Climate change and community impact have made cracks in the Democratic coalition that could turn into a complete split over time.
Cross posted from Pruning Shears.
The conventional wisdom about Democrats' and Republicans' racial politics over the last century or so seems to go something like this: Lingering hostility towards Republicans over the Civil War created a "solid South" for the Democrats. The GOP's more business-friendly stance also sent working class people to the Democrats, creating an uneasy and unstable coalition comprised in part of minorities and unreconstructed racists. The fractures were visible even in signature achievements like Social Security,* and the coalition split apart for good over civil rights legislation in the 60s. Helped along by the Southern Strategy, conservative whites flocked to the Republican party starting in the 70s, and the two parties sorted into bases that had fewer ideological contradictions.
It's tempting to put other issues in that narrative, maybe because it's fun to contemplate the drama of major parties splitting apart and re-sorting in response to seismic shifts. It's more fun than contemplating a major party adapting to new circumstances and including new partners incrementally, anyway.
That bias acknowledged, it seems at least possible that climate change and environmental issues might be in the process of creating an unsustainable coalition for the Democrats. While there's long been a kind of low-grade disgruntlement with certain Democrats in areas where the extraction industry looms large - those who tread lightly around coal interests in Ohio or West Virginia, oil drilling in Louisiana, etc. - the growing awareness of human-influenced climate change and the cost/benefit analysis of unconventional extraction is creating sharp new divisions.
Since I've been paying particular attention to fracking in my neck of the woods, I know how communities are having to accommodate a process that brings little benefit to most citizens. On an issue like, say, water supplies, blandly comparing the amount used to the total amount in a state or region is deceptive. The real impact is felt at the community level, and the relative dearth of political leadership on that creates a vacuum.
In its absence, ad hoc coalitions have started to form ("It's as if bed and breakfasts, birdwatchers, bicyclists, beef producers, and Bambi killers united against big oil"), traditional environmental groups have come under increased scrutiny, and representatives who try to play both sides are being called out. With the oil and gas industry increasingly willing to do whatever it takes to win, politicians are less and less able to be on the fence. Either declare which side you are on or be presumed opposition.
Earlier this year Chris Hayes made the case for a connection between slavery and fossil fuels. He looked more at economic parallels, but the impact on the political landscape could be just as huge. The comparison isn't perfect, of course: there isn't a sizable Democratic constituency primed to bolt to the Republicans over the issue. The tension here has more to do with politicians wanting to remain cordial with moneyed interests. Still, it's an issue that will create increasing dissonance between higher ups and the base, which creates room for new leaders. That may come from unapproved challengers within the party, or it may develop organically outside it. But either way, it looks like something that will only get more, not less, urgent - and that might cause some fundamental realignments.
* I thought this attempt to argue otherwise was interesting:
The fact that many authors have mistaken the evidence in Witte as showing something it manifestly does not is especially surprising because Witte discussed the Title II coverage exclusions in his book, in the section "Exemption of Agriculture and Domestic Service." Here is Witte's (1962) explanation of how the coverage decision came about:
The staff of the Committee on Economic Security recommended that the old age insurance taxes and benefits be limited to industrial workers, excluding persons engaged in agriculture and domestic service. The Committee on Economic Security struck out this limitation and recommended that the old age insurance system be made applicable to all employed persons. This change was made largely at the insistence of Mr. Hopkins, but was favored also by Secretary Perkins.
Subordinate officials in the Treasury, particularly those in charge of internal revenue collections, objected to such inclusive coverage on the score that it would prove administratively impossible to collect payroll taxes from agricultural workers and domestic servants. They persuaded Secretary Morgenthau that the bill must be amended to exclude these groups of workers, to make it administratively feasible. Secretary Morgenthau presented this view in his testimony before the Ways and Means Committee … In the executive sessions of the Ways and Means Committee, the recommendations of Secretary Morgenthau were adopted, practically without dissent. (152–154)
So the historical evidence of record tells a very different story than that associated with a racial motivation behind the Title II coverage exclusions.
It's possible that the estimate of what was impossible or administratively feasible might not have been purely technocratic, though. The perception of on whose behalf such efforts would need to be undertaken might have influenced the evaluation as well.