Today, President Bush gave a speech to USAID employees with a complete focus on Tsunami Relief. This speech came just a few days after I met with a former classmate of mine who had just returned from Iraq. He was working for a Department of Defense (DOD) contractor and chose to leave so that he could go back to Iraq with an NGO or the USAID instead. He says that DOD-funded projects are operating at a snail's pace, while USAID projects are operating very quickly. He is determined to help the reconstruction effort, as he feels strongly that the Iraqis are in desperate need of help, but can't do so through the DOD. His decision was an eye opener to me about the organizational structure of the DOD and USAID, and how this relates to US strategies before, during and after wars.
He didn't leave his job in Iraq for personal safety. Just as community workers in high-crime neighborhoods learn to live with such circumstances, he felt the same about living in Iraq. He also didn't leave because of money. He was paid a very high salary for his job and is now willing to take a much lower salary. He left in frustration for how the DOD reconstruction effort has been done. And while most criticism has focused on particular cases of cronyism (such as Halliburton's Brown & Root division overcharging), he believes that the issue is far more systematic. Money is being wasted on contractor administration and no money is getting spent on projects to help Iraqis get their lives back to normal (with water, power, roads, etc.). And while I don't know enough about the inner-workings of the DOD and much of my thinking is based on a single conversation, it does relate to some of the research I've seen within my own field of Organizational Science. Regardless on one's view of the justification to go to Iraq, this is what I believe to be the systematic issue at the organizational-level that's hurting the reconstruction effort:
1. Lack of external pressure on DOD thinking
Ironically, one major ideology within the United States (especially among Right-wing politicians) is that government should be as small and accountable as possible, yet the goal of defending Americans outweighs this goal, as defense and security is the most important role of the government. Since 9/11/01, this has been an even more acceptable doctrine. Consequently, with the exception of post-Cold War Defense budget cuts in the 1990s, this mentality has often led to a lack of pressure on the DOD to be accountable itself. The Defense Budget is over $400 Billion while the USAID budget is under $10 Billion. Criticisms of how defense money is spent always faces potential political backlash, with politicians concerned about a perception that they are "soft on defense". Meanwhile, foreign aid money is always under great scrutiny, as the perception is that: a) aid can come from private sources and/or b) aid shouldn't be a primary role of the government. A lack of external pressure on the overall budget levels can lead to a lack of internal pressure on procurement. As my friend suggested, procurement within the DOD is focused on cost-plus deals (meaning, an agreed upon cost is set and then a fee is tacked on top) among a limited number of suppliers. These suppliers must not only know how to work on reconstruction, but must pass DOD security clearances and understand the inner-workings of the DOD bureaucracy. For these suppliers, it's just a matter of locking in a deal, not trying to serve their mission in the most effective and efficient way. Donald Rumsfeld is right when he says that the military needs to be "leaner and meaner", but he's got the wrong part of the DOD he needs to talk about. He needs to talk about procurement, and its failed system of relying on crony relationships. As bad as this is for costing US taxpayers (as we're putting too much money into the pockets of defense contractors), it's even worse for reconstruction efforts, as there's not sufficient pressure for going to the suppliers who know how to get money out quickly and efficiently.
2. Lack of an "aid culture"
An organization has its own culture and this culture influences the selection of employees, the goals and objectives, and the knowledge base of the organization. The DOD is a culture that's main purpose is defense, not reconstruction. And this means that its members don't have the incentives or the ability to handle such work. Aid work usually involves constant cooperation with locals to make things work. In fact, giving locals influence over managing the process is part of the goal. This runs counter to a "protect Americans" mentality that is well-suited for defense, but not for aid efforts. Working with locals requires coordination and communication, so skills-sets must include linguistic skills, cross-cultural communication skills, and knowledge of local resources.
3. The External Image of the Organization
As long as reconstruction is done within the confines of Camp Victory and the image is of US military, this external image will not allow Iraqis to feel safe and confident about working with such efforts.
The friend I talked about said that no progress in Iraq can be made without a basic infrastructure put in place. And apparently, the insurgency isn't the only factor that's preventing this from happening. We need to finally come to grips with the fact that Iraq really is in desperate need of "aid" and that we must organize this effort as we would a major aid effort. And this means aligning the right organizations around the right cause. This means diverting DOD money to USAID money (or another civilian organization). This also will help in our effort to have a military exit plan without hurting reconstruction efforts. Meanwhile, the Under Secretary of Defense (who's in charge of procurement) needs to be fired and replaced by someone who makes a real effort on working with aid groups instead of playing a game of organizational inertial. If they can't get rid of Rumsfeld for political reasons, at least they can make a statement at the next level down.
My friend's aim of continuing reconstruction though should be a call for us progressives. We can't let our feelings against the war get in the way of our desire to improve the lives of Iraqis. Regardless of who we say created the mess (US, Sadam, both...), Iraqis still need help.