This analysis is made for the Daily Kos community- a community blog devoted to American politics and American policy, both domestic and foreign.
This analysis covers the events of 2010 thus far as the summer approaches and violence promises to escalate in South/Central Asia.
Pashtunistan:
The Pashtun people are
known for a few things; their language of Pashto, their social/honor code referred to as "Pashtunwali", their tendency to cross the poorly-marked border at will(they believe the Durand Line was meant to divide them, and it did), and lastly but perhaps most of all they are known for dominating the Taliban. It is in this not-so-imaginary place called "Pashtunistan" that the NATO, Pakistani and Afghan security forces have been battling most of the militants.
Here is the most common map of Pashtunistan. But first, I have some issues with it. For one, it extends in my opinion way too far south into Balochistan province of Pakistan. In fact, Balochs seem to have gotten confused with Pashtuns when this map was made. Balochistan has been the site of a low-level insurgency by Balochs for independence against Pakistan, while across the western border in Iran there is also a low-level insurgency taking place. Pashtuns are very much present in the north-east in and around the city of Quetta, which is where Mullah Omar was/is widely thought to be hiding. But Pashtuns are definitely not dominant at all outside of the Quetta region. Balochs dominate the wasteland that is the center and south of the province, along with the west bordering Iran. Balochistan borders Afghanistan's Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul provinces in the south.
Pashtuns are also present in the millions in the Pakistani southern port city of Karachi. Also problematic with this map is that it doesn't include the northern Pashtun enclaves in the Afghan provinces of Kunduz and Baghlan provinces, and it doesn't clearly separate the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas. Lastly, I believe the map exaggerates the Pashtun population in the west of Afghanistan. If you look north of Afghanistan it should become abundantly clear that this map is decades old. But with all that said, here is an idea of what "Pashtunistan" looks like.
Even with my recommended alterations to this map, it's clear that the Pashtuns should have probably been given their own country and borders. This wouldn't be the first time that "British Map-Making" has failed.
Afghanistan:
In Afghanistan, the non-Pashtuns are being given fewer and fewer reasons to care about Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Co.(warlords). While many Pashtuns are not supporters of Karzai, a familiar split seems to be shaping between the Pashtuns and the rest of the Afghans.(Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara, et cetra) This was made evident by Karzai's dismissal of his Interior Minister and intelligence chief, both of whom were considered "agents of India" by Pakistan. Karzai is obviously moving closer to Pakistan, which appears to still be very much playing a double-game and may have much stronger control over the Afghan Taliban than initially thought. At the same time, Karzai is trying his best to hug the Afghan Taliban. It looks like an emerging threesome, or at least attempts to form one.
As for the Pashtuns of Afghanistan, the ordinary Pashtun is being caught between the Taliban, corrupt or non-existent Afghan officials, official and unofficial Afghan "contractors", and NATO soldiers. The situation is far from ideal. In an attempt to please farmers, NATO decided against going after poppy crops. This hasn't really worked, and the continued production of poppy will only keep corruption deeply and broadly fueled- which in turn makes the Afghan government all the more weakened for the short-term and the long-term. A recent blight has effected about a quarter of poppy output in Helmand, causing prices of opium to sky-rocket which is traditionally a benefit to those who store it(corrupt officials, the Taliban, drug lords) and likely to cause a spike in those planting it next season.
Marjah has been a failure. The rules of engagement imposed on NATO forces probably saved a number of innocent lives, but they also allowed the Taliban to easily escape the offensive and meld back into the population so they can tax and control the opium production that should have been ended. The Taliban continue to harass allied efforts in Helmand. The new unit of police that had been sent into Marjah turned out to be just about as corrupt and incompetent as the average Afghan police unit. The "government in a box", amongst other things, heightened expectations beyond what was realistic and was far from an accurate depiction. If General McChrystal truly believed this to be a war of perceptions, he performed badly in this regard by setting everyone up for inevitable disappointment.
We'll see what Kandahar, the summer, and the completion of "the surge" holds along with whatever changes General David Petraeus may now bring to the area.
Pakistan:
In Pakistan, there are still a lot of problems. The province of Balochistan, of which Quetta serves as its provincial capital, remains impoverished and prone to the low-level insurgency being waged by Baloch nationalists. The Quetta region is probably still the headquarters of the Afghan Taliban, known as the Quetta Shura. Karachi could still use some kind of crackdown, as could southern Punjab province. But that is unlikely. The Pakistani army is still fighting the Pakistani Taliban in Orakzai despite declaring victory three weeks ago and, despite what some in the media appear to believe, they have yet to actually fight the Afghan Taliban(although they sure as hell have provided some intelligence for drone strikes in North Waziristan).
As was mentioned above, Pakistan may have more control and influence over the Afghan Taliban than previously thought. I previously cited reports stating that Pakistan had captured one "Mullah Zakir"- a former inmate at Gitmo. That report then appeared to have been false, given that Khalid Khawaja(former ISI officer) made no petition in court for Zakir's release while repealing the arrests in Pakistan of several other Taliban leaders, including Mullah Kabir. Reports since then, in the wake of the British Economic School's report detailing the Pakistan-Taliban connection, say that Mullah Zakir was captured afterall by Pakistan. And then released when the ISI felt that he would be their man. Mullah Zakir has since assumed Mullah Baradar's responsibilities as military chief of the Afghan Taliban. It now appears more than plausible to conclude that Pakistan "arrested" Baradar, and then limited U.S. access to him, because they felt that Baradar was too much of a loose cannon. Baradar was trying to set up a diplomatic channel between himself and Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who hails from the same tribe. In this instance, regional peace did not seem to fit into Pakistan's perceived interest.
When we look at Bajaur and South Waziristan, two tribal agencies where the Pakistani army launched major offensives, it's clear that these offensives did not push all the way towards the Afghan border. They are focusing on Pakistani-focused militants, not Afghan-focused militants. While I remain of the belief that Pakistan will launch some kind of an offensive in North Waziristan, I don't see any reason to believe that it will target the Afghan insurgents. What is far more likely is that Pakistan would go after the non Afghan-focused militants that have made North Waziristan their home, which includes al Qaeda Central, the Pakistani/Mehsud/Punjabi Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and various other militant groups that few of us have ever heard of. Even the most pro-militant of the former ISI agents have reason to worry that they lost control of the situation in parts of North Waziristan demonstrated by the death of Khalid Khawaja at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban.
Even if Pakistan decided to go after the Afghan Taliban, they lack the capabilities to do so effectively right now. It's questionable whether or not they currently have the resources to go into North Waziristan. Most of their armed forces are still focused on India and some in Pakistan still see Afghanistan's Pashtun regions as a strategic zone of interest, either as a fallback position for Pakistan or as a place to wage a proxy war with India against the non-Pashtuns that made up the Northern Alliance(again). While the U.S. has been pushing arch-rivals Pakistan and India towards talks, it's really too soon to expect much if anything at all developing out of these talks. Pakistan still has a giant militant problem like Afghanistan has a giant opium problem.
al Qaeda Central:
Back to Waziristan. Al Qaeda Central has taken a pounding since the Obama administration took office, but they aren't broken and both OBL and Zawahiri are still free men. They still have plenty of territory to operate relatively-freely in North Waziristan and the western part of South Waziristan. Drone strikes are the only thing keeping them from operating with complete impunity. But look to the months ahead, as U.S. soldiers grow in number in the south-east of Afghanistan along the border with both Waziristans. This is Haqqani's territory, especially Paktia and Khost provinces. It really remains to be seen what Pakistan has planned for North Waziristan, but some sort of operation is likely. U.S. Special Forces operating in Pakistan have escalated dramatically under President Barack Obama as has aid to Pakistan.
If President Barack Obama wants to exit Afghanistan in the best way possible and as soon as possible, he can't do so without finally ridding the world of Osama bin Laden. His capture is almost surely impossible. Symbols are important, and that would be a major symbolic victory for the U.S..
Conclusion:
Relative to a year ago, not much has really changed pertaining to NATO's situation. Neither the governments of Afghanistan nor Pakistan have truly proven to be reliable partners for NATo. Talks are beginning with Karzai and the Afghan insurgents(Omar's Taliban, Haqqani's network, Hekmatyar's network) which could come at the expense of non-Pashtun support for the weak and corrupt government. Talks are beginning between Pakistan and India, but there is no reason to plan for a hopeful scenario. Some Afghan-Pashtuns are rising up against the Taliban on their own(and being rasied by us), but these risings are few in number, localized at the moment, and entirely fragile. Hamid Karzai is still uninspirational and ineffective, at best.(personally, I think he's a drug addict) Afghan nationality seems to be increasingly slipping into the growing cracks between ethnic divides. Pakistan is still playing a double-game and remaining obsessed with India. Throughout Pashtunistan, we can expect a very bloody and tragic summer- one of many that have been known in the region for the past three decades.
There are, of course, wild cards. There are always wild cards, especially in areas that some might even dare call "wild" such as a warzone. Perhaps the most important is the extent to which the Pakistani Taliban can draw in the Pakistani security forces. Also is General David Petraeus and what he might do differently than General Stanley McChrystal, who himself was a vast improvement over his predecessor, General David McKiernan. Hamid Karzai is also a major wild card- it is entirely possible that his journey towards Pakistan and the Taliban could cause severe problems for him in the north.
Education, as advocated by Greg Mortenson, is the only long-term solution for this troubled region. But that initiative could easily fall apart in the face of the region's many problems, few of which are seeing any tangible improvement thus far. With the summer here, and more troops arriving, the violence can only get worse. It's hard to see how the situation gets any better during the rest of this year.