As soon as NATO ( the US) leaves Afghanistan can the corrupt government in our wake survive a determined Taliban assault?
I just read “The Impact of the 2014 U.S.-NATO Withdrawal on the Internal Politics of Afghanistan” by Nazif M. Shahrani (Asian Survey, Vol. 55 No. 2, March/April 2015; (pp. 273-298) DOI: 10.1525/as.2015.55.2.273). It was a fascinating read on the history of Afghanistan focusing on the history of our involvement.
Because Afghanistan is a cross road between East and West, the country is populated with multiple ethic and tribal groups such as Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Shia Hazara and Turkmen. The are multiple Pashtun tribes but the Pashtun monarchy consolidated control by politically merging the Tribes into one Pushtun ruling group. (pg 276)
Pashtun power was eliminate by the Soviet invasion of 1979. Since most of the refugees escaped to Pakistan, they came under the control of the Pakistan security forces – Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) who separated what became the Mujahideen into six(6) Pushtun groups and a combined Tajik/ Jamiat-i-Islami (JI) group. (pg 276)
Iran only let the Shia Hazaras form a battle group with the Uzbeks and the Turkmen left without a patron.
Each group was manipulated by their patrons to distrust and sometimes attack each other which has plagued the struggle since. (pg 277)
In 1992, Mujahideen led by Uzbeks and Shia Hazaras ironically took over the capital installing their own government much to the fear of the ISI. Chaos ensued with the final result the dominant Taliban (Pashtun) took over the capital Kabul. They did not stop there. The Taliban want to re-establish Pashtun control over all of Afghanistan. They attempted in their typical brutal fashion creating permanent enemies in what became the Northern Alliance (Tajiks, Uzbeks, Shia Hazara and Turkmen). (pg. 278)
Then came 911.
When the Taliban would not give up al-Qaeda, the US attacked with Special Forces and air support. The ground forces were the Northern Alliance.
This is the beginning of how the US used patronage by ethic/tribal groups resulting in “transactional” politics. The successors to the Northern Alliance became rich with the US money funnel. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah (Prime Minister after 2014 Presidential election) is an example. (pg. 279)
Using the Northern Alliance (non-Pashtuns) and minor Pashtuns to defeat the Pashtun Taliban in their own Southern stronghold had the consequence of giving the Taliban license to claim they were the only group fighting for Pashtun rights. This move probably fractured any chance of having a credible, effective post-Taliban government. (pg. 280)
At the Bonn conference, the Bush administration many relied on Pashtun exiles who were English speaking and Western educated with little experience in Afghanistan. The consequence of this conference was the formation of an Afghan government split by ethic group with Hamid Karzai (Pashtun) at the lead and an allocation by winning ethic groups of each cabinet post.
The Bonn accords institutionalized patronage politics and politicization of ethnicity and tribalism in Afghanistan.
Karzai proceeded to make deals with warlords and attempted to enhance his family’s wealth and power as well as marginalizing the Northern Alliance. The NATO and US supported the government (Karkai) materially thus creating one of the most corrupt regimes in the region and in Afghan history. (pg 281)
The 2014 Presidential elections were an example of ethnic politics and corruption where Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani had an “unsatisfactory” runoff election (corrupt). The US intervened forcing a unity government. (pg. 287) The jockeying and realignment of ethnic groups is too complicated to list but one can say it gives a new definition to byzantine.
We have already seen the consequence of funding a corrupt, transactional government in Iraq. Because the Shia government lacked the moral legitimacy, ISI was able to easily route a superior force in numbers and equipment.
Afghanistan is more difficult because the option is both corrupt and fractured. Will they be able to survive a long struggle against a determined, religious-based enemy in the Taliban.
Don’t think so without continued US support.