In today's Washington Post, there's an article with the relatively reasonable title of
Pentagon Seeks to Fund New Force Of Conventional-Warhead Missiles. When you read the article, however, you realize that Rumsfeld, or his deputies, or
somebody at the Pentagon has gone stark raving mad. See, the 'Conventional-Warhead Missiles' the story is discussing would be nuclear-deterrent missiles with the nuke stripped out.
I'll quote from the article below, but the reaction people should have to this proposal is "are they insane?".
The Pentagon, seeking a faster way to thwart threats from hostile states or terrorist groups, is asking Congress for $500 million to create a new force of conventionally armed, long-range missiles capable of striking anywhere in the world within an hour after an order is given, a senior defense official said yesterday.
The initiative would convert 24 Trident missiles armed with nuclear warheads into rockets carrying conventional warheads and begin fielding them by 2008. The missiles would be launched from submarines and could hit targets 5,000 to 6,000 miles away within 10 yards, the official said.
This is the story in a nutshell. Take Trident missiles, which were developed during the Cold War to give a secure "second-strike" nuclear deterrent capability, and bolt regular warheads on to them.
The fundamental problem with this idea is that there is no way to tell the difference between the launch of a conventionally-armed Trident and a Trident carrying its normal payload of eight nuclear warheads. The Cold War may be over, but the Russians still have plenty of nuclear-armed missiles, the Chinese have several that can reach the US west coast, etc., and do we really want to take the risk, small as it might be, that somebody will see a ballistic missile launch and assume that it's targetted at them?
Here's how the "senior defense official" puts it:
"Will it be interpreted as having a nuclear warhead and elicit . . . a nuclear response?" asked the senior defense official, acknowledging the potential "ambiguity" of the weapon if detected by early-warning systems. Such systems may not be able to determine if an incoming warhead is conventional or nuclear.
Now, in a rational world, that "ambiguity" would be enough to kill this idea dead dead dead. What target would be worth the remote chance of having the Russians launch a 100 missile strike on the US mainland? Or, for that matter, having the Chinese decide to nuke LA in perceived reprisal for a US strike? Such a thing is a remote possibility, sure, but the potential cost is so mind-bogglingly large that only the modern reincarnation of
General Jack D. Ripper would think this is a good idea.
Oh, and it seems that the administration hasn't learned anything about keeping Congress in the loop:
The worrisome scenario, he said, "is that they do see it, then they misinterpret it," he told a meeting of defense reporters. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they had not yet briefed Congress.
Now, this sort of proposal has been floated before from time to time. At first glimpse, it seems attractive to the military because it really does allow striking anywhere in the world on very short notice. It's always failed to get beyond the very basic drawing board on two grounds:
- Money. Tridents and similar ballistic missiles are very expensive, far pricier than cruise missiles like the Tomahawk
- Is it a nuke? That's the real problem with the concept. Anyone in the target area, or along the flight path, or anywhere near the flight path, will see a missile launch. They won't know whether it's a conventionally-armed missile doing a precision strike on a "terrorist stronghold" (seriously, that's the intended target) or a nuclear warhead aimed at their capitol. If they assume the worst, things can get very very nasty very quickly.
This proposal needs to be shot down, and whoever is pushing it needs to be identified and (preferably) ridden out of town on a rail.
-dms