February 25, 2013 by Bruce Wallace, 121Contact
“Intelligence (noun) the ability to learn or
understand or to deal with new or trying situations”[1]
Musing on the
February 15, 2013 Robert C. Gottlieb, Esq. talk at John Jay College of Criminal
Justice, “Has fear of terrorism robbed
America of its soul?” we wondered if his discussion of fear-driven,
over-reactive responses to the attacks of 9/11 on America’s legal system and
sense of values didn’t lead to a broader question…
Has the fear of
Terrorism Robbed us of our Senses?
Fear has driven
errors in preparation and response that make us more, not less, vulnerable to
terrorist attacks. We can return to more efficacious actions if we admit our
errors, do the necessary research, and implement strategies and tactics that
are based upon sound science, and not panicked, instinctive reactions.
How have Errors in
Thinking Manifested?
The most
important strategic error was our declaring a “War on Terror,” with its
implications of the possibility of a final victory. The war rhetoric guides our
responses to violent actions that have unexpected results exactly because we
are dealing with terrorist mindsets and not with classical, international
conflicts. The Drone war generates more terrorists than it kills because of the
recruiting power of the perceived atrocities that the U.S. commits with its
targeted killings and consequent deaths of innocent civilians. The insertion of
American troops into Arab lands has become a powerful part of al Qaeda’s global
narrative of terrorism and is used to justify martyrdom operations.[2] The creation
of Guantanamo Prison, the use of extraordinary rendition, torture and the
creation of numerous ‘black sites’ are also used as recruitment inducements.
The Presidency has taken extraordinary powers unto itself making the Office of President
judge, jury, and final word on assassinations of both citizens and non-citizens
alike. There has been a strong backlash among local populations that serves to
engender resentment against the U.S. and to radicalize people. The radicalized
are those most prone to take the next steps into violent extremism. (Moghaddam)
At home we have
taken drastic, and sometimes ludicrous, measures to ‘ensure safety.’ The
Patriot Act has taken constitutional rights away from Americans and the
Homeland Security airport procedures have become an expensive joke. Media have
consistently framed the dangers as imminent when they are of relatively low
risk. Our overall response to 9/11 was and continues to be one of exaggeration
and narrow-mindedness.
Why have we made
Errors in Judgment?
The sciences
that study thought processes, especially those manifest under stress, are
revealing distortions in logic that act beneath our usual awareness. These
distortions cause errors in thinking and lead to inevitable errors in judgment.
This logical chain is demonstrable in
the laboratory and is predictable, mainly within the science of cognitive and
social-cognitive studies. Psychological influences on our individual and group
responses to fear and outside threats are measurable and help to explain our
individual, national, and government reactions to 9/11.
Cognitive
science teaches us that negativity bias causes us to pay attention to and give
more weight to our fears of attack than is warranted by facts. An effect of
loss aversion pushes the politicians and the population at large to accept huge
costs to avoid what might be small chances of attacks. Threats generate changes
in thought that are more conservative and more accepting of immediate violent
solutions. (Cohen) Under stress we tend to replace logical thinking with black and white views, rigidity,
and closed-mind perception. (Hudson)
Primary Misunderstandings
Basic flaws in
understanding the nature of terrorist organizations and their mindset lead to
false conclusions about the best way to thwart their efforts. This interferes
with our critical ability to “Pay attention to the impact of US action/policy
on Terrorism’s thinking, beliefs, and goals.”[3] One example is the persistence of “Black
Sites”, at one time involving over 50 countries, which yield little actionable
data but function as a constant source of propaganda for terrorists. In each of
those countries the local Islamists have ‘proof’ that the local government is a
partner to the America’s anti-Muslim crusade. Targeted killing has likewise
been more advantageous to al Qaeda than to the “War on Terror.” The ‘top level terrorist operatives’ that are
assassinated are quickly replaced and the effect on the terrorists is generally
minimal and short-lived. The longer-term effects of our quick-response violence
against terrorists is an area worthy of more study.
Bakker and
Veldhuis delineate a number of misperceptions that skew decision making about
strategy, tactics, and policy:
- Western
fear is not commensurate with the numbers of actual incidents.
- Fear
leads to overreaction which can lead to extreme policy decisions which can
generate the backlash of increased recruitment power to terrorists.
- Threat
assessments become possibility-based, rather than statistically arrived at,
vastly inflating the danger.
- Primarily
due to the fact that “perceived collective fear of terrorism can contribute to
elevating real fear of terrorism, irrespective of whether the perception of
shared fear is accurate or not,” we find
ourselves in panic mode when measured response would be more appropriate. (Bakker, Veldhuis)
Simple finance
also plays a role in exaggerating threats. The media know that sensationalism
sells and they cash in whenever they get the opportunity to heighten our fears
with graphic depictions of the latest terrorist attack. We also should not ignore
the effect of corporate influence on Congressional approval of vast sums to be
spent on questionably effective anti-terrorist initiatives, equipment, and
munitions.
Managing
Perceptions as Part of Counterterrorism
The government,
academia, science, and the media all have important roles in correcting the perceptions
of terrorism and its impact, both real (historically) and potential for two main
reasons: Distorted reasoning leads to:
1) The adoption of ineffective
counterterrorism measures, and
2) An enormous
waste of money.
If we
exaggerate threats and perceive them as imminent when they are not, then we
risk suffering the stress-amplified impairment of confirmation bias which can
lead us into restrictive modes of thought just when we need maximum flexibility
and openness. Terrorists have proven to be highly adaptable, changing
effectively as we try to limit their actions. We, on the other hand, have
proven to be rigid in our thought and slow to adapt to rapidly changing
tactics.
Those in
leadership positions must learn to recognize when intelligent thought is
compromised by psychological pressures. The general populace must also learn to
realistically assess the world around them before they make decisions as to
personal safety and who to vote for.
Science has
shown us mechanisms that interfere with rational decision making. We now have
to disseminate that knowledge so that we can all be better at resisting the terrorist’s
aim of inducing panic and irrational thought.
In the
aftermath of a terrorist action it is important to manage fear. This requires
preparation beforehand as well as coordinated activity as part of the response.
Negativity bias, fundamental attribution error, and media’s propensity for
sensationalism all have to be mitigated to ensure intelligent decision making
on the part of government, and intelligent response on the part of the public.
Distortions that occur right after an attack tend to persist and further cloud
perceptions and, therefore, policy making. Scientific risk assessment, clear
information about preparedness, realistic assessment of the perpetrators, and
robust communications networks can mitigate the emotional effects of terrorism.
(Breckenridge and Zimbardo)
Obstacles to Progress
There are many
obstacles to thinking effectively about terrorism. Three are particularly
harmful. The first because it irrationally affects who we elect as decision
makers; the second and third because they have a pervasive effect on the
population as a whole.
1) The power of self-interest:
There is a tension between seeking the greater good striving for our own
well-being. Official seeding office may pander to fear by increasing the
public’s anxiety,
2) Media may frame events in the
most inflammatory way to increase circulation.
2) The apathy of the populace.
People have the power to alter the direction of political, educational, and
communications discourse, but only if they are willing to work toward those
ends.
These elements define a self-feeding, societally
self-destructive mechanism. The great power amassed at the head of political,
media, and corporate entities presents a formidable wall, which leads to
frustration on the part of those seeking change, which leads to apathy in the
face of hopelessness. But there is a way out.
Keys to Success
The critical path to a future in
which we can apply more intelligent handling of the terrorist threat lies within
educational sphere. Institutions of learning have access to the thought
processes of young people. While they are learning to apply intelligence to
solving problems we can enlighten them as to the real-world factors that can
influence the clarity of their thinking. Awareness of cognitive mechanisms that
can interfere with logical thought should be part of the teaching curriculum at
all levels, from pre-school through advanced studies. In this way we will arm
our citizens with the tools required for an intelligent approach to the
existence of terrorism in our world.
We
also have to work to mitigate the current impairments to judgment by exposing
the general public to the distortions that are guiding today’s policy
decisions. This calls for more government transparency and requires cooperation
of the media, and both are difficult goals. Although there is some movement in
this direction, more would be helpful.
Bibliography
"About
Those Black Sites." Editorial. New York Times. New York Times, 18 Feb.
2013.
Bakker,
E. and Veldhuis, T. "A Fear Management Approach to
Counterterrorism." Discussion Paper, International Centre for
Counterterrorism, The Hague (February 2012).
Beck,
A.T. (2002). Prisoners of hate. Behaviour
Research and Therapy, 40, 209-216
Breckenridge,
H.N., & Zimbardo, P.G (2007). The strategy of terrorism and the psychology
of mass-mediated fear In B. Bongar, et.al., (eds.) Psychology of Terrorism
(pp. 116-133). New York: Oxford University Press
Cohen,
S. (2011). Psychological theories of terrorism and political violence; a
non-linear evolution. To appear in: Encyclopedia
of the History of psychological theories. New York, Springer
Friedman,
Benjamin H. Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security, Political Science Quarterly, Volume
126, Number 1, Spring 2011, pp.77-106.
Hudson,
R.A. (1999). The sociology and psychology of terrorism: Who becomes a
terrorist and why? Washington, D.C. Federal
Research Division, Library of .congress.
Moghaddam,
F. M. (2007). The staircase to terrorism: IN: Bongar, B., Brown, LM, Beurler,
Le, Breckenridge, JN, and Zimbardo, PG (eds.) Psychology of Terrorism, pp.69-80. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
February 25, 2013 by Bruce Wallace, 121Contact
[3]
A.T. Beck (2002), Prisoners of hate. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 40,
209-216