When Rummy was doing the rounds in Iraq, he could have taken the opportunity to explain that one of the reasons (my own thinking is that realistic postwar planning SHOULD have scotched the entire imbecilic adventure) why they are spending another Christmas in Baghdad is due to a
lack of planning by him and his minions.
The U.S. military invaded Iraq without a formal plan for occupying and stabilizing the country and this high-level failure continues to undercut what has been a "mediocre" Army effort there, an Army historian and strategist has concluded.
Looking at the chaos that followed the defeat of the Saddam Hussein regime, a military officer's study says, "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."
I've pointed out that the lack of post-operation planning was noted as early as October 2002, and by people who know about these things:
SEN. AKAKA: In the Persian Gulf War, we did not go all the way to Baghdad and replace Saddam Hussein. If we are planning to do so this time, most of you suggest that we should be planning also for what we will do in Iraq afterwards.
GEN. SHALIKASHVILI: One of my colleagues mentioned that perhaps a more difficult and perhaps equally important part of our thinking should be devoted to what will happen after we go in, as it is, about how we get in and so on. And I fully agree with that. And yet this is the most difficult thing to do, and it's most difficult to pin the tail on the donkey as to who it is that is responsible for it.
Surprisingly enough, in the open press, in the open discussion -- that's all that I have access to -- there's been very little of that discussion. There's been very little about what opposition forces there are, what political elements there are to tie together these disparate groups, between the North and the center and the South. And we've already talked about the potential of them splintering, and none of us are really sure whether that will happen or not. But there needs to be someone worrying about it, and a blueprint needs to exist as to who will do what.
And so I wish I could tell you that I have heard somewhere on the West Coast, where I now live, that this is all under control. I do not have that confidence at all. But that doesn't mean that something isn't ongoing.
It surely is not the task of the Defense Department, and yet from Haiti to Bosnia and other places where we went, invariably the part that should fall on the civilian institutions to do fell back on the Defense Department, because it's a kind of a entity that you get your hands around, and you can order them to do something, and they generally have the means to do something.
But to establish a government, to ensure that the government has the political support, that the security structures are there, that the police forces are there, all of the things that we saw as very negative aspects of our previous operations during the previous administration, someone needs to be taking care of, and it must not be put on the hands of the Defense Department.
SEN. AKAKA: General Clark?
GEN. CLARK: Well, I just want to underscore everything General Shali had to say on that. I think that it's a very, very difficult task. I think it's really the critical task in terms of winning. I think it's the most difficult part of this operation. It has not received adequate attention in public discussion. Whether there have been decisions made on this or not, I don't know. . . . So it's the United States government that has to take the lead in planning this. . . . Whether that's in place or not, I don't know. But it is the most challenging part of this operation, and the United States government needs to take the lead before it hands it off to the United Nations.
SEN. AKAKA: General Hoar?
GEN. HOAR: Yes, sir. I think, as my colleagues have said, this is the part of this operation that has received very little attention. And given the failure in 1991 to have a war termination plan that would allow us to have a set of circumstances exist in Iraq that would be favorable to us, it seems to me that we should not go down this road again.
What to do after we get to Baghdad seems to me a little bit like what happens to the dog when he finally catches the car. What are we going to do now? And I would suggest to you that it's a National Security Council issue, and it needs to be developed. And I sure hope that this committee and other committees would ask the administration what their plans are after they get to Baghdad and "catch the car."
SEN. AKAKA: General McInerney?
GEN. MCINERNEY: Sir, I brought it up in my comments because I think it is extremely important. I think we have great experience from World War II. I lived there as a youth and watched how the U.S. military did that.
I think General Clark had a much tougher problem, or equally as tough, in Bosnia and Kosovo. We've had experience. It is not one that is above our skill level, and particularly because the Iraqi people have probably the best middle class, the most educated. They've got over 2 million Iraqis that are in the United States today that could go back, could help. Afghanistan, to me, is much harder, but it is clearly one of the important questions we must work because it's that success that will determine the whole success, I believe, on this war against terrorism.
(Emphasis mine)
The failure described by Major (not Col. as I had stated earlier) Wilson should surprise no one. Merry Christmas Rummy, thanks for nuthin.
More from WaPo:
Similar criticisms have been made before, but until now they have not been stated so authoritatively and publicly by a military insider positioned to be familiar with top-secret planning. During the period in question, from April to June 2003, Wilson was a researcher for the Army's Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group. Then, from July 2003 to March 2004, he was the chief war planner for the 101st Airborne Division, which was stationed in northern Iraq. As a result of the failure to produce a plan, Wilson asserts, the U.S. military lost the dominant position in Iraq in the summer of 2003 and has been scrambling to recover ever since. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative . . . gained over an off-balanced enemy," he writes. "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since."
It was only in November 2003, seven months after the fall of Baghdad, that U.S. occupation authorities produced a formal "Phase IV" plan for stability operations, Wilson reports. Phase I covers preparation for combat, followed by initial operations, Phase II, and combat, Phase III. Post-combat operations are called Phase IV.
Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so not did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from "stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt."
Army commanders still misunderstand the strategic problem they face and therefore are still pursuing a flawed approach, writes Wilson, who is scheduled to teach at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point next year. "Plainly stated, the 'western coalition' failed, and continues to fail, to see Operation Iraqi Freedom in its fullness," he asserts.
"Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of a collective cognitive dissidence on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people's war, even when they were fighting it," he comments.
Because of this failure, Wilson concludes, the U.S. military remains "perhaps in peril of losing the 'war,' even after supposedly winning it." Overall, he grades the U.S. military performance in Iraq as "mediocre."
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