Some may be wondering why, for many years, President Obama hasn't taken much interest in the NYPD-CIA cooperation, a model other law enforcement agencies used.
Part of the roadblock is the President: He's afraid of a revolt by the Intelligence Community if he leads an investigation of their misconduct after 9-11. [h/t]
There's plenty of evidence the NYPD-CIA cooperation was modeled within other law enforcement jurisdictions.
• The CIA public affairs office confirmed the CIA assistance to law enforcement was not solely to NYPD.
• Wikileaks shows us there are NYPD connections with JTTF, jointly sharing with the FBI an interest in monitoring federal weapons of mass detection programs.
• The ACLU also has information.
The information below goes through some of the interesting connections within the ACLU database between the NYPD and the interrogations at Guantanamo, and outlines why there may be some larger issues related to Geneva and FISA not just for NYPD but for your local law enforcement.
The Guantanamo interrogation transcripts show NYPD detectives were working with Guantanamo interrogators. If you scroll back and forth from October 2002 through the Guantanamo-related FOIA releases, you'll see some interesting intelligence briefings the US government gave to local law enforcement personnel.
Search: "NYPD"
Then notice this in the document summary:
Author: NYPD detective assigned to GTMO
Here is the document reference:
Document #: DOJFBI001682-DOJFBI001684
Date of Record: 2002-11-25
Government Agency: FBI
URL for the original document: here
The key language refers to the rotation system,
The new FBI group (Including four NYPD Detectives) is settling in and becoming more and more comfortable with the routine down here. The other group (AF OSI, Army CID, and NCIS) that I rotated in with will be leaving very soon also. They were a great group of people to work with.
Notice the "groups" distinguish between (a) law enforcement on the "civilian" side -- FBI, local law enforcement -- and (b) the "military" side -- OSI, CID, NCIS.
This distinction between military and law enforcement interrogations was important in later discussions in Dec 2002. Recall, later we learned that when information collected was not used for prosecution, there was little concern whether that information had been the fruit of abuse. NYPD-CIA presumably argued, "We're using this information for intelligence and national security, not 'primarily' for prosecution, therefore FISA-Geneva do not control our interrogation/electronic interception.
Later, you'll see how the two groups interfaced, and information was exchanged through briefings. This forms the basis to conclude that the NYPD-CIA cooperation was a model which was much wider than just NYPD.
Here is where there is some overlap between FBI and DoD Intelligence.
A Key Term Within NYPD Emails
There's an important event, which NYPD officers would not have been all that familiar. If you recall the recent hurricane along the East Coast, you'll see how unusual those types of winds are. In 2002, there was a similar event. NYPD officers assigned to Guantanamo, and later transferred back to NYC, would have likely commented on the storm near Guantanamo.
We would like public FOIA requesters to review the following FOIA response, and then consider using this event as a key indicator when examining NYPD-related message traffice from within NYC, and when connected with NYPD-CIA cooperation.
They key information relates to the unusual transfer of prisoners from Camp Delta at Guantanamo because of the weather, which NYPD-connected law enforcement officers would have likely heard about, mentioned, or discussed in 2011 when recalling events of 2002:
Information: "A Hurricane Condition IV is now in effect for all base personnel, meaning that the suspected time of impact is within 72 hours, Camp America will be totally vacated by 1400 hours tomorrow (09/25/2002, Wedneepay) and all detainees will be secured away from Delta for at least 48 hours."
Document #: DOJFBI001565
Date of Record: 2002-09-24
Government Agency: FBI
Url: here
It remains unclear how the CIA used the lessons from the NYPD-CIA cooperation to train the Iraqi National intelligence Service (INIS). In Iraq, the CIA had problems with Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and it's a question how CIA-NYPD applied these lessons from Iraq to better monitor undercover agents in NYPD.
We do not believe CIA-NYPD would have allowed undercover NYPD agents to roam ethnic areas without random audits, especially with the prospect of a sleeper agent within the Demographcis Unit. This would have required supervisory-level reports from outside agencies to NYPD.
We believe CIA would have likely cooperated with the newly assigned CIA-NYPD management to conduct audits and provide feedback on the progress of undercover detectives assigned to the demographics unit. Otherwise, there was no basis for NYPD Management to know whether undercover agents were or were not meeting reasonable observation targets.
It's possible, by violating FISA, that NSA-captured information was routed through CIA-NYPD to management so they could examine the preliminary planning for a meeting. This information could have formed a baseline to explore whether an undercover detective was or was not adequately covering a region/cafe, or fully observing events and conversations related to ethnic events.
It's curious the FBI director was supposedly aware of the NYPD-CIA cooperation, but didn't do anything about it. Presumably, because of the FBI connection with NYPD at Guantanamo, he was already aware.
This document shows a sample of message traffic related to FBI agent observations to FBI HQ, one month after the NYPD reference:
Document #: DOJFBI001545-DOJFBI001548
Date of Record: 2002-11-13
Government Agency: FBI
URL: here
It remains a matter of law whether the FBI director or Attorney General knew, or should have known, of an
inappropriate relationship between local law enforcement and the CIA; how this relationship was exported to other local jurisdictions; and whether Federal laws were violated, not enforced, or deliberately ignored.
The documents show these were not merely a single visit by NYPD, but they were part of a regular rotation system. Another document lists law enforcement personnel from Arizona -- far from New York -- who were also part of this rotation system.
Establishes: Local Law Enforcement at Guantanamo, Not Limited to NYPD
Information: "The interview was conducted by [redacted] Arizona Department of Public Safety/FBI, JTTF"
Document #: DOJFBI003262-DOJFBI003263
Date of Record: 2002-10-07
Government Agency: FBI
URL: Here
The dates on these documents are interesting, because if you go back into the summer of 2002, you'll find some of the briefings by the US government explaining the liaision with local law enforcement.
Document #: DOD056102-DOD056113
Date of Record: 2002-10-16
Government Agency: DOD
URL: Here
The interesting information from the briefing is on pages 11 of 12, showing us that DOD didn't have much information/experience with the process.
A "cold start" for DoD. No experience in this type of effort. We are learning as we go.
Presumably, neither would NYPD-CIA, despite NYPD attendance to the interrogations in 2002. Without a valid process in place to address ICRC concerns at the federal level, there's little prospect there was a robust legal compliance program when the NYPD-CIA model was exported to other jurisdictions in the United States.
Also of interest in the briefing is the documented Senior Review, showing us there would have been information related to intelligence passed up the channels to senior officials. This shows there was not only a review, but a process to coordinate cooperation and intelligence sharing between Guantanamo and law enforcement:
Interagency Experts Group
—Chaired by DoD at the Assistant Secretary level.
— Purpose is to:
• review case files for potential transfers or releases;
• coordinate intelligence and law enforcement efforts; and
• coordinate diplomatic efforts.
From:
Document #: DOD056102-DOD056113
Date of Record: 2002-10-16
Government Agency: DOD
URL: Here
This shows us that there was a briefing in October 2002, near when NYPD detectives were assigned, and that there was a planned process and review procedure to coordinate intellingence and law enforcement efforts.
It appears the term "Interagency Experts" is similar to the phrase "outside agencies" on the NYPD Demographics Unit supervisory feedback to an undercover detective in 2006.
The CIA acts a covert arm for the nation, not just the President and Secretary of Defense. The CIA, working with the NYPD, was gathering tactical intelligence for DoD and other combat forces. Presumably, the issue isn't narrowly how much NYPD or other law enforcement agencies cooperated with the CIA, but, more broadly, how this law enforcement-CIA relationship and cooperation was overseen by the Department of Defense against American civilian targets.
This shows the cooperation between those assigned to Guantanamo and the law enforcement community:
"Intelligence facility for interrogations, and to enable other intelligence and law enforcement efforts.
From: Ibid
If you have time, you can scroll back and forth through the ACLU records database, and examine documents related to Guantanamo interrogations. You'll start to see some of the presentations related to US government cooperation with law enforcement personnel.
One program was the Temporary Assignment or rotation system. For forty-five days, law enforcement personnel were rotated through Guantanamo. Case 188 was a sample interrogation which referred to the 45-day rotation cycle:
"The NCAVC currently is rotating two SSAs every 45 days to assist with the interview process concerning the detainees housed at GTMO."
Document #: DOJFBI002921-DOJFBI002922
Date of Record: 2002-08-28
Government Agency: FBI
URL here
This allowed local law enforcement to get first-hand experience interctding with prisoners at Guantanamo.
Presumably, NYPD detectives were assigned, learned things, then brought those lessons back to NY City, where other officers learned from those who personally attended the interrogations.
NYPD officers were also allowed to attend the FBI Academy at Quantico, VA. This allowed them to get information about intelligence gathering methods.
It remains to be understood how the NYPD-CIA law enforcement model was learned and exported to other local law enforcement jurisdictions.
It appears the model -- detentions, searches, seizures, intelligence gathering -- was applied in both JTTF and non-JTTF jurisdictions. It is possible the FBI Academy used lessons learned from Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and CIA black sites to update law enforcement personnel on interrogation methods to be applied under a similar NYPD-CIA-like domestic law enforcement program.
There is another set of files within the ACLU Torture Logs, which are connected with "GTMO Updates." These were from FBI Agents to Bureau Headquarters ("BuHQ") and Bureau Management ("BuMa") as they prepared for travel on Bureau Aircraft ("BuAC" or "BuPlane").
One sample document in the ACLU Torture Archive is:
Document #: DOJFBI002525-DOJFBI002526
Date of Record: 2002-10-26
Government Agency: FBI
URL: Here
Some are wondering what you can do about the illegal
domestic spying, modeled after the CIA-NYPD cooperation.
First, closely examine the CIA Public Affair's office press releases related to the NYPD-CIA cooperation. Note closely that the admitted-cooperation is not solely between the NYPD and CIA. Rather, CIA says that some of the cooperation was with the NYPD, strongly suggesting there were other law enforcement agencies the CIA was cooperating with.
Second, consider applying this toolkit when monitoring your local law enforcement. Your goal might be to see how your local law enforcement practices mirror those disclosed within the NYPD-CIA model.
Third, consider the possibility that the FISA Immunity Act of 2008 was, in part, designed to immunize NYPD-connected violations of FISA. Presumably, this immunity would -- in theory -- prevent the public from examining how the CIA-NYPD cooperated to violate FISA; or in how your local law enforcement applied the CIA-NYPD model to violating FISA without your hometown.
Conclusion
The NYPD-CIA cooperation appears to be a subset of a larger DoD-managed intelligence gathering system directed against American citizens domestically.
We are surprised to learn the NYPD-CIA cooperation at Guantanamo appears much more than a benign interface system, but part of something larger connected with intelligence gathering, dissemination, and use by the federal and local law enforcement communities.
We believe one means for the NYPD-CIA model to have been exported was through the interrogation-intelligence lessons learned at the overseas interrogation centers. Some published presentations establish some of the architecture of this relationship between the intelligence community and local law enforcement. The question is the details, subject to other reporting, investigations, FOIA, and reviews.
We do not believe that the NYPD-CIA cooperation was isolated to NYPD, but was an extensive, world-wide cooperative effort between local law enforcement and the United States leadership within the intelligence and law enforcement communities. This document shows us FBI agents were trained at Ft. Belvoir, but we have no information whether NYPD-CIA-connected personnel were similarly trained on Geneva or FISA.
It's unclear whether NYPD-connected officers were aware of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concerns, as discussed in November 2002, a meeting which including Judge Advocate Generals (JAGs); or how these concerns were factored into how NYPD-CIA-like operations were directed at civilians.
We believe that an excuse to breach either Geneva or FISA was "justified" on the grounds that the "substantial" or "primary" purpose of the FISA-Geneva violation was not for prosecution, but for a different objective. However, the oath of office is not to national defense at any cost, but to the preservation of the Constitutional established order within the law, as Youngstown showed Truman during times of war.
It remains a matter of law whether -- because of apparent decisions not to investigate allegations of war crimes -- whether senior officials within the intelligence and law enforcement communities might be prosecuted for violations of the laws of war. Some of these breaches were discussed in the Taguba Report, which mentioned the serious standards of conduct applicable to the treatment of prisoners [Taguba Annex # 33 FM 27-10, Military Justice].
There is no statute of limitations for war crimes. Foreign jurisdictions, upon learning the United States senior leadership did not want to provoke a domestic revolt, might conclude, as a matter of law, that the US efforts to "enforce" Geneva are whitewashes. They may conclude, under the theory of "universal jurisdiction," that the Executive Branch has no serious plans to bring this evidence before US courts.
Should foreign jurisdictions conclude such, it might be possible foreign courts could attempt to prosecute NYPD-connected officers for alleged breaches of Geneva while assigned to Guantanamo. It remains unclear how information unlawfully collected outside FISA was used by NYPD-CIA to execute this strategy allegedly in breach of the laws of war.
We believe the NYPD-CIA cooperation is important not only as a model for how other US law enforcement units cooperated with the CIA, but in how other non-federal officers may have benefited from the FISA immunity Act of 2002, with the ultimate aim of avoiding consequences for the breaches of the laws of war.
We believe the current President, because of his fear of a revolt by the defense and intelligence communities, has not fully enforced Geneva. We believe the disclosed information about NYPD-involvement with Guantanamo may relate to a larger NYPD-CIA operation to export this model to other jurisdictions, gather lessons, and then export this cooperative model to foreign combat zones not limited to Iraq.
Once exported to a combat zone, that policy, procedure, and other government program would be something that could be connected to the Secretary of Defense, widening the growing possibility that US citizens allegedly abused overseas could bring additional suits not only against SecDef, but against named officials working for NYPD and the CIA.
We believe the information publicly available could reasonably give a foreign power and jurisdiction the legal basis to set a deadline for the United States to disclosed documents and evidence related to NYPD-CIA cooperation; and other evidence related to their alleged connection with violations of the laws of war in other foreign jurisdictions, not limited to Europe, Africa, and Asia.
It appears the President of the United States may have allowed these breaches to go unenforced. It remains a matter of international criminal law whether these are subsequent breaches of the laws of war. Former Vice President Cheney has already expressed some concerns in his new book that there were issues of war crimes. We remain unconvinced that the current DOJ OLC has not discussed these similar issues with the current President.
We believe part of the post-9-11-related harassment directed at civilians is related to attempts by the intelligence-national security "communities" to retaliate against those who have observed this alleged officially-sanctioned misconduct. This abuse comes in the wake of Geneva and FISA violations; and the flawed export of the NYPD-CIA intelligence gathering model to other jurisdictions within the United States.
It appears the aim of these operations was to directly support combat operations by the Department of Defense and intelligence community against civilian and non-civilian targets. This was done, in part, without adequate regard to the Supreme Law, FISA, laws of war, Geneva, or other legal precedents governing the President, SecDef, NYPD, FBI, CIA, and others connected with the domestic law enforcement units.
Congress has no legal authority to prevent We the People from expansively reviewing these alleged breaches of Geneva, FISA, and other statutes.
Recommendations
1. Geneva
We encourage the NYPD-CIA cooperation be viewed through the lens of a potential war crimes investigation. It remains a matter of law whether the reportedly admitted to "intelligence destruction" by NYPD is evidence destruction related to the laws of war, allegedly a subsequent offense per Geneva.
2. FISA
NYPD-CIA cooperation should also be examined through the lens of alleged FISA violations: What information did NYPD have access, request, or allegedly unlawfully obtain by breaching FISA standards; and what did they promise, threaten, or offer the telecoms to not fully comply with FISA requirements.
Examine the relationship between NSA intercepts, and information provided through DOJ to the NYPD-CIA for purposes of identifying potential areas the NYPD undercover detectives were not aware, or needed to focus their efforts.
3. Exported Model, Supporting DoD
NYPD-CIA cooperation should be viewed as a model that was exported to other jurisdictions outside NYC.
4. Larger CIA Staff Support to NYPD
We encourage interested investigators to examine evidence the CIA provided for the NYPD supervisors ongoing feedback, audits, and field level tactical intelligence on whether the undercover agents were or were not meeting benchmarks.
Note in this document -- in the URL at the bottom -- the words, "ORION," and "CaseData." Use those similar URL-connected terms as sample flags or "key terms" for searches within NYPD.