Many probably remember "Curveball", an Iraqi defector who supplied "intelligence" on Saddam's WMD (chemical/biological) program that became a significant piece of the case for the run-up to Gulf War II. Essentially his bogus story was believed because many in the CIA and others in the Bush Administration wanted to believe it. See here: Salon Magazine 2007. We know what happened as a result. This last week, Iranian scientist, Shahram Amiri showed up at the Pakistani Embassy in DC and told the Iranian representatives there that he wanted to return to Iran. While the question of whether Amiri defected or was kidnapped in Saudi Arabia last summer remains a tantalizing one, the real question should be why the US seemed to put such emphasis on a nuclear scientist in his early thirties. It appears that the attempt at Curveball II and a justification for an attack against Iran has not only been missed by the catcher, but the ball went wild and allowed the runner to steal home.
I do not intend to get into the many questions surrounding Mr. Amiri's status, i.e. whether he defected or was kidnapped, how he "escaped" or not in order to go home. From much of what has emerged, clearly US intelligence wanted him to provide something, and what I wrote back in March when the US revealed that Amiri was here in the US remains true: Iran's Nuclear Defection and the Dog That Did Not Bark. The story back in March was that all they had to say about his information was this basic line that did not amount to much:
"...the scientist has been extensively debriefed, and has helped to confirm US intelligence assessments about the Iranian nuclear programme."
Mr. Amiri did not provide the smoking gun the US was looking for, and we really should be asking, why did our intelligence services think that he could? Other than his loose affiliation to the Revolutionary Guards through the university Amiri worked for, why would this man be a credible source for the "low-down" on Iran's nuclear program? His field of study was clearly nuclear materials related to medicine, and he could not have finished his PhD more than a few years ago. Again, how could he be such a central or credible source for much?
In June of 2002 a good friend of mine told me that we were going to go to war with Iraq. In the summer of 2002, I thought he was nuts. "Clearly the American people know that Saddam Hussein, bad as he is, had nothing to do with 9/11," I reasoned. Well, reason had very little to do with it in the end. Now, I don't think we are on a war track with Iran, but the possibility of some type of military strike certainly has some powerful advocates--starting with Secretary Gates. See this article here: TIME, July 15, 2010. Before we do any such crazy thing which will most certainly be counter-productive, can someone in the media ask some hard questions about our Iran policy? Here are a few:
How does a military strike solve anything with Iran?
How does a military strike against Iran effect our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan? How does it effect oil markets?
How does a military strike not lead to a larger war?
How exactly is our intelligence on Iran better than our intelligence was on Iraq?
How do we know that Iranian ex-pats providing information are any better than Chalabi?
How can we minimize the political motivations behind intelligence findings to be more certain of their implications?
If "All options remain on the table" can we put some diplomatic ones on the table too? Can we ask for some comprehensive explanations as to how military options solve our problems better and at a lower cost? Lastly, How does expanding a war in the Middle East get us out of there? Do we have any exit strategy at all any more?
I certainly hear myself reasoning that "Obama is not Bush and he's much smarter," etc. BUT, I remember the summer of 2002, and what if the summer of 2010 turns out to be similar, and next year we bumble into a much larger war through what would undoubtedly be sold as a "necessary surgical strike" ?
"History does not repeat, but it often rhymes." Mark Twain