Short fix: My brother is recently returned from Iraq. His CO was one Colonel Tim Ryan, who has gained no small amount of notoreity for writing a essay
"Aiding and Abetting the Enemy", which pretty much accuses the American media (liberal, naturally) of giving aid and comfort to the terrorists in Iraq.
Funny thing is, Colonel Ryan was once the commanding officer in the field most receptive to the idea of negotiating with insurgents.
Why? Because he showed how to do it, and make it work.
I guess only Nixon can go to China. :)
More below the break.
Not so long ago, the military was quite proud of negotiating with "rebellious Iraqis".
Apparently, they're all foreign jihadists, now.
But that was not always the official line.
The following is from an official Army website; it's an archive of favorable news stories.
One thinks that the Bush administration hasn't gotten around to vetting all the news, on account the attached story is an explicit celebration of the benefits of negotiating with insurgents...
Compliments of the 2-12 Cavalry, out of Fort Hood, under the Command of one Lt. Colonel Tim Ryan
U.S. Commander: Respect Works Best in Iraq
ABU GHRAIB, Iraq (AP) - Lt. Col. Tim Ryan tried the carrot, and he tried the stick to put down insurgents fighting U.S. troops in his region west of Baghdad. In the end, he found what worked best is a little respect.
Yes, that's right. Abu Ghraib
Ryan, commander of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment from Fort Hood, Texas, took control of the Abu Ghraib district in March [2004]. There were ambushes daily, insurgents put bombs along the highway several times a day, and at night guerrillas fired rockets and mortars at Baghdad International Airport, home to thousands of U.S. personnel. By numbers of violent incidents, Abu Ghraib was the toughest neighborhood around Baghdad. The infamous prison at the center of detainee abuse also was just down the road.
What would happen at that prison stole Colonel Ryan's thunder, and he would later take his vengeance on the media (as oppose to taking issue with his ill-behaving peers down the road) for reporting on the story.
In the first week of April, violence came to a head. Militants ambushed two U.S. convoys on the highway through Abu Ghraib, killing and kidnapping American contractors and troops. And instead of running, this time the insurgents dug in for battle.
The contractor ambush on the highway right after the infamous Fallujah bridge visuals was one of these convoys.
For five days, April 3-7, Ryan's 400 soldiers fought pitched battles with militants using Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. No Americans died, but hundreds of Iraqis did and much of the town was damaged.
The battalion took control of Abu Ghraib, but it was the worst kind of occupation, Ryan said. There was a curfew and numerous checkpoints were set up. Soldiers searched every vehicle and person entering town and no one liked it.
My brother participated in this battle. He sent an email some days (try 10 of them) after the fight; I sent him a summary of T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia's) views on how to treat with Arabs.
My brother was in position to give advice to Colonel Ryan...He was the XO; I hear all the time that liberals don't contribute.
I'm not sure what he listened to that I had to say. I'm not sure if either he or Ryan had Lawrence of Arabia in mind already.
What is for sure is that they did not act on that information for the first month that they were in the town of Abu Ghraib, else there would not have been so much bloodshed. I mean, per by brother's missives, the town was laid waste -- "like Sherman in Georgia", was the description.
Ah, live and learn...
My first interpretation of Lawrence's advice -- Get them to talk, and be prepared to listen. For a very, very long time. So long as they are talking, they are not killing.
But Ryan also was learning about Iraqi culture. While the councils had political power, he realized he needed the help of tribal and religious leaders to ease tensions.
``When I met with this one sheik, from the Tamimi tribe, he told me I was the first coalition official to ever talk to him,'' Ryan recalled.
At another meeting, Ryan was offering cash for a construction project when ``one guy said to me, `We don't want your money, we want your respect.' That stuck with me.''
On May 1, Ryan called a meeting of all the tribal and religious sheiks at a milk-bottling plant, which had an auditorium that could seat several hundred. There was no electricity and the heat was stifling.
The first two hours saw a relentless tongue-lashing from the sheiks, a litany of perceived injustices by American troops. Ryan said it was hard to take at times.
``They are frustrated and if the idea is to diffuse their frustrations, that means letting them put those frustrations on the table,'' he said. ``As the leader of the tribe - the tribal sheik of the men in desert camouflage - my job is to listen to them.''
Then for six hours, Ryan did some things U.S. officers say is ``outside the box.''
This is a signature of my brother; Ryan's later missives indicate to me that he is a highly-focused, well-read, but very conventional thinker, a well-polished weapon in the hands of his [staunchly conservative] civilization.
My brother's values are conservative, but his methods are bit more...open-minded.
But I get the impression that Ryan is like the Prince described by Machiavelli -- someone wise enough to know the difference between good and bad advice, and act on it.
First, he told the sheiks both sides had made mistakes.
``Just saying we've made mistakes - we've been afraid to say it because people will blow it out of proportion - makes a huge difference,'' Ryan said. ``... Their faces light up and they are ready to talk.''
Can you imagine a civilian Bush administration official doing any such thing in early 2004? How about in mid-2005? How about ever?
It was unprecedented. It's so stunning, to my knowledge it's a feat that's never been repeated.
Then he [Ryan] offered a clean slate, or as they say in Arabic, a white page. If the sheiks took responsibility for security, Ryan told them, he promised that his soldiers would not raid their homes. Further, he said, if the sheiks promised that members of their tribes sought by U.S. forces would stop carrying out attacks, the troops would stop hunting them.
All the sheiks agreed, and the deal has become known as ``The White Page Truce.''
How was the gesture received?
Funny you should ask -- famously.
``This is the best move the Americans have made yet,'' said Sheik Sadi al-Khinani, a senior tribal leader. ``The people will see that the Americans have come here to help them, not what others have said, which is that the Americans have come here to abuse them.''
But why should Americans care about the goodwill of a bunch of sand...ahem, Arabs?
Because. It. Saves. American. Soldiers'. Lives.
Ryan said that in the six weeks from March 1 to April 12, 28 U.S. soldiers were wounded and two killed. In the six weeks since the truce, there hasn't been a single U.S. casualty.
As for the change in doctrine, at least on Ryan's watch? Let him explain it...
``Part of the challenge here is that [historically,] we've targeted the other side as criminals instead of combatants,'' Ryan said, explaining that he wanted a cease-fire, not trials. ``In two months, we threw 107 people in jail and it didn't change the number of attacks. I haven't thrown anyone in jail for six weeks and attacks are down 50 percent.''
The MO going forward, that kept the peace...
Ryan now regularly shares meals with sheiks and uses their method of conflict resolution. If an Iraqi is killed by mistake, or property is damaged, the Army compensates the family through the tribal system.
``We've got folks who want to solve the problems,'' he said. ``We need to respect their culture and their leaders.''
Getting the attention of the brass was good, too...
Higher headquarters has sent people to study Ryan's methods. In many ways, he has done on a small scale in Abu Ghraib what the United States will do on June 30: give Iraqis their sovereignty.
Ryan is now at the Pentagon. My brother is now training units bound for Iraq...with methods that the two of them developed, boots on the ground, that worked well in the hottest [as in radioactive, as in bad, as in bloody, as in infamous] piece of real estate in all of Iraq.
Alas, the Iraqis kept the peace, deferring their wrath on the expectation of a better future, on in which they controlled...one in which the positive actions of Colonel Ryan were not made into lies by the politicians in Washington:
Al-Khinani said American actions will speak louder than words.
The handover ``is very important because this will cut the amount of anger by 50 percent,'' he said. ``The terrorists, they are telling people the Americans will never pull out. This will show the honesty of American forces by transferring power.''
It is my understanding that wherever the U.S. armed forces treat the locals as human beings, even infamous zip codes such as Abu Ghraib and Fallujah and the Al-Anbar outback tend to be more easily-managed than elsewhere.
However, paraphrasing Al-Khinani above -- the proof of goodwill is in being a good guest, and knowing when to depart in peace.
It is now over a year later. The latest round of comments from the Bush Administration suggests that the last thing that is going to happen is a timely departure from a country that may no longer be accessible in many parts to Colonel Ryan, rather, Lawrence of Arabia's time-tested methods.
Why?
Because the sheiks are no longer talking as readily as they once did, leastwise the Sunni.
And if the Shi'a should stop talking, as they did during the Najaf crisis, the game is up for good.