I am writing as an amateur reader with no legal expertise; only an immigrants outside perspective on American society. I lean left politically but otherwise subscribe to no ideology so I felt I could comment on the state of the United States as a relatively neutral party. I came to the idea of writing these reflections as part of my side-project of reading multiple long audiobooks this year of which a compilation of the Federalist papers is but one. It's a 23 hour listen so I'll be reading over 5 days and making 5 different diaries as to give each chunk their proper due. I’ll quote passages where relevant; but will mostly give my thoughts and paraphrased suummaries.
Federalist No. 1: General Introduction (Alexander Hamilton)
There aren’t really many insights to glean from this one except for how Hamilton predicted the likeliest opponents of our Union.
Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union under one government.
Hamilton, however, triies to give people a fair shake where he makes perhaps a more insightfiul observation
Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. [ emphasis mine]
Reaading further here, Hamilton comes to anticipate the vitriol and divisions of modern American political debate.
it will happen in this as in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense of the public good.
As this is a work of persuasion, Hamilton establishes his good faith bonafides and seeks to ask people to make jjudgments based on asomething that has long disappeared from our ppolitical debaate: a shared basis on truth.
I have had an eye, my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions other than those which may result from the evidence of truth.
The rest of the documents summarizes the theme of the next few essays: the advantages that will arise from union.
Fedralist 2: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence [John Jay]
The second Federalist essay may be of great significance in our current Putinist moment. Vladimir Putin has invested heavily in various secessionist groups inside the United States and our polasrized political debate openms a lot of doorsd for foreiign influence opererations.
It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities.
With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs, and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established general liberty and independence.
Jay’s optimism here notwithstanding, there are substantial national divides within the United States as discussed by scholars like Colin Woodard here which contribute to our national divisions that our adversaries are currently seeking to exploit.
They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on that head. That they were individually interested in the public liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and advisable.
As observed by many scholars of American polarizartion, the sorting of American politics into national parties based loosely on ideology instead of diverse geographical interests has conttributed to the dysfunction of American democracy.
Jay continues hgis analysis discussing foreign threats in the next installment.
Federalist 3: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence [John Jay]
I must once again bring up that I am a fairly recent immigrant and therefore may fall within the category of foreign influence so please consider my comments as one of aan interested outsider who loves American democracy.
ot a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
…
The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
And here arises the biggest folly of the previous decades of neoconservative thought. The Federal government gets its klegoiytimacy from its ability to guarantee peace and the past few decadesof foreign wars have undermined a major geopolitical advantage of our United States.
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for, although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government,--especially as it will have the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more SAFE with respect to us.
That highlighted sentencereveals an unfortunate flaw in our national design that has been exposed by the past few years under Trtump. The rot oof the Republican Party opened the way for malicious oppurtunists to climb up regardless of their lack of merit. Our “wide fioeld of choice” has produced an all you can eat buffet of incompetents and unqualified hangers-on.
Lastly, Jay provides an instructive historical example before continuing this topic on the next essay.
n the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV., endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?
Would a dividfed America riven with secessionist confederacies as Putin wanted, been able to present a suimilar counterweight to the rise of authoritarian nations in Euirasia?
Federalist 4: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence [ John Jay]
Jay’s third essay is more relevant to current events as it points to how a stroong Union can prevent wars and guarantee peace.
It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
Just imagine what kind of trouble TFG might have gotten us into for his personal glory.
This next passage is more relevant to our commercial competition weith China:
them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic.
In short, making sure the United States has no unfriendly neighbors is key to American security. They must either be American allies (Canada) or linked to us by economic and cultural ties (Mexico). This is why Lincoln was willing to bleed the country to preserve the Union in the 1860s.
One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defense of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into three or four distinct independent companies.
It’s this next paragraph that explains why Vladimir Putin despises NATO and the EU ; or is so invested in stoking our divisions.
Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense? Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content to see diminished?
Jay isn’t done. He continues in another installment
Federalist 5: The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence [ John Jay]
Jay’s fourth installment references the United Kingdom, another victim of Putin’s influence operations. He references Scotland. Before we go on, it’ll be interesting to note that Scotsch Ulster-Irish provided many of the settlers to the Appalaachian sections of the Thirteen colonies; and that Scottish philosophers (like Adam Smith)provide mnany of the bases of modern liberrtarian ideology
QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention. I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island, being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES." "We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."
Wgile referring to the United Kingdom, it’s undeniable that this promise of liberty and prosperity forms a single-mminded component of the social contract underpinning the Union for many kiberttarian minded Americans. Colin Woodard points out that Appalachian America which now forms the heart of MAGA America sided with the American Revolution against British opression then sided with the Union against the opression of the lowlaand slaveholders running their states. Their reactionary turn of laste stems from their perception of Federal enforcement of Civil Rights as infringing on their liberty and from the failure of Northern capitalism to provide the prosperity that the slaveholders also denied them.
Near the end of this essay, Jay provides the biggest argument against any disunion.
it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides.
Federalist 6: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States [ Alexander Hamilton]
The next few essays, written by Hamilton, are some of the most controversial and misquoted of the Federalist papers. Why? Because they lie at the heart of many of the most explosive culture war issues.
Hamiton starts by warning against the kinds of conflicts between states that led to the American Civil War.
A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.
Indeed, it took the American Civil War before the Federal government even became strong enough to supress such interstate conflicts. Hamilton makes the argument that then United States must either be one nation or be natural rivals.
So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."11 This passage, at the same time, points out the EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.
Federalist 7:
The Same Subject Continued: Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States [ Alexander Hamilton]
Hamilton’s second essay on the topic of internal discord isn’t nearly as insightful as his next installment would be; but it’s important to contextualize the very controversial Federralist No. 8.
There are causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed.
TL;DR of the rest of the essay: lots of territoprial disputes. But he also continues with other concerns
e competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors. Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
Note the mention of interstate wars and disputes. Hamilton rambles on to mention the issue of public debt (which fans of Lin-Manuel Miranda might be familiar with); … near the end of this essay, Hamilton sneaks in a passage that sets up the next installment.
Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility. We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice.
Federalist No. 8: The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States [ Alexander Hamilton]
This next installment from Hamilton is notorious fr being a favorite of 2A nutjobs. Just remember the things Hamilton was concerned about in No. 7 as we move on to this one.
War between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has contributed to the same ends.
However, Hamilton reformulates this observation for the American context.
In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory. PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the events which would characterize our military exploits.
So, of course, remember what Hamilton was talking about the next time some 2A nut cites Federalist No. 8
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have a good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the army renders the natural strength of the community an over-match for it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights. The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection; but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united efforts of the great body of the people.
The Civil War led to a massive expansion of the U.S. Army to the point weere all arguments for the 2A as a counterweight to the Federal government seem to be anachronistic.
Arguably, Hamilton would probably also have disapproved anyway of the massive expansion of the military-industrial complex as a resuilt of the ACW, the World Wars, the Cold War, and the War on Terror.
The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by the military power.
In case you miss it, that line lends some weight to the “well-regulated militia” part of the Second Amendment.
Federalist No. 9: The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection [Alexander Hamilton]
Federalist No. 9 is my favorite dissection of Hamilton’s prescriptions on how much government we should have, what trype we should have, and what form that type should take.
Hamilton makes historical references to make his point about what he REALLY fears: instability as a result of a weak Federal government.
A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy.
If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been so justly celebrated.
My favorite insight from Hamilton in No. 9 is his invective against those who idealize small government in the American context.
When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or happiness of the people of America.
Is suppose that second line I emphasized applies to many Republicans in state government who harbor national ambitions. Many ”small government” Republicans are ambitious types whgo want to turn “big government” on their enemies when they’re in power.
He follows with an extenmsive discussion describing a federal form of government.
So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
"It is very probable,'' (says he1) "that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.
"This form of government is a convention by which several smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body.
"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
Federalist No. 10: The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection [James Madison]
Personally, it’s preferable to digest the Federalist papers with an open mind. It is Federalist No. 10 that chlallenged my precopnceived notions the most and it deals with what Madison called factionalism (i.e,. partisanship).
G the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.
What I found most interesting about No. 10 is Madison’s discussion of possible solutions to it. It really challenged my thinking.
There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
The first solution would of course be absurd, although many on the extremes of American politics are increasingly tempted by it. However, Madison also acknowledges the impossibility of the second solution:
The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.
Madison naturally makes the point that diversity is the natural consequence of humann affairs and we are better off tolerating it. But he does zero in oon something interesting.
The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property.
Also interesting in Federalist 10 is the ammount of page space Madfison dedicattes to debating Democracy and Republicanism. While many of us would no doubt support the proiposition that ther United States is a democratic republic, Madfison spends a lot of time explaining why pure democracies are a bad idea for dealing with factionalism and talking up instead the republican structure of government.
….
A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
….
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts?
If you read carefully here, Madison is hinting at the separation of powers. There is honestlyuv a lot of TL;DR in this part as Federalist No. 10 is probably one of the densest and most weighty of the Federalist pappers, IMHO.
And so, Madison end up talking up the republican principle. I suggest reading this next passage as it’ll probably come up a lot the next time some idiot argues for antimajoritarian tools like the filibuster; or the next time the reactionaries win unified control of the federal government.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.
And Madison also provides a usefgul distinction for those who still argue the democracuy versus republic thingAlthough I stil personally argue the United States is a democracy owing to the words “We the People” on the preamble.
The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.
Herre, the first highlighted sentence explains what exactly Madison means when he means talks about a Republic. I highlighted the second senbtence becauser it is an apt warning about the crazies who keep ending up in government or about false “populists” like TFG who are good at manipulating our public tempers to make everything abbout him so he can betray the interests of his voters.
In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that, however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
These three paragraphs here have more to do with my personal preference for enlarging the House of Representattives; but may also be construed as an argument for the superiority of the large diverse federal government over the small, narrow-minded, and parochial state governments.
In the first sentence I highhlighted, Madison merely talks about a preference over the size of deliberative bodies; which can be read as an argument for expanding our House of Representatives; and the Supreme Court of the United States.
The second sentence is an argument for how bigger more diverse polities are better suited to ensuyring fair government. If you read closely, it’s an argument in support of the bigger Federal government as opposed to the small republics in the state governments for why the former is a better representative of the will of the people than the latter.
The third sentence highlighted is a word pof caution for those of us gung -ho on things like expanding the House and the Courts although arguably both instiotutions still fall on the too small restriction Madison mentions in the first sentence.
The Federalist No. 10 closes as a condemnation of the Republican strategy of state-level crazy.
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A rage for [bad policies], or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.
In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
Remember that highlighted sentence the next time you hear anyone mention “states rights” as an argument for anything. The Constitution isn’t a suicide pact that should condemn ALL of us whenever SOME of us decide they want to be stupid.
Federalist No. 11: The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy [Alexander Hamilton]
As a diehard Hamiltonian, I am torn between No. 10 and No. 11 as my favorite among the Federalist Papers. While No. 10 pretty much explains why a large diverse United States benefits us as citizens witythin a Republic; No. 11 makes the argument that a large United States brings economic benefits so long as we preserve the Union. I love No. 11 because it puts Hamilton’s full forward—looking vision of America in full display.
THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of those points about which there is least room to entertain a difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject. This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as with each other.
There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness. Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of ministers.
Having gone through Federalists No. 7 and No. 8, it should come as no surprise that Hamilton is a bigger fan of naaval powwer than of sdtanding armies. Buit Hamilton forsaw a great deal of Americangeopolitical interests throughout the 19th century and it is certainly in following it that the United States became a superpower almost by accident after the World Wars.
A further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties.
If Federalist 10 is a definitive source for how we should conduct our politics; No. 11 is the handy guide for American diplomatic and trade policy. No. 11 also closes decidedly against Eurocentrism, and those who would presuppose the superiority of European ancestry in their pedifgrees.
Facts have too long supported these arrogant pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother, moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!
Federalist No. 12: The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue [Alexander Hamilton]
We arrive at another bigbone of contention in American politics: taxes. This is seriously a lot of TL;DR of Hamilton just saying this:
The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates. Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite supplies to the treasury.
But he also sneaks in a point avout the failure of the Articvles of Confederation to just that.
But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other points of view, in which its influence will appear more immediate and decisive. It is evident from the state of the country, from the habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of administration inherent in the nature of popular government, coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for extensive collections, and has at length taught the different legislatures the folly of attempting them.
In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called) constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this country would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable in a free country.
So the rest is pretty much TL;DR repeating the importance of taxation asnd how only the Union can guarantee that. I’ll come back next time for the Federalists No 13 to No. 21