The preemption is of a sure to come troll diary misstating Clark's views on Iraq. Mark Kleiman has the money -
". . . The transcript has another gem, one that Digby didn't notice. (Why should he have all the luck?)
Q. The one question I want to ask from your written statement, you have -- there's been a lot of effort put in on the resolution and the language. You state this one sentence: "The resolution need not at this point authorize the use of force but simply agree on the intent to authorize the use of force if other measures fail" and this to me is a key question because you know I want our president to feel like he's got all the support of the American people he needs to work this out dealing with the international community.
But, I'm not I don't think willing to vote at this time to say and here you've got my card to go to war six months, eight months down the line if in your mind it hasn't worked out well. I think that's a decision the American people want the Congress to make. What do you mean by that language?
CLARK: I think that what you have to do is first, the card has been laid on the table about the intent of the United States to take unilateral action, so we've moved past the point we were at in mid- August when there was a discussion and the president was saying he hadn't made up his mind what to do and so forth.
So the president, our commander-in-chief, has committed himself. I think it's wise to narrow the resolution that was submitted. I think it will be more effective and more useful and I think it's more in keeping with the checks and balances that are the hallmark of the American government if that resolution is narrowed.
And on the other hand, I think you have to narrow it in such a way that you don't remove the resort to force as a last option consideration in this case. So, not giving a blank check but expressing an intent to sign the check when all other alternatives are exhausted. I think in dealing with men like Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein that diplomacy has to be leveraged by discussions the threat, or in the last instance, the use of force.
I think it's not time yet to use force against Iraq but it is certainly time to put that card on the table, to turn it face up and to wave it and the president is doing that and I think that the United States Congress has to indicate after due consideration and consulting our people and building our resolve that yes, this is a significant security problem for the United States of America and all options are on the table including the use of force as necessary to solve this problem because I think that's what's required to leverage any hope of solving this problem short of war.
Again, seems clear enough to me: Clark was against using force, or authorizing its use, at that point, but approved of threatening force, and authorizing its use later, if the threat failed to do its job.
Of course, that job was defined as forcing Saddam Hussein to get rid of WMD's and WMD programs and submit to inspections verifying that, not forcing regime change. But equally of course, that was the officially the Administration line back then as well. It's only subsequently that, in the wake of failure to find any WMDs, the real reason for the invasion -- forcing regime change -- has become the official reason.
Since I think the question of going to war with Iraq was a hard one, with good arguments on each side, it doesn't bother me at all to be supporting a candidate whose view was different from the one I took, especially when he's entitled to express an expert opinion and I'm not.
It would bother me to support a candidate whose views were incoherent, or inconsistent over time for no good reason, or who was misrepresenting now his earlier views. That is how Clark's positions have been described, but this transcript reinforces my view that any such description is false-to-fact."
http://www.markarkleiman.com/
This was and is Clark's position on Iraq. The rest is lies and distortions.