(photo courtesy of the IAEA)
From The Huffington Post:
WASHINGTON -- A veteran international nuclear official questioned the authenticity of a document The Associated Press relied upon for its controversial report that Iran would be allowed to inspect Parchin, a site suspected of hosting illicit nuclear activity over a decade ago. He said the document contains wrong terminology and other signs it may be fake.
Tariq Rauf, the former head of verification and security policy coordination at the International Atomic Energy Agency, told The Huffington Post that a document the AP described as a transcript of a draft agreement between Iran and the IAEA, published on Thursday, appears bogus, designed to undermine the real agreement and the broader nuclear pact negotiated between Iran, the U.S., and five world powers.
"In my personal view, this is not an authentic document," Rauf said. "Likely a crude attempt to hinder the JCPOA and the Road-map," he added, referring to the Iran nuclear deal, and the parallel agreement between Iran and the IAEA over an investigation into the possible military dimensions of Parchin, an Iranian military site thought to have been used for illicit nuclear weapons work prior to 2003.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/...
Here, according to Rauf, are the 13 signs that suggest the document is bogus:
"Comment [1]: Iran never calls itself “Islamic
State”
Comment [2]: Normal practice for the IAEA in
official documents, legal agreements, is to refer first
to the IAEA and then (second) to the Contracting
Party – i.e., the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Islamic Republic of Iran
Comment [3]: Iran refers to itself as the Islamic
Republic of Iran in official documents, not just “Iran”
Comment [4]: Standard IAEA swipe kit contains 6
“swipes” (swipe cloths). Even if 7 sampling points or
locations within the building (purported ‘explosives
chamber’) are meant, this is an arbitrary number?
Comment [5]: Swipes “outside” of Parchin make
little sense – and only 2! Even if 2 sampling points or
locations outside the Parchin military-‐industrial
facility are meant, this is an arbitrary number?
Comment [6]: Not specified how IAEA would
“ensure technical authenticity”
Comment [7]: This is not standard IAEA language
– there is no “authenticated equipment” for the use
of States relevant for safeguards, monitoring and
verification
Comment [8]: This is not standard IAEA language
– IAEA safeguards equipment is certified by IAEA for
quality/tech specs for IAEA’s own use – any
technical specifications are not shared with States.
Even if IAEA swipe kits are meant, the formulation
of language is strange and not standard IAEA
language.
Comment [9]: Environmental sampling does not
involve “containers and seals” as such – swipes are
sealed in clear plastic pouches/bags – see photos on
my article on www.atomicreporters.com.
Again the language is not standard IAEA language.
Comment [10]: This is not standard IAEA
language – there is no logical rationale for inclusion
of such a paragraph. There is no reason for the IAEA
Director General to make a “public visit” to Iran – he
is not a tourist to make public visit, his visits
normally are for official/technical purposes.
Comment [11]: IAEA organizes technical
meetings, topical meetings, dialogue forums,
topical meetings, experts meetings, symposia -‐-‐
“technical roundtable” is not standard IAEA
language
Comment [12]: Correct formal title is: Deputy
Director General, Head of the Department of
Safeguards – this formulation is used by the IAEA in
official agreements and documents. "
"Comment [13]: This is unprecedented – in the
past IAEA has signed agreements with the President
or Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI) and with the senior officials of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs – these are “designated
points of contact” (POC) in Iran for the IAEA – the
Supreme National Security Council is not a
designated POC and it is highly unlikely that IAEA
would sign a binding agreement with such a non-‐
designated entity.
Mr Ali Hosseini Tash is previously associated with
the Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics
(MODAFL) – Internet search does not bring up Tash
as Deputy Secretary of the SNSC – in fact Wikipedia
page does not list any position as Deputy Secretary
nor Tash."
(each listing above corresponds to highlighted portions of text in the document, which can be viewed at the HuffPo link above)
Tariq Rauf, who is the former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination at the IAEA concludes:
"In my personal view this is not an authentic document, several reasons cited in the notes appended in the margin, and the document is not in the standard legal language used by the IAEA in preparing official documents and agreements with States. Likely a crude attempt to hinder the JCPOA and Road-‐map – origin of the document could be similar to that of the “Niger Letter” re uranium purchases by Iraq.
Yowch - the comparison to the Niger Letter is pretty brutal. If Rauf is correct, it suggests the neocons are resorting to the same old dirty tricks to make a case for war.