On NPR this morning:
Steve Inskeep talks to retired Lt. Col. John Nagl, an author of the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, about U.S. military strategy and policy during and after the Iraq war.
In response to question of why after 8 years, the U.S. still had not left a trained military force in Iraq:
JOHN NAGL: It takes, literally, generations I think to train a culture of command responsibility for your troops that rewards people for good performance, that does not rely upon their political decisions or their religious affiliation for their promotion potential.
So basically, it was mission impossible.
So what is Nagl's recommendation for for such a situation?
NAGL: I think it tells us that that sort of strategy is enormously difficult. Its chances for success are increased if we put American advisers with these units for the long haul, providing access to the American advantages of intelligence, airpower, medical support. We then dramatically increase the chances that those units will be able to do the fighting and the dying on our behalf to accomplish shared, mutual objectives.
Got it: US sends in "advisors" for several generations to "help" Iraq build a force that can fight and die for American goals in the Mideast.
Sounds like good old-fashioned colonialism. By the way, US gets Iraq's raw materials, basically oil, as a reward for our "help".