I'll bet you've never heard of General Fullhart. Let me introduce you:
Brig. Gen. Randal D. "Randy" Fullhart is Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, Md. The CSS is a combat support agency of the Department of Defense with military and civilian professionals stationed worldwide. As Deputy Chief, he manages the partnership of the military Service Cryptologic Elements with the NSA/CSS.
Now that you know who he is, let's move on to why Patrick Leahy and Henry Waxman, for starters, should have much to ask the good General.
The Central Security Service is responsible for, among other things, the security of Government communications. In their words:
The National Security Agency/Central Security Service is America’s cryptologic organization. It coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information. A high technology organization, NSA is on the frontiers of communications and data processing. It is also one of the most important centers of foreign language analysis and research within the government.
That obviously includes mundane things such as email and IM communication between Executive Branch employees and appointees. The burning question is: does it include communication outside official Government channels? General Fullhart is the person to know.
Now the fun begins. Let's posit that General Fullhart tells us that communication on the RNC servers is not protected by the CSS under any circumstances. Now we have evidence that sensitive Executive Branch information was sent unprotected by the very Agency charged with that responsibility.
Then, let's posit that General Fullhart tells us that that info was protected. First of all, that seems unlikely. Second, it would be of questionable ethics for a Government agency to be encrypting RNC server data. Third, if this was done, dollars to donuts it's backed up on NSA-secure servers.
What treasures exist for the Congressional committees to behold? General Fullhart may be the Alexander Butterfield of the moment. Even if he's not, his testimony is essential if we intend to prove that the Administration misused non-Governmental communications.
General Fullhart is also in a position to know quite a bit about anything involving communication. The National Security Letters? The telephone taps? It all flows in some way or another through the CSS.
Let's get the man on the stand.