To all those saying that WikiLeaks is not functionally an investigative journalism organization and that it's revealing nothing of any importance to the public beyond the titillation of eavesdropping on back-channels gossip, I say read this:
US diplomats are concerned that India could be the target of a biological terror attack, with fatal diseases such as anthrax being released into the country before spreading around the world, confidential cables from the US embassy in New Delhi reveal.
A senior Indian diplomat told the US in 2006 that concerns about biological weapons were "no longer academic", adding that intelligence suggested terror groups were increasingly discussing biowarfare.
"[Diplomat YK] Singh reported that Indian intelligence is picking up chatter indicating jihadi groups are interested in bioterrorism, for example seeking out like-minded PhDs in biology and biotechnology," a cable sent to Washington reports.
Of course anyone can speculate that terrorists may be targeting India, but isn't it worthwhile for both the publics of India and the rest of the world to know that they're targeting biotechnology, and not just in an aspirational but in an operational way?
It also warns terrorists could easily find the material they need for bioterrorism in India and use the country as a base for launching an international campaign involving the spread of fatal diseases.
"The plethora of indigenous highly pathogenic and virulent agents naturally occurring in India and the large Indian industrial base – combined with weak controls – also make India as much a source of bioterrorism material as a target," diplomats warned.
"Release in an Indian city could facilitate international spread ... Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark....
"Given the strong web of air connections Delhi shares with the rest of the world and the vulnerabilities that might be exploited at airports, a witting or unwitting person could easily take hazardous materials into or out of the country."
A broad public aware of this development could be more on guard against such possibilities. It would also put international pressure on a New Delhi unwilling and ill-prepared to deal seriously with a bioterrorism threat.
At the very least, basic disinfection and containment practices could be enforced as a result of widespread public alarm at the practices being followed, and the resultant embarassment and loss of face for the Indian government:
Scientists attached to the US embassy had been shown photographs taken by a senior Indian army officer from "frontline field laboratories for diagnostics of infectious diseases" which "demonstrated a host of poor laboratory security and safety practices, including families sleeping in labs and disposable gloves being washed for re-use or being disposed of as non-hazardous biological waste," the cable reported.
International assistance could be marshalled to correct such deficiences if the publics of many nations became aware of how much at risk these practices in Indian laboratories put them.
From the cables themselves:
there is no well-established collection of baseline epidemiological information/data (naturally occurring disease burden) which is needed for India to distinguish between a natural outbreak and a terrorist attack....
The impact of a biological attack or the accidental release of a disease-causing agent in India could be devastating, given the high population density in Indian cities and the growing mobility of India's middle class. Most biological warfare (BW) agents do not produce symptoms for many hours or several days, so Indians exposed to a contagious BW agent could easily spread the agent to thousands before symptoms manifest. Release in an Indian city could facilitate international spread -- Delhi airport alone sees planes depart daily to numerous European, Asian, Middle Eastern and African destinations, as well as non-stop flights to Chicago and Newark.
These cables were marked confidential. Releasing them to the public may have caused embarassment to the governments involved. But clearly it was an act of journalism, and in the public good.
Barack Obama, Eric Holder and their secret grand jury desperately trying to cobble together some way to prosecute investigative journalism that's actually worthy of the name can just stuff it.