Attempts to understand the European Union in the same terms that we are accustomed to using in describing traditional nation states usually end in a fair amount of confusion and frustration. Its lines of formal authority are more complex and defuse an the behind the scenes politics is often quite Byzantine. The ultimate authority resides, more or less, with the heads of government of the 28 member states. They are all people focused on the domestic issues that keep them in office. Thus much of the actual operations is in the hands of an army of faceless technocrats. Suddenly this postmodern army and its technocratic planning finds itself forced to deal with a phantom from the last century in the person of Vladimir Putin who is ready and willing to use his control of energy resources and an army of tanks and guns to make people offers that they really can't refuse.
Ukraine Upheaval Highlights E.U.’s Past Miscalculations and Future Dangers
When antigovernment protesters first took to the streets of the Ukrainian capital, Kiev, late last year, José Manuel Barroso, the president of the European Union’s executive arm, applauded the demonstrators for “writing the new narrative” for a 28-nation bloc weighed down by economic gloom and growing public skepticism about its purpose.
Three months on, with those same pro-European protesters now victorious but their country at risk of being dismembered by Russia, Ukraine’s political tumult has instead brought back an old story line — a confrontation redolent of the Cold War that has only underscored Europe’s divisions and exposed the chasm between the bloc’s high-minded aspirations and the rough reality of geopolitics as practiced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.
For years before Ukraine fractured, European leaders went out of their way to reassure Moscow that their approach to Ukraine would pose no threat — that it was not the zero-sum game that Mr. Putin ultimately saw it to be. That approach clearly failed, and the question now is not just how, but whether they can draw a firmer line. “The European Union definitely miscalculated about Russia’s reaction,” said Linus Linkevicius, the foreign minister of Lithuania, a Baltic state with a long and painful history of living in Moscow’s shadow. “When you play soccer there are rules of the game, but the other side turned out to be playing rugby with a bit of wrestling.”
Anchored in elaborate rules and regulations, the European Union has repeatedly been caught off guard not only by Russia’s blunt methods and its disdain for established borders but also by the pace of unforeseen events in Ukraine.
The move to tie the former members of the USSR and Warsaw Pact to the EU, either as members or associates, in theory has many positive aspects to it. It imposes constraints on governments to adhere to higher standards in areas such as political corruption and human rights. It ties them into an economic system that has historically meant an improved standard of living. Those are all areas in which far eastern Europe has experienced recurring problems. The EU has operated on the assumption that everybody would be reasonable and welcome their advance with cheers and flowers.
Putin is now meeting that advance with a ringing NYET. All indications are that he has strongly consolidated power within the Russian Federation. Now he is laying claim to the role of protector of the interest of ethnic Russians in the near abroad. This places him squarely in the path of the EU's eastward expansion. Washington seems inclined to push the EU toward imposing strong economic sanctions in an effort to contain Russia. There seems to be little appetite for such a technocratically disruptive course. The EU summit meeting has asked the Commission to draw up a list of possible sanctions that they might think about using if Putin should continue to misbehave.
Meanwhile the EU has proceeded to sign a watered down association agreementwith the interim government of Ukraine. It contains the nice sounding window dressing about corruption and human rights. It leaves out the economic and trade agreement which was the major bone of contention with Putin. That is being differed until sometime after the presidential elections scheduled for May.
Russia's annexation of Crimea seems to have been generally accepted as a fait accompli. There is general hope that it will be the limit of Russian territorial acquisition. However, it is pretty clear that a fundamental reset of Russian and EU relations is in process. Putin is unwilling to voluntarily accede to the EU expansion plans in their present form. If the EU intends to continue on that course, it will likely have to find a more muscular approach.