If you hear someone banging on your door at about three in the morning, yelling, POLICE, SEARCH WARRANT. It’s unlikely you will be able to get up, put on something decent and get to the door before it is splintered. Probably the best thing to do is grab your dog, duck and cover, and then continually scream—NO ONE IN THE HOUSE IS ARMED!!
This extended Review of Radley Balko's The Rise of Warrrior Cop, Public Affairs Press, 2013 will explain the logic behind this response.
Radley Balko, a journalist with an enduring interest in American policing, has produced a book filled with important information and infused with a frightening message. The author explains how the adoption of political agendas that included clarion calls for the War on Crime, the War on Drugs, and the War on Terror— in conjunction with an enormous increase in the acquisition by local police of military-style equipment from the Federal government—have "militarized" police forces across the entire nation. The author provides a wealth of information on this transformation, as well as well-reasoned and convincing arguments about the genesis and effects of this major change.
Reflective and symbolic of this militarization, the author notes that the iconic image of American policing as a man in a blue uniform who walks his beat with the tools of the trade safely holstered has morphed from the image of a masked SWAT team member in full body armor, clutching an assault rifle to his or her chest.
Balko demonstrates that SWAT team members are our nation’s own “ New Men in Black." Unlike their cinematic counterparts, they are not responsible for controlling the behavior of extraterrestrials. The New Men in Black are militarized police (soldiers) clothed in black battle gear from head-to-toe, who use military hardware to fight their fellow citizens in internal "wars" trumpeted and funded by politicians.
Balko also takes note of the less directly political, but no less important, factors in this process of change. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have generated an enormous stockpile of used military equipment. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security with its bags of money has no real idea of what to do with that surfeit of funds, except to give law enforcement agencies whatever they request.
These two factors have combined to foster the perspective among current police administrators that "my armored personnel carrier should be bigger than yours," and this competition continually raises the ante in the acquisition of military-style equipment by law enforcement agencies. When and M-16 with an extended magazine and a grenade launcher are just not enough, then an armored assault vehicle with a belt-fed .50 caliber machine gun nestled in a rotating turret might just sate a local police chief’s need to be one step ahead of his neighbors, at least for a while.
On a more individual level, Balko argues that the increased presence of combat veterans in police ranks, resulting from the winding down of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, now provides exceedingly fertile soil for the transformation of American police culture into a military culture. The author understands that we should also factor into this discussion the "boys have got to have more guns to have more fun" mentality of some younger officers. As a number of police officers told Balko, SWAT is “fun” duty. After all, what young police officer worth his salt wouldn't trade time writing burglary reports for time carrying an assault rifle and grenades, wearing full battle armor, and busting through doors?
As we know, almost all addicts have enablers. For those addicted to seeing the streets as a war zone, the “Old Folks in Black,” the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) have, like all good enablers, provided the means and the opportunity for The New Men in Black to wage their war. Since the birth of the Rehnquist Court, the SCOTUS has chipped, and sometimes furiously hacked, away at Fourth Amendment protections of citizens from unreasonable search and seizure. As Balko documents, SCOTUS has turned the Fourth Amendment into a pale shadow of its former self. If Justice Scalia and his cronies have their way, it will soon need to apply for entry into a hospice. The SCOTUS has consistently loosened warrant requirement and defined less and less evidence gathered in questionable circumstances as “fruit of the poisonous tree” and thus inadmissible in court.
The SCOTUS has also supported the legislative branch in its efforts to substitute No-Knock entries for procedures that showed at least some semblance of respect for the Castle Doctrine, which has long given special status to citizens in their own homes vis-á-vis government agents. Ironically, at the same time Congress was trying to erode the Castle Doctrine, state legislatures were using the Castle Doctrine and its variants to support citizens’ ability to make more lethal responses when strangers intruded into their home or personal space.
After the attack on 9/11, the Boston Marathon tragedy, and numerous hostage situations, how can one question the usefulness, nay the necessity, of Special Weapons and Tactics teams? Balko has no interest in doing so. He readily agrees that SWAT units play an important role in today’s too-often violent world. For him, the use of SWAT teams against terroristic threats and heavily armed criminals is beyond argument. What is not beyond argument for Balko are the current dynamics of SWAT operations and thier effects.
The picture we have of SWAT operations is one where team members continually face horrifically dangerous situations. In reality, the vast majority of SWAT operations involve serving warrants related to drug crimes. Nonetheless, these raids involve all the drama of our idealized picture of SWAT procedures. The team gathers in the earliest hours of the morning; they check their weapons; they review the operational plans. They don their black gear and body armor; they settle their helmets on their head, pull up their masks, and check their communication links to the rest of the team.
After the journey to the raid site is completed, a gaggle of team members gather on the porch of a private residence. A member of the team knocks on the door and announces their presence. They wait as long as they consider prudent (maybe 12 seconds), and they then execute a “dynamic entry.” The door buster uses a heavy ram to splinter the door. Team members have their assault rifles aimed forward, and the flashlights on their gun rails sweep the walls and doorways like spotlights at some old TV awards show.
Team members fans out and move through the house. At traumatized residents, various members of the team scream phrases like “POLICE DEPARTMENT! POLICE DEPARTMENT! DON’T MOVE! POLICE DEPARTMENT! PUT YOUR HANDS BEHIND YOUR BACK! DRUG SEARCH WARRANT! ON YOUR KNEES!
The family dog tries to do its job. The intruders have agitated and frightened it, surrounding it with the scents of anger, excitement, and fear. Best for it to hide in the closet, but this family is the dog’s pack—the only important elements of its world are under attack. It barks; it growls; it menaces. Using an assault weapon, probably purchased with funds from a Department of Homeland Security grant, a SWAT team member fires three or four 5.66 mm rounds. The slugs enter and exit the dog’s body at roughly 3,000 feet per second, killing it. The family dog, a pit bull, bleeds out on the floor, and during the course of the raid SWAT team members track its blood on floors throughout the entire house.
I have not just described a SWAT raid on terrorists, gun runners, or hostage takers. This was not SEAL TEAM SIX entering Bin Laden’s hideaway in Pakistan. Instead, I have just described only one (and far from the most egregious) of Balko’s many examples of the ill and unintended consequences of the militarization of police.
This was a raid in Columbia, Missouri to serve a search warrant for drugs. The only armed individuals in the house were the SWAT team members. The only “violence” that occurred was the smashing of the door, the sudden intrusion of a group of armed men into a family home, the death of one dog, and the wounding of another.
The raid was initiated based on a tip from a confidential informant. The residents of the home included a man, his wife, their young daughter, and two dogs. No drugs were found in the house. When the police combed through the family’s garbage, they found marijuana residue in an amount considered legal in that city. The homeowner was eventually charged with possession of drug paraphernalia (a pipe). This drug kingpin, so dangerous that special weapons and tactics were required to serve a warrant in the early hours of the morning, was fined $300.
How did we get from courageous SWAT teams risking life and limb while fighting heavily armed criminals or terrorists devolve into SWAT teams using dynamic entries, body armor, and assault weapons to terrorize families and execute family pets so that they can seize a dope pipe? Balko offers us a convincing explanation of just how this lunacy has become commonplace.
The first ingredient in this nasty brew is the incredible increase in funds available for law enforcement agencies to fund SWAT teams. The first element is the Federal government’s provision of billions of dollars in funds and equipment to local law enforcement agencies. In fiscal year 2011 alone, the Pentagon “re-utilized” $500 million worth of equipment to law enforcement.
The second ingredient is the forfeiture of assets in drug arrests. Law enforcement agencies share in the forfeited assets of drug dealers. The Justice Department’s asset forfeiture fund is a gold mine that literally contains billions of dollars. These funds go to those law enforcement agencies involved in drug arrests. SWAT teams don’t just generate costs; they generate revenue without requiring police administrators to go groveling to politicians with hat in hand.
We live in a country that can easily lay claim to a pervasive, if unreasonable, fear of terrorism, hostage takers, or multiple homicides. This fear is fed by a few tragic events and the rhetoric of an array of politicians and interest groups. We live in a country where the military is dedicated to providing weaponry and supplies to law enforcement. That is why we live in a country where 80 percent of towns with populations between 25,000-50,000 have SWAT teams. In larger towns and cities, SWAT teams have been ubiquitous for decades.
But those events that truly call for special weapons and tactic are few and far between. SWAT teams across the nation are at risk of feeling like Meatloaf—"All Revved Up With No Place To Go." Luckily, as least for SWAT teams, we also live in a country where SWAT teams make money for police departments. In 2005, SWAT teams carried out between 50,000 and 60,000 raids. Some estimates indicate that somewhere between 80 and 90 percent of those raids were to serve warrants in drug cases.
So, SWAT teams are “called out” on the slimmest of evidence, as in Columbia, Missouri, and far too often terrorize families with little or no connection to crime. Many of the he numerous “wrong address” raid in this country are discussed in detail by Balko. We have all seen the reports at one time or another. As Balko reports, to further fill their time, SWAT is also now being used to enforce administrative law (e.g., the arrest of individuals for barbering without a license). Some SWAT proponents even support this process. They believe that these raids allow teams to get practice for “the real thing.”
With all of this information, Balko gives us a glimpse of why law enforcement is awash with The New Men in Black and their presence offers us protection but at considerable unnecessary risk. This convincing and well-argued book tells a shocking tale about the direction taken by policing in modern America.
You should read this book. But, a few words of warning. What Balko has done is re-organize the material from his Cato Institute report and embellish it considerably. Unfortunately, some of that embellishment is distracting. His extended discussion of the history of policing and of constitutional law are far too detailed. His discussion of the Third Amendment (quartering of troops) is a case in point.
Balko is also hampered by the lack of data about SWAT and SWAT operations. Thus, we sit in the second decade of the twenty-first century and read about raids that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Sections in the book called THE NUMBERS provide interesting data, but they had little continuity as one moves through the book.
Balko has organized his chapters by decade, which has both advantages and disadvantages. Decades are huge time spans in policy and political terms. So, one must follow topics (Federal largesse) from chapter to chapter in what seems to be no coherent fashion. A stronger internal organization of these chapters would have helped this reader.
Okay, enough bitching about the small stuff. I would buy the book again. I recommend it to my friends. I especially recommend it to my enemies. Radley Balko has done us all a great service by writing this book. Public Affair press has done us great service by publishing it. And, last but not least, John Oliver and The Daily Show have served us well by giving Balko and his work the attention it richly deserves.