The 1st MarDiv wasn’t the only UN force at the Chosin Reservoir. There was also a much smaller Army unit, RCT-31, all by itself on the eastern side of the reservoir. Their story has been eclipsed the larger story of the 1st MarDiv, but it is perhaps more tragic. My father, who was at Yudam-ni when the PVA attacked during the night of November 27-28, was himself aware that the Army unit across the reservoir was also being attacked. He didn’t know any details, but he knew they were there.
RCT-31 was nearly annihilated – about 90% of its soldiers were killed, captured, or wounded so severely they could no longer fight. Some are still missing to this day. Yet the five days they fought against the Chinese PVA were marked with unimaginable heroism and immense personal sacrifice. As much as any Marine, RCT-31 was responsible for the Marines’ successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir.
As we have already seen, General MacArthur’s “Home-by-Christmas Offensive” directed the Marines’ RCT-5 to vacate its positions near “the inlet” on the east side of the reservoir and move to Yudam-ni, where it would join with RCT-7. The combined forces would then commence a major attack to the west early on November 27. This would leave X Corps’ left flank completely open. There were several access routes from China itself to the MSR, over which PVA troops could pass to attack X Corps’ left flank quickly and in strength. To protect against this, General Almond hurriedly created a regiment-sized force, RCT-31. It would move into the area where the RCT-5 had been, north and south of the inlet. RCT-31 was a hodgepodge of 7th Infantry Division units, pulled together from whatever was handy. (It was not part of the 1st MarDiv, even though they were much closer together than RCT-31 was to any other 7th Infantry Division unit.) The component units were:
The 2/31 (*), 3/31, and 1/32 Infantry Battalions (note that these came from two different regiments,)
Three batteries (*) of the 57th Field Artillery (FA) Battalion. (The 57th FA Battalion had four batteries in all. Three of them had twelve 105mm howitzers. The fourth had twelve 155mm howitzers.)
One platoon of Battery D, 15th Antiaircraft Battalion.
31st Tank Company, which had 22 tanks.
(* The 2/31 and one of the three batteries of the 57th FA Battalion were still in the vicinity of Hungnam, about 60 sixty miles away, when the battle broke out. They did not participate in the battle. This reduced RCT-31's strength by about one third, though in the end I don’t think this would have made much difference.)
All together there were about 3,300 soldiers in RCT-31, of whom about 650 were ROK troops. Had the missing units been there, the RCT strength would have been about 4,500 men – a good-sized RCT, but still smaller than RCT-5.
The Commander of RCT-31 was Col Allen MacLean, whose previous command had been the 31st Infantry Regiment, which furnished many of the new RCT’s units . LtCol Don C. Faith was the commander of the 1/32 Infantry Battalion. At first, RCT-31 was nicknamed “Task Force MacLean.” Later it became known as “Task Forth Faith,” and it is by this latter name it is remembered by history. I prefer “Task Forth MacLean/Faith” because both its commanders were killed in action during the five days’ battle in this lonely place.
The lead elements of RCT-31 moved into this area on November 27. When they stopped for the night, the RCT was actually divided into three widely separated formations.
1. In the area north of the inlet was the 1/32 Infantry Battalion, commanded by LtCol Don C. Faith. The anti-aircraft platoon was in this location. The Chinese had no aircraft, but the 40mm anti-aircraft guns could be fired horizontally at advancing troops.
2. South of the inlet (about four miles behind the 1/32) was the 3/31 Infantry Battalion and two of the three FA batteries.
These two formations did establish basic defensive positions for the night, but their commanders were not expecting any enemy activity. Consequently, neither formation set up a tight perimeter with 360 degree security. They were sitting ducks for the PVA when it attacked in the early hours of November 28.
3. Another eight miles further back, in the village of Hudong, was the third formation, consisting of the 31st Tank Company, which had 22 tanks, and the RCT-31 command post.
The missing units were missing for two reasons: the very short time frame allowed for assembly of RCT-31 and the fact that its constituent units were widely spread out all over northeastern North Korea. General Almond seemed to have a problem keeping his forces coherently organized.
The initial Chinese attack was the “pyrotechnics” that Lieutenant Owen saw from ten miles away, on the other side of the frozen reservoir. Within the first 24 hours of the initial Chinese attack in the early hours of November 28, RCT-31 lost about one half of its available strength. More than 1,000 troops were dead, including many of the senior officers and NCOs. 400 were wounded and 300 were captured.
During the afternoon of November 28, General Almond came in by helicopter to encourage RCT-31's officers to continue the offensive. According to David Halberstam...
...Almond seemed oblivious to the fact that a critical part of his command was being annihilated. [Lt Col Faith] tried to explain how desperate their situation actually was: they were being hit by two entire Chinese divisions. “That’s impossible,” Almond said. “There aren’t two Chinese divisions in all of North Korea!” The enemy who was attacking them, he said, was nothing more than the remnants of Chinese forces fleeing north. “We’re still attacking and we’re going all the way to the Yalu. Don’t let a bunch of goddamn Chinese laundrymen stop you!” He thereupon ordered Faith to retake the high ground he had lost the previous night.
He then awarded Lt Col Faith and two other men (picked – by random – by Faith) a Silver Star in an impromptu ceremony. Faith picked a wounded lieutenant and a mess sergeant who just happened to be passing by. Almond presented each his medal, then flew back to Hagaru-ri. Faith’s operations officer walked over to Faith and asked him what the General had said. Faith replied, “You heard him, remnants fleeing north.” He then ripped his medal off and threw it into the snow. “What a damned travesty!” he was heard to say.
General Almond refused to see the evidence that a major attack was occurring. As Corps commander, he had a responsibility to have some idea of enemy strength and location before making command decisions. He didn’t have any idea about these things – no one did – but he disregarded the importance of this ignorance. To him – as to MacArthur – Chinese soldiers were second-rate and
would never be any match for American soldiers. I think his best course of action would have been to consolidate and strengthen his positions, secure their supply lines, and make every effort to locate the enemy’s strength and position, at least generally, before advancing further. In other words, exactly the same things that General Smith was doing with the 1st MarDiv.
If I had to enter a darkened room which was occupied by either a house cat or a lion, I would try to find out which one was there and its approximate location before going in. That’s just common sense. Almond already knew he had the lion – this was established by RCT-31's horrifying casualties after just one night, plus what was going on at Yudam-ni –- and at the Chongchon River — but he blithely assumed the Chinese were “fleeing” north, despite all evidence to the contrary.
While General Almond was in Hudong-ni, the Chinese could be seen, by both soldiers on the ground and in Marine pilots in the air. They were steadily moving south in the hills beyond RCT-31’s perimeter and surrounding it, preparing to attack again that night. If the PVA had really been evacuating en masse, they would have been observed moving away. As the day went on, the Chinese didn’t leave, and darkness would be upon them soon.
All I can say in defense of General Almond was that he was following orders from his boss, General MacArthur. MacArthur was such a big personality, so overpowering, so sure of his “rightness,” that Almond was swept along by what the Great Man said. Almond also had his own reputation for being a very aggressive commander. Someone once said of him, “When the situation calls for aggression, he is aggressive. When the situation calls for caution, he is aggressive.” He may even have been delusional, but I doubt it. Anyway, whatever Almond said at this point did not matter. RCT-31 had already been so badly mauled that it really had no ability to mount any offensive action. It would be lucky to survive.
David Halberstam is less kind. He writes:
With the great offensive, Ned Almond had gotten his last career command, the one he had so badly wanted, and he had been slow indeed in coming to terms with the hopelessness of it, and to tell his superior that it was in effect a failure. As late as November 28, three and a half days into the great Chinese attack, Almond was still refusing to admit the catastrophe it had become and still pushing the Tenth Corps forces to advance. At noon that day [just before he met with Col MacLean in Hudong] he choppered up to Smith’s headquarters at Hagaru-ri to give one of his patented pep talks. Smith paid as little attention as he could. He was busy consolidating his Marine division, already dangerously close to being entrapped, for what he hoped would be a breakout to the south. To the Marines, there was something almost crazed about Almond then, as if he were commanding an Army still on a great victory march, when in fact it was facing total annihilation. Part of it, they were convinced, was his own subconscious racism, which blinded him to the ability of the enemy.
“There was a disrespect for them as soldiers, a belief that they had been fleeing from us because they should be fleeing from us, not because they might be setting a trap – whereas we who were fighting them and had been fighting them from early November knew how good they were – that’s where the phrase ‘laundrymen’ came from. It was pure racism. It was as if the only person in Tenth Corps who did not know how good they were and how dangerous our position had become was the Tenth Corps commander,” said Major Jim Lawrence, a battalion executive officer in those days.
After his visit with MacLean, General Almond returned to Hagaru-ri, apparently believing that his “eloquent words” had convinced RCT-31 commanders that they were strong enough to attack and deal with whatever "remnants" of PVA were in their way. Waiting for him there was a summons to come immediately to MacArthur’s headquarters in the Dai Ichi Palace in Tokyo. The Great Man never once spent a night in Korea – the closest he came was spending the afternoon in Inchon harbor and on the beach during the landings.
During the second night, the PVA attacked again, with greater force. They used NKPA tanks and self-propelled guns against LtCol Faith’s 1/32 Infantry. The 1/32 was still in its exposed, isolated position, entirely on its own. The PVA nearly overran their position. The temperature dropped that night and it began to snow. Some troops froze to death in their foxholes. The next morning, November 29, Faith’s artillery and Marine air were able to destroy the NKPA tanks and artillery. Colonel MacLean decided to pull the 1/32 from its position north of the inlet back into his perimeter with his other units, to provide a unified defense behind a single perimeter. It was easier to defend one perimeter.
While the 1/32 was moving south toward him, Col MacLean saw what he thought were his long-awaited reinforcements approaching from his south. Strangely, as they were approaching his perimeter, they were also firing at it. MacLean thought this was a “friendly fire” situation. He went out to meet them and learned too late that it was a Chinese detachment. They shot MacLean several times and took him prisoner; he died four days later. It is unclear whether he died of his wounds or from Chinese mistreatment. LtCol Faith took command of RCT-31 and finished establishing the defensive perimeter that Col MacLean had started.
The tanks parked at Hudong-ni proved to be ineffective. The terrain was not suitable for their use. The Chinese had occupied Hill 1221, which overlooked the section of the MSR just south of 3/31’s position. As long as the Chinese were there, nothing could move either way on the road. (The north side of Hill 1221 is shown at in the photo at the top of this diary.)
The tanks were used in an attempt drive the Chinese off the hill. They couldn’t climb it; several capsized in the attempt. The surviving tanks returned to Hudong-ni. When they got there, they and the RCT-31 CP troops were ordered to pull out and withdraw to Hagaru-ri, which was also being attacked and was in danger of being lost to the Chinese. If Hagaru-ri fell, then all US forces on both sides of the Chosin Reservoir area would be entirely trapped. However, this withdrawal left Faith’s position at the inlet completely exposed to attack from the south.
With the help of massive air support, without which RCT-31 would already have been overwhelmed on November 29, they were able to maintain this position for two more days, fighting off nearly continuous PVA assaults against their positions and inflicting severe losses on the PLA 80th and 81st Divisions. All attacks on the perimeter were repulsed, but RCT-31 continued taking heavy casualties. LtCol Faith realized he was on his own, and that, aside from Marine air attacks in the daytime, he would receive no additional aid or reinforcements. The Chinese realized this too.
On December 1, Faith began evacuating the remnants of RCT-31 south along the road back to Hagaru-ri. On the way they ran into Chinese roadblocks and hilltop positions. There was fierce fighting and more casualties. LtCol Faith was himself severely wounded by a Chinese grenade and soon died from his wounds. Marine air attacks proceeded throughout the afternoon, attacking and destroying the Chinese positions. In one incident, Marine air mistakenly napalmed some RCT-31 troops. As it got dark, the air support ended. The Chinese renewed their attack for the fifth night in a row. At this point, RCT-31 disintegrated entirely. The troops fled west, off the road, onto the frozen surface of the Reservoir itself. Once there, they headed south toward Hagaru-ri, still several miles off.
To quote historian Max Hastings from his book The Korean War:
Among a host of tragic spectacles that MacArthur’s forces were to behold that Korean Winter, the arrivals of the survivors of the 7th Division’s “Task Force Faith” at Hagaru remained one of the most vivid. Across the great sweep of ice covering the reservoir, the Marines on the perimeter saw handfuls of men stumbling, limping, even crawling. Some were without weapons. Most had lost their equipment. Many were at the extremities of frostbite. “Some of these men were dragging themselves on the ice,” wrote a Marine officer, “some had gone crazy and were walking in circles. It was pitiful.” The Marines hauled sledges out onto the reservoir, and brought in all the soldiers they could find.
About 1,050 survivors managed to make it to the Marine lines at Hagaru-ri; of these only 385 were able to continue fighting. These 385 soldiers were formed into a provisional battalion, the 31/7, which was an operational part of RCT-7 for the duration of the breakout.
At the time, the RCT-31's actions were seen as a failure. Many historians now recognize that Task Force MacLean/Faith successfully blocked the Chinese drive along the east side of Chosin for five days. This kept the PVA 80th and 81st Divisions from joining the PVA 58th Division already besieging Hagaru-ri. Had the Chinese had three divisions available for the siege, Hagaru-ri would almost certainly have fallen. The 1st MarDiv, which did not leave Yudam-ni until December 1, would have been trapped and eventually destroyed. General Song did eventually get his divisions to the Hagaru-ri area, but they were a day too late. They were also considerably weaker. Being subjected to five days of attacks by Marine Air while in the open in the hills around RCT-31's positions came close to destroying these two divisions.
The siege of Hagaru-ri will be covered in the next section.
In recognition of their exceptional valor, Task Force MacLean/Faith was finally awarded a Presidential Unit Citation in September 1999 (49 years after the fact!) LtCol Faith was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor for his bravery.
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