This is not an I/P diary. Actually, I am not going to talk about that conflict at all. Usually these kind of diaries devolve rather quickly to name calling and meaningless arguments from both sides.
So no, this is not an I/P diary. It is rather a U/I diary, namely trying to remind all of us that the relations between US presidents and Israeli Prime ministers were never the bed of roses everybody think they always were until this or that guy showed up.
It seems that out of President Obama's entire speech on the Middle East and the "Arab Spring" (which is yet to spring, in my opinion), the most debated topic here is the icy relationships between President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu.
Relations are in all time low! "Obama and Netanyahu, Distrustful Allies, to Meet" read the NY Times.
"Obama to aides: Netanyahu will never do what it takes to achieve Mideast peace" reports Haaretz, while the Guardian tells us that "Barack Obama is to meet Israel's prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, at the White House in what is predicted to be a tense meeting".
Like Yogi Berra once famously said: "It's like deja-vu, all over again."
I don't take sides claiming one side is right while the other is wrong. The purpose of this diary is not to justify Israel, the Palestinians or the US. I will jut try to make a point that since the beginning of the "Special relationship" between the USA and Israel in 1968 US Presidents and Israeli Prime ministers found themselves at loggerheads over Mid-East policy. Some of these disputes make the current one looks like a love affair.
Even before the six days war the Johnson Administration and PM Sharet government were suspicious of each other. This was at a time that the Johnson administration still hoped to stop the Soviet Union influence over the short-lived UAR (United Arab Republic)
With regards to the nuclear intentions of Israel:
Here:
A few months later, Rusk told an Israeli envoy that the administration assumed Israel did not wish to go nuclear, and that if it did, it would "lose U.S. support." When Eban told Ambassador Walworth Barbour that this suggestion of sanctions was not in accord with the atmosphere of trust that should prevail between good friends, Barbour replied that it was not a question of sanctions but of a loss of U.S. support.
When the Israelis were informed of the pending decision on arms for Jordan, they complained that it would unsettle the arms balance in the area. New York banker Abraham Feinberg, who was sometimes an unofficial channel of communication between Johnson and Israeli leaders, warned that the American Jewish community, already upset by the U.S. vote to censure Israel, would be still more upset if the administration gave arms to Jordan and not Israel.
U.S. officials, concerned that border skirmishes might lead to wider fighting, opposed Israeli reprisals and counseled the Israelis to take the incidents to the United Nations. On one such occasion, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir complained to Ambassador Barbour about a U.S. public statement deploring the use of force by both sides. Barbour told her that Israeli reprisals made such statements inevitable by removing Israel's status as injured party. Meir told him tartly that she was not interested in being an injured party; she did not want to be injured at all.
After the Six Days war and the release of the Nasser-Hussain conversation infuriated the US, signaling that good relations with the Arab world were unattainable for a time.
During Nixon's administration relations between the President and the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir sometimes described as "icy at best".
For example:
“They [Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir and Israel’s ambassador to the US Yitzhak Rabin] must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote.… What all this adds up to is that Mrs. Meir, Rabin, et al., must trust RN [Nixon] completely.… He will see to it that Israel always has ‘an edge.‘… But he must carry with him the 60 percent of the American people who are in what is called the silent majority, and who must be depended upon in the event that we have to take a strong hand against Soviet expansion in the Mideast.… It is time our friends in Israel understood this. This is going to be the policy of our country. Unless they understand it and act as if they understood it right now, they are down the tubes.”
in 1975 then secretary of state Henry Kissinger told his Iraqi counterpart:
We can't negotiate about the existence of Israel, but we can reduce its size to historical proportions.
[...]
He said U.S. public opinion was turning more pro-Palestinian and U.S. aid to Israel could not be sustained for much longer at its massive levels. He predicted that in 10 or 15 years, ``Israel will be like Lebanon - struggling for existence, with no influence in the Arab world.''
And President Ford wrote to Prime Minister Rabin:
I wish to express my profound disappointment of Israel’s attitude over the course of the negotiations,” Ford wrote. “You know the importance I have attached to the US efforts to reach an agreement. Kissinger’s mission, encouraged by your government, expresses vital US interests in the region. Failure of the negotiations will have a far-reaching impact on the region and our relation. I have therefore instructed that a reassessment be made of US policy in the region, including our relations with Israel with the aim of reassuring that our overall American interests are protected.”
After Ford-Rabin came Carter-Begin. Their relationship were not good, and this would be considered the understatement of the century.
Carter in his book White House Diary writes on page 301 :
I have rarely been so disgusted in all my life. I was convinced he would do everything possible to stop a treaty, rather than face the full autonomy he had promised in the West Bank/Gaza
[...]
Ham and the others advised me not to take my frustration with Begin out on the cabinet, that I must stick with my original reason for coming to Israel: to go over Begin's head to the cabinet, with Begin negative on every subject. It was a fruitless session.
However, this did not stop them achieving the first peace agreement in the middle east.
Then came Reagan, who some might consider to be the most pro Israel president ever. However, during 1981 there was a major confrontation between Reagan and Begin regarding the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia and the destruction of the Iraqi reactor. The United states voted "yes" for UNSCR 487 condemning Israel and suspended shipments of F-15 fighters to Israel. After the annexation of teh Golan heights Regan decided to "punish" Israel by suspending the memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation.
Begin wrote back his famous "Banana republic" response:
What kind of expression is this – “punishing Israel”? Are we a vassal state of yours? Are we a banana republic? Are we youths of fourteen who, if they don’t behave properly, are slapped across the fingers?
[...]
You have announced that you are suspending consultations on the implementation of the memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation, and that your return to these consultations in the future will depend on progress achieved in the autonomy talks and on the situation in Lebanon.
You want to make Israel a hostage of the memorandum of understanding.
Ambassador Lewis wrote in his book
When my telegram and media accounts of Begin's extraordinary tongue lashing reached the White House, the thermometer plunged to subzero. Needless to say, the suspended memorandum was never revived and the deep chill spread between Washington and Jerusalem by these events lightened only marginally for short periods during the rest of Begin's period in office.
The spat between Begin's successor, Yitzhak Shamir and Regan's successor G.H. Bush came to a head when in 1991 in order to pressure Israel into participating in the Madrid conference, President Bush linked the $10B loan guarantees to a freeze on settlement construction.
Secretary Baker in his testimony before the house foreign relations committee said
It's going to take some really good faith, affirmative effort on the part of our good friends in Israel, and if we don't get it and if we can't get it quickly . . . everybody over there should know that the (White House) telephone number is 1-202-456-1414. When you're serious about peace, call us," Baker said sarcastically.
And the Time reported:
Jokes aside, the rift between Washington and Jerusalem appeared to be widening alarmingly. Senior Administration officials insisted Baker's crack was no impulsive outburst but a calculated attempt "to lay down a marker before the new Israeli government locked itself into a position that made further progress ((toward peace talks)) even more difficult."
Then came to golden age of Clinton-Rabin.
This period of good relations between President Clinton and PM Rabin were horribly cut short.
I think that the good relations between them helped Israel overcome its fears and agree to the principles of the Oslo accords. Clinton's relations with Rabin successors Netanyahu and Ehud Barak never achieved the same level of trust. At the same time other domestic (loss of control of the house) and international affairs (Rwanda, Balkans, Ireland) placed the Israeli-Palestinian on the back burner.
When George W. Bush tried to persuade Arab countries to support his policy on Iraq then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was afraid that Bush will offer some concessions at Israel's expense. He than compared Bush to Chamberlain:
ISRAEL and the US yesterday tried to settle a severe diplomatic row after prime minister Ariel Sharon expressed regret for appearing to liken President Bush to Neville Chamberlain, the appeaser of Hitler.
Mr Sharon's words on Thursday astounded Washington, which called them "unacceptable" and reminded the prime minister that Mr Bush was a friend of Israel.
Hoping to dismiss the row - the most heated verbal exchange for a decade - in advance of the military strikes against the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Mr Sharon said at the weekend that no comparison between Mr Bush and Chamberlain was intended.
To conclude, the relations between US presidents and Israeli Prime Ministers were never easy. The recent feud between President Obama and PM Netanyahu is just another link in a very very long chain that dating back practically to the founding of Israel.
After all, we are not talking about just two leaders. These are relations between countries that sometimes find that their regional and global interests do not align 100% of the time.
It was Kissinger who said:
America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.
And when real or perceived national interests collide - sparks fly, no matter how "special" the relationship is.
When this happens, furious letters are exchanged, angry statements are made, op-eds filled with self importance are written all over the globe, fish are rolled in yesterday newspapers, blog entries like this one are discarded, our little blue planet continues to revolve about its axis, and some perspective never hurts.
Let me leave you with the following:
I call on Israel to make clear that the security for which she yearns can only be achieved through genuine peace, a peace requiring magnanimity, vision and courage.
I call on the Palestinian people to recognize that their own political aspirations are inextricably bound to recognition of Israel's right to a secure future.
And I call on the Arab states to accept the reality of Israel -- and the reality that peace and justice are to be gained only through hard, fair, direct negotiations.
In making these calls upon others, I recognize that the United States has a special responsibility. No other nation is in a position to deal with the key parties to the conflict on the basis of trust and reliability.
The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs and a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.
I want to make the American position clearly understood: the purpose of this transition period is the peaceful and orderly transfer of domestic authority from Israel to the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. At the same time, such a transfer must not interfere with Israel's security requirements.
That was Ronald Reagan, about 30 years ago.
In the Middle East, As more things change, the more they stay the same.