trying to keep fighting from breaking out between the Kurdish peshmerga and the Iraqi national army.
I know it is tempting for the anti militarists here, of which I count myself as one, to say, no, enough with imperial entanglements. We elected Obama to get out of Iraq, so let's get out, and let them work out their problems. However, this is an illusory position, similar to the false arguments for deregulation, since there is no way the US can refrain from exerting influence and shaping the course of Iraqi politics, just as the government shapes the market by its inaction as much as by its regulation. By refusing to intervene in a crisis, should one occur, we are in fact intervening on the side of the dominant party, whom we have arbitrarily previously placed in that position of dominance, as was the case with Maliki. There is no way out of accepting responsibility for the mess we created. Abandoning the Iraqi now, just as they are starting to show progress, would be an immoral betrayal of these people whom we have wronged so terribly and to whom we owe so much. And apart from moral reasons, nobody, regardless of how anti imperialist we are, can deny the vital importance of a stable Iraq with accessible natural resources for the future of the Middle East and the entire world. An Iranian proxy in Iraq would be very destabilizing for many many reasons.
We can look to the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo for examples of somewhat successful recent Western diplomatic stabilization of former warzones. A decade after these conflicts were ended through outside interventions, these places remain under foreign supervision, with American troops still present to guarantee the peace, though local governments rule in each. It is only through that foreign supervision that these places, which are beset by very inflamed and longstanding ethnic and sectarian tensions, have not relapsed into civil war or ethnic cleansing. One can argue that there are many things wrong with both Bosnia and Kosovo today, and that they are overly dependent on Western support, but the fact remains is that the Serbian minority in Kosovo has not been physically harmed, and Bosnia is even in a position to apply for EU membership. This would not be the case if those places were simply left to their own devices after the initial conflicts died down.
UPDATE: Clearly the UN also has a role to play here. They have a lot of expertise in managing troubled elections and helping countries recover from civil war, though their track record on this is less than stellar. However, given the fact that the UN is very gunshy about Iraq, and that in this particular instance, the UN has already signed off on the Anbar elections as fair and open, weakening any hope for a revote, we cannot look to the UN to absolve us of our responsibilities.
As of today, the US has refrained from getting involved in the Iraqi election brouhaha, apart from congratulating the Iraqis on their marvelous democracy and whatever behind the scenes activity is coming from the embassy and the military commanders on the ground. And it is probably premature at this time to start overreacting. But it is always easier to prevent a war rather than stop it once it starts, so I hope our leaders are monitoring the situation closely. We missed the chance to prevent the sectarian bloodbath of 2006-2008 from spiraling out of control. But this time we have better leadership, which prefers a diplomatic over a military approach, as shown by the Zinni unappointment, and this is great. But let us hope they do not confuse a diplomatic approach with a hands off approach, because Iraq is not ready to function on its own yet, and, with hundreds of thousands of Americans still in Iraq, the U?S is not in a position to wash its hands and look the other way.