Inspired by Armando's
comments on Afghanistan, but this diary draws parallels between the British in Kabul and the Americans in Baghdad...though I suspect the lessons are generic.
Based on this narrative.
In the 1840s, the British up and decided that the Russians, with whom they weren't even at war at the time, had designs on India and unless they took over Afghanistan first, then India would fall and so would the British way of life.
So they set up a rationale to invade Afghanistan and make it their own.
It ended up very badly...and all told was the second most unnecessary war in the last two centuries...the first being the WMD War in Iraq, with which there are many parallels.
The First Anglo-Aghan War was a precursor to the events of now, a cautionary tale that gives clear warning of what
not to do in Afghanistan.
- The moment you make the other side of the world the most important part of your empire, instead of your own country (British dominance of India vs. American dominance of the Middle East), your empire's days are numbered.
- Why? Because forward basing is not cost-efficient, but rather an expensive way of control, usually over a critical resource (cheap manufactures in 1840s India, cheap oil in 2000s Middle East).
- Making a far-off, populous, and warlike province the prime piece of imperial real estate is likely to give that province ideas. (The British made this mistake over and over again.)
- Mercenary legions will not always fight well for your political reputation or national prestige...at least, not for you.
- Planning out self-aggrandizing wars in countries that you, in fact, know next to nothing about is not self-aggrandizing at all.
- Entering into wars in countries you are ignorant of, because you are afraid of what enemies you might have in the future might do in the future is exceptionally foolhardy.
- Don't enter into local politics with a horse already in the race, when you have no idea what the rest of the field looks like.
- Don't let self-interested adventurers hijack either your foreign policy or the conduct of foreign affairs in support of same...especially the conduct of your wars.
- Don't become overly infatuated with your own armed might, because your defeated enemies are not, and such pride can lead to conceits that are dangerous for any fighting force to indulge itself.
- Anyone who depends on local spies for information and success in the battlefield will depend on them for success in governance.
- Anyone person who can be easily recruited as your spy is cannot be trusted; a great spy should be difficult to purchase.
- Betraying locals who serve you is the most certain way to assure that none of them will.
- If you have to keep your military assets within a secure compound at all times, perhaps you are not in nearly as much control as you think you are.
- Commanders more interested in either (a) their next promotion or (b) the next transport out of country will not report on difficulties, failures or problems that, if they were acknowledge, would jeopardize their obtaining (a) their next promotion or (b) the next transport out of country. (You might have noticed how 'successful' everything was before both Bremer and Negroponte departed Iraq for greener pastures...or how wonderfully General Myers describes ongoing events under the aegis of CENTCOM.)
- Remember picking a horse before the field for the race is announced? That's especially bad when the locals come to despise your favorite.
- Discounting good intelligence will not only get soldiers killed but bring empires down.
- Casual observation of your fighting forces in action, in response to scores, if not hundreds, of engagements staged for exactly that purpose, will tell the local insurgency everything it needs to know about your strengths and weaknesses in country, by assessing what you will respond instantly and aggressively to protect, and what you discount as someone else's problem. (Yes, there is indeed a pattern to the insurgents' attacks; the so-called insurgency experts just don't read other countries' military histories. Big mistake.)
- Your worst enemy will in time be either (a) the leader you deposed in the first place or (b) someone affiliated with him, because (c) once motivated to hate the foreign invader, the first recourse will be to rally behind the last successful national icon, whether he was an absolute bastard or not.
- In lieu of such a figure, the danger is unmitigated for the occupying army and empire, for the lessons on how to defeat it are easily transmitted and analyzed by other enemies...and other countries. (Leading Afghans in the 1840s were not ignorant of a successful overthrow of British rule that began in the 1770s...in eastern North America.)
- You cannot divide and rule a nation that is united in hatred of you, no matter how many ethnic and sectarian divisions lying therein. It is best not to even try.
- When the gig is up, leave immediately. Under no circumstances draw out your departure, for the humiliation will be magnified, and the danger to your army in the field much greater.
- In the long run, the guy you originally despised will turn out to be a closet admirer of your way of life, and you'll wind up placing him back on the throne...or someone affiliated with him, because all the alternatives are even worse.
Regarding that last:
The British were opposed in the First Afghan War to Dost Mohammed, who was their version of Saddam Hussein.
So...what did they end up doing with him?
...It became apparent to the government in Calcutta that Dost Mohammed was the only man who could bring any semblance of order to Afghanistan. During his exile in India he had come to admire the British and feel great affection for them. When finally he was allowed to return to Afghanistan and and again take up the throne, he proved himself to be a good friend to the British: just as Alexander Burnes had said he would.
Naturally, history never repeats itself, so there's no reason whatsoever to think that the Bushies would reinstall Saddam...
...but the British, who had much blood of their own blood to avenge on the account of Dost Mohammed and his son, Akbar, mended fences with him and made him their vassal, anyway.