Here’s how compromise is supposed to work during normal negotiations — say, when someone is negotiating a salary with their boss:
- One side proposes an opening figure exceeding what they’re really hoping for
- The other side counter-proposes a figure that exceeding what they’re hoping for
- The two sides work towards the middle until they reach agreement
In politics, this happens during normal legislative negotiations over, say, the cost of a new piece of legislation. Assumptions are that each side has things they want, things they’re willing to give up, and a shared desire to reach a compromise of some kind. So the debate over a large and costly infrastructure plan might go as follows:
- Democrats introduce a package of very high “Level D” in hopes that they will be able to arrive at a consensus package of at least, say, Level C
- Republicans counter with a package of paltry “Level A” cost in hopes that they’ll be able to arrive at a consensus package of no more than, say, Level B
- The two sides work towards the middle until they reach agreement between B and C
But that’s not what’s happening on infrastructure, of course.
Senator McConnell’s statement that the $2T package “is not going to get support from our side” before negotiations even begin undermines and distorts this process. Recent history is full of examples of bad faith GOP efforts to derail legislation proposed by Democrats they would otherwise support (or had previously supported). The Congressional GOP caucus have become masters at trapping Democrats into worshipping bipartisanship, only to unilaterally deny them a bipartisan solution to any and every problem Democrats address, and then assailing them for their partisanship. Democrats lose, Republicans win, and nothing is accomplished.
But back to negotiation, because this new reality — a GOP completely unwilling (or in their view unable) to join in good faith negotiators on a myriad of issues — presents both opportunities and threats for Democrats.
In my view, the Biden administration seems to: 1) genuinely believe that the GOP wishes to contribute to efforts to pass things like COVID relief and an infrastructure package, and 2) welcome this participation. If so, it’s likely they elected to inflate their initial ask — as described above — in anticipation of it being to some degree watered down in exchange for GOP votes. This would be normal. But when no GOP participation materializes allowing a package to be compromised downward in cost and aspirations, the White House is left with two bad options: 1) it can attempt to pass its initial lofty ask, even if it was artificially inflated, or 2) it can lower it on its own to levels it always believed were preferable — perhaps in response to moderate Democratic concerns, etc.
Neither option is ideal. Let’s look at each.
If the original package is passed, the mere fact that it represented no compromise at all will be effectively assailed — the Biden administration would have “rammed through” it’s preferred ideas with no input from others.
Or, conversely, if without GOP participation the original package were reduced only according to moderate Dems’ views, then the administration would be accused of “negotiating with itself” and needlessly passing up the opportunity for more meaningful policy outcomes.
In other words, by refusing to negotiate, the GOP ends up baiting the Biden administration into releasing artificially high-priced packages of legislation under the guise of a process of future compromising they never intend to honor. The White House is then left to either pass this extravagant package — made larger than they’d wanted for the purposes of traditional negotiations — or reduce it, have their bluff called, and risk angering their base.
The lesson: if it truly intends to seek out the bipartisanship unicorn, the White House needs to secure GOP input before releasing package costs and details, not afterwards. In other words, for bills it insists must be bipartisan (or for bills it believes it cannot or should not pass any other way), it needs to involve Republicans in the initial stages, force them to sign on to the idea that they are now negotiating in a bipartisan way somehow or other, contributing ideas and suggestions or hammering out compromises, and then, when a package is released, lash them to it — even if they end up not supporting the final legislation itself.
So the new roadmap, in the face of GOP intransigence, might look like one or the other of these approaches, depending on what the GOP does in response to Step 1:
OPTION I (the hopeful “return to classic negotiation” model):
- Democrats announce that they are preparing legislation costing between Level D and Level C cost, and would love GOP participation.
- The GOP agrees, proposes Level A cost and enters negotiations with Democrats, hoping to stay below Level B
- Democrats work towards a compromise bill costing between B and C (as above)
- Bipartisan legislation passes, moderate cost and impact, but better politics
Or,
OPTION II (the cynical “beat them at their own game” model):
- Democrats announce that they are preparing legislation costing between Level D and Level C cost, and would love GOP participation.
- The GOP refuses to negotiate (or offers only the façade of participating, as in the current infrastructure bill)
- Democrats complete a bill on their own at or around Level C cost, thereby providing a lower cost solution (but higher/more impactful than in Option A) — notably avoiding “negotiating with themselves” but at the same time inoculated against the “their way or the highway” criticism that would have been most potent at Level D cost
- Partisan legislation passes, higher cost and impact, but more problematic politics
What we cannot do is continue to try to kick the bipartisan football while the GOP plays Lucy, ready with talking points undermining any action we take.
Looking forward to your feedback. Thanks for reading.