The Sunday New York Times had an article about our conduct of the war on terror, via shadowy operations that blur the lines of military and intelligence.
The administration’s demands have accelerated a transformation of the C.I.A. into a paramilitary organization....
For its part, the Pentagon is becoming more like the C.I.A.
New York Times
The article focused on the war in Yemen, and used the May 25 cruise missile strike as jumping off point.
The attack offered a glimpse of the Obama administration’s shadow war against Al Qaeda and its allies. In roughly a dozen countries — from the deserts of North Africa, to the mountains of Pakistan, to former Soviet republics crippled by ethnic and religious strife — the United States has significantly increased military and intelligence operations, pursuing the enemy using robotic drones and commando teams, paying contractors to spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists.
New York Times
The Comprehensive Approach
National security strategy documents now consistently speak of a "Comprehensive Approach." The jargon refers to a deeper intertwining of military, intelligence, State, State aid, mercenary forces, front NGOs, local armies, local security and special forces, and local militias. The approach puts military needs as controlling, and has U.S. Special Forces as a prime player. The approach is an explicit increased militarization of U.S. policy.
The official 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review emphasized the Comprehensive Approach, as did the independent panel review of the QDR.
Many of our authorities and structures assume a neat divide between defense, diplomacy, and development that simply does not exist.
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report
The need for enhanced "whole of government" capabilities will be driven by the complex operating conditions, strong potential for civilian interaction, and the need in many cases to work closely with the agencies of a foreign government. It is in the interest of the Department of Defense to work closely with the National Security Council, the State Department, State/AID, and DHS to develop support for more enhanced civilian capability and for putting into operation "whole of government" and Comprehensive Approach solutions to security challenges.
Independent Panel Review Report of Quadrennial Defense Review Report
The Comprehensive Approach can be considered as a current institutionalization of old mistake.
Use of mercenary forces has been a mistake. The Comprehensive Approach increases reliance on them, and oddly does it in the name of better management.
Destroying the independence of NGOs is a mistake. NGOs by definition operate independently from any government. Nonindependent front NGOs, working according to the needs of United States military and security institutions, wreck the trust and independence required in the work of the real and vital NGOs.
Compromised humanitarian relief is a mistake. The response to the flooding in Pakistan exposes this.
The medical team described above is affiliated with the provincial reconstruction team and both come from Special Operations. By militarizing these vital functions which could be part of helping the Afghan population, the military is pushing aside neutral groups such as the UN and other non-governmental organizations. With these "services" being provided by US Special Forces personnel, it is no wonder that resentment of the US presence in Afghanistan only continues to get stronger.
Militarization of Humanitarian Aid in Afghanistan Accelerates: Special Operations Forces Delivering Medical Care, Jim White
We really are in a position–and seem willingly trying to push ourselves further into that position–where we’re placing our paramilitaries into a competition with indigenous militias to see who can most credibly provide functions that ought to be governmental. I really don’t see how this ends well.
Our Paramilitaries and Their Militia Play Doctor, emptywheel
JSOC versus CIA
U.S. Special Forces, the Joint Special Operations Command, have a key role in the Comprehensive Approach.
The Bush administration had a deep reflexive distrust of the CIA. Intelligence was stovedpiped, intelligence operations were moved elsewhere, including under the JSOC.
The Obama administration has continued and increased this reliance on Special Forces and the JSOC.
Shadow War, Transparency, and Politics
The Obama administration, on the day following inauguration, announced a major commitment to government transparency.
My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government.
Transparency and Open Government, January 21, 2009
The transparency and public accountability policy, on national security issues, has been abandoned.
Special Operations troops under secret "Execute Orders" have conducted spying missions that were once the preserve of civilian intelligence agencies. With code names like Eager Pawn and Indigo Spade, such programs typically operate with even less transparency and Congressional oversight than traditional covert actions by the C.I.A.
New York Times
The reliance on secrecy is highly politicized.
The wars are widely seen as a mess. The response is to remove war operations from public awareness and discussion. The politicized response is to operate to minimize public repercussions.
Obama administration officials point to the benefits of bringing the fight against Al Qaeda and other militants into the shadows. Afghanistan and Iraq, they said, have sobered American politicians and voters about the staggering costs of big wars that topple governments, require years of occupation and can be a catalyst for further radicalization throughout the Muslim world.
New York Times
Institutionalization of Mistake
The Bush administration approaches to terror left us with the deepest and most intractable of problems. Solutions now are hemmed in.
The original kill, capture, detain, and interrogate order was made on September 17, 2001. This order, unknown still in language, underlies the whole mess. Kill and capture is still, very strongly, current policy and current overall strategy.
Killing and capturing terrorists is whack-a-mole. We cannot obtain national security with the approach. We can only increase insecurity with it.
Shadow wars, missile strikes and drones and disappearances and paramilitary operations, can be minimized from U.S. public view and discussion. Government secrecy enables this. Implausible deniability enables this. A mired frustration existing in the U.S. public enables this.
Shadow wars cannot be hidden in the places they operate. Shadow wars are not so shadowy, in the places they are waged. Foreign opinion is not nearly so blasé about U.S. conduct.
We are not entirely stuck by the Bush mess. We can make positive changes in policy and strategy now, to walk away from the mess.
The Comprehensive Approach, a wholesale increase and deep institutionalization of old mistake, is the wrong direction. The response to the flooding in Pakistan is but one example of why it should be avoided.