Adapted from The Next Hurrah
Vanity Fair will announce today that Ben Bradlee said Richard Armitage is Bob Woodward's Source. I don't know about Bradlee, but I know those of us eyeballing the redactions in Fitzgerald's recent affidavit have concluded that Armitage is far and away the most likely person to be Woodward's (and Novak's) source. The problem is, none of the explanations for how or why Armitage would do this have ever made sense to me. They don't account for who Armitage is or his relationship to OVP. This is my attempt to offer a plausible explanation.
Armitage's Character and Motives
I'll start then, with one of the chief reasons I've always been an Armitage skeptic. As I described in my December Armitage post (which has mysteriously reappeared, just in the last few days, after having spent most of the time since I wrote it in Typepad hell), any Armitage scenario needs to account for some well-known character traits.
Let me start by laying out the three Armitage characteristics that I believe any story has to consider. Armitage is, by many accounts a gossip. Which makes it possible that he shared this information with Woodward just for fun. But, he is also very very good at negotiating lethal bureaucratic infighting--he's not dumb, not by a long shot. And, most importantly, he is absolutely, fiercely loyal, to Colin Powell most of all, but also more generally to anyone he sees to be on Powell's team.
There's a relevant episode in Woodward's Plan of Attack that illustrates what I mean:
In the days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, The New York Times ran a front page story on the debate in the Bush administration over whether to go after Iraq in the first wave of military attacks in the war on terrorism. Headlined "Bush's Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation," the story reported Powell to be opposed, while Wolfowitz and Libby were listed as pressing the case for Iraq. It was an unusual appearance of [Libby's] name in the newspaper, and he was excruciatingly uncomfortable. The reporters had not called him for comment, and he felt the leak was "scandalous." He tried to tell others that the story was "untrue." Asked if it was "totally untrue," he responded with a lawyerly parsing of language: "It's not totally untrue, but untrue." He had not spoken about Iraq in the large NSC meeting but as he put it, "there were confabs on the margins."
Libby went to see Armitage. "I'm used to seeing Powell's name in print," Libby said. "I didn't like to see my name next to him, particularly in that context. And I don't have a dog in that fight."
"You want me to tell the secretary this?" Armitage asked.
"Please."
"I'll do it," Armitage said, "I'll do it faithfully, but it's not a personal fight. This is about business. And how we do the nation's business, Scooter." (50)
The episode (and another, in which Armitage goes on the record to better build the case for Powell's strength on Iraq) is a clear example of the way in which Libby and Armitage were competitors making sure their respective boss' and their own agenda had the upper hand in the public sphere. In this case, Libby realized he had been compromised, and he went to Armitage to complain. And Armitage clearly represents Powell's interests and treats this leak as a legitimate approach to defend Powell's position.
The contest between OVP and State was not just bureaucratic for Armitage. It was personal. Years before, when Ross Perot was opposing Armitage's nomination to be Secretary of the Army, Cheney didn't defend Armitage in the way Armitage expected. Armitage ended up blaming Cheney after he had to withdraw from his nomination.
In May 1989, with his nomination vote approaching, Armitage went to see Cheney. By Armitage's account, he asked the new defense secretary, "Are we going to win this thing? Are you ready for battle?" To Armitage's surprise, he got a cool, noncommittal answer. "I don't know." Cheney replied.
"It was the strangest thing I had ever heard," Armitage reflected many years later. "Where I come from, with [Defense Secretary Caspar] Weinberger and Powell, if you're on the team, you're on the team. I just needed him to say, 'Sure, we'll do whatever it takes to win it.' But he just said, 'I don't know,' I realized then that Dick Cheney is a little different. I wasn't his political equity."
[snip]
[Armitage] often treated even government work in Washington as an outgrowth of small unit combat: You kept watch over your close friends, they kept watch over you and together you went out into the night. (Rise of the Vulcans 175-6)
It's this Armitage I don't understand leaking Plame's name. Sure, Armitage worked the press as actively as anyone (including gossiping to the press). There are two reasons to believe that Wilson would be considered a member of Armitage's team, and therefore worthy of protection. First, Wilson had worked closely with Brent Scowcroft to lobby against the war; Armitage and Powell were involved in maximizing Scowcroft's opposition to the war, so it stands to reason that they also wanted to maximize Wilson's opposition to the war. Also, State had every reason to insist that it was right to doubt the Niger intelligence leading up to the war, particularly wrt Powell's UN speech. Therefore, Armitage would have every reason to present Wilson's trip as credible. So I just don't see Armitage leaking the Plame information maliciously.
How Did Armitage Know
Before I get into the actual scenario, I'd like to talk about how Armitage would know of Plame's identity. This is a long discussion, but I think it reveals some of the politics surrounding Armitage's possible role in this.
It is unlikely Armitage was in the loop of the OVP Get Wilson campaign, so he had to have learned of Plame's identity via another route. Purveyors of the Armitage theory have pointed to two articles alleging that Armitage got a copy of the famous INR memo when he returned from his trip in June 2003. They point to this Massimo Calabresi article posted July 31, 2005 and sourced to "sources familiar with the memo." (It's worth noting, Calabresi was Cooper's co-author on the original Time Plame article.)
The previously undisclosed fact gathering began in the first week of June 2003 at the CIA, when its public-affairs office received an inquiry about Wilson's trip to Africa from veteran Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus. That office then contacted Plame's unit, which had sent Wilson to Niger, but stopped short of drafting an internal report. The same week, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman asked for and received a memo on the Wilson trip from Carl Ford, head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Sources familiar with the memo, which disclosed Plame's relationship to Wilson, say Secretary of State Colin Powell read it in mid-June.
Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage may have received a copy then too.
When Pincus' article ran on June 12, the circle of senior officials who knew about the identity of Wilson's wife expanded. "After Pincus," a former intelligence officer says, "there was general discussion with the National Security Council and the White House and State Department and others" about Wilson's trip and its origins. A source familiar with the memo says neither Powell nor Armitage spoke to the White House about it until after July 6. John McLaughlin, then deputy head of the CIA, confirms that the White House asked about the Wilson trip, but can't remember exactly when. One thing he's sure of, says McLaughlin, who has been interviewed by prosecutors, is that "we looked into it and found the facts of it, and passed it on."
Now, we know from the indictment that several of these claims are inaccurate or misleading. The CIA public affairs office received a request from Pincus during the first week of June, sure. But someone at CIA also faxed materials relating to Wilson's trip to OVP on June 9, so the attention within CIA was not solely a response to Pincus' inquiry. This Time story asserts that Grossman asked for "a memo on the Wilson trip." It's not entirely clear what he asked for and why. Did Grossman request it only in response to Libby's May 29 questions about Wilson's trip? Or did Grossman ask for the broader report on State's disagreement with the White House about Niger and uranium that the memo is reported to provide? In either case, if reports are correct, then the memo is much broader than a narrow response to an inquiry about Wilson's trip. Calabresi's article portrays people within NSC, the WH, and State as learning about Wilson after Pincus' June 12 article; but we know several members of OVP had briefed on it before June 12 (indeed, someone at OVP had been a source for Pincus), and the attendees at Marc Grossman's June 11 or 12 briefing likely learned of Plame's identity independent of Pincus' article. Finally, McLaughlin's response may be just a dodge. But Libby's notes, at least, indicate Tenet (or whoever Dick's source is) passed on information on Plame before June 12.
In other words, this article is not fully accurate, and a lot of the inaccuracies serve to portray the discussions about Plame as a response to Pincus' article, rather than an effort that pre-dated Pincus' inquiries. The article shields the abundant activity at OVP related to Plame before June 12. Either Calabresi didn't have good sources at OVP and the WH, or his sources deliberately hid their own involvement in this affair. Which raises questions about the remaining assertions, about Powell's review of the memo and Armitage's possible review of it. Frankly, I think it leaves open a real possibility that Armitage and Powell, like those at OVP and NSC, already knew of Plame's identity before the INR memo, via another source. Or that they didn't yet know.
The purveyors of the Armitage theory rely on one more article to explain how Armitage knew of Plame's identity, this August 2005 LAT article sourced (at the end of the article) to "Times reporting, media reports, White House and Senate documents." This article more directly asserts that Armitage asked for and got the memo.
After a June 12 Washington Post story made reference to the Niger uranium inquiry, Armitage asked intelligence officers in the State Department for more information. He was forwarded a copy of a memo classified "Secret" that included a description of Wilson's trip for the CIA, his findings, a brief description of the origin of the trip and a reference to "Wilson's wife."
The memo was kept in a safe at the State Department along with notes from an analyst who attended the CIA meeting at which Wilson was suggested for the Niger assignment. Those with top security clearance at State, like their counterparts in the White House, had been trained in the rules about classified information. They could not be shared with anyone who did not have the same clearance.
(As a side note, the safe referenced here is almost certainly the INR SCI safe, which we know Bolton's folks were using at the time, and we know they had actually violated the protocols on access to the safe.) Now, it's not clear whether this passage of the LAT article is relying on Times reporting or media reports, but the only prior LAT article that references the memo and Armitage is this July 17 article, which states:
One former State Department official, who because of the sensitive nature of the case asked not to be named, said that the information on Plame in the memo was sparse, but that her identity was known through other means in much of the intelligence community, suggesting that the memo might not have been the way her name spread among government officials -- and the media. As the former State Department official recalled, the memo identified Plame only as "Wilson's wife" -- it did not give her first or last name, and it did not mention her undercover status.
"The Niger uranium issue was a huge argument within the intelligence community for over a year before the Novak column," the former official said. "So all the ins and outs of Niger uranium were the subject of endless meetings and discussions and food fights among people in the intelligence community and all the details of it were well-known."
Once Wilson's July 6, 2003, article appeared, then-Deputy
Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage arranged for a copy of the memo, which had been drafted earlier detailing the Niger matter, to be forwarded to Powell, who was on his way to Africa with Bush.
"There was never any feedback from anyone on the memo," the former State Department official said. "The memo itself was basically repeating common knowledge in the community."
If the August LAT article is based on the July article, then either Hamburger and Efron (they wrote both) were asked in July not to include the information on Armitage seeing the memo but they decided to include it in the August article, their August reference to it is just a poorly-worded rewriting of their July 2005 statement that Armitage circulated the document in July 2003, or it comes from another source, perhaps a media report.
In any case, this July 17 article strongly suggests it doesn't matter whether Armitage saw the INR memo. Folks "in the intelligence community" knew of her identity already, via other means. Consider--if Powell knew enough to leave the Niger assertions out of his UN speech in February 2003, it's likely he and Armitage were privy to some of these discussions.
All of which accords with this July 20, 2003 article, written by the AP's diplomatic writer and sourced to "a retired department official." This article claims that Armitage hadn't received the INR memo before July. It says that Armitage asked that Powell receive some background on Wilson's trip, not that he receive the INR memo per se.
Armitage called Ford after Wilson's op-ed piece in The New York Times and his TV appearance on July 6, 2003 in which he challenged the White House's claim that Iraq had purchased uranium yellowcake from Niger.
Armitage asked that Powell, who was traveling to Africa with Bush, be given an account of the Wilson trip, said the former official.
[snip]
The June 2003 memo had not gone higher than Grossman until Wilson's op-ed column for The New York Times headlined "What I Didn't Find In Africa" and his TV appearance to dispute the administration.
Now, particularly given the date (these last two articles were written three days apart, in the time period surrounding Cooper's testimony when everyone believed the INR memo was the rosetta stone to this case), these two articles may rely on the same source and that source could very plausibly be Armitage himself (other possibilities are Grossman, former INR head Carl Ford, or Larry Wilkerson). If the source is Armitage, it's always possible he was lying to hide his own involvement. But the notion that the intelligence community, at least, knew of Plame's connection to Wilson long before the INR memo got drafted strikes me as logical (and note, this is different from knowing her covert status). Would Armitage be included in that intelligence community? Dunno. After Bolton had made several inadequately vetted speeches, Armitage started vetting Bolton's speeches personally. So he certainly got involved in these kinds of things.
In any case, I will assume that Armitage could have learned of some aspects of Plame's identity before the INR memo, independent of the OVP channels. This makes our work harder, frankly, because we don't know whether Armitage could be the source for Novak's knowledge that Plame was an operative or the name Plame; after all the INR memo only said Wilson's wife--who worked at CIA--recommended him for the trip. That's enough information to provide the leak to Woodward, but not enough to provide the leak to Novak (though Rove could be the source that she was an operative).
The Scenario
Which brings me to my scenario.
I suspect Woodward asked Armitage a question in response to Pincus' June 12 article. In his story on his role in the Plame leak, Woodward notes,
Pincus had published a story the day before, Sunday, June 22, about the Iraq intelligence before the war. I testified that I had read the story, which referred to the CIA mission by "a former senior American diplomat to visit Niger." Although his name was not used in the story, I knew that referred to Wilson.
This implies that Woodward did not know of Wilson's and Plame's identities before the June 12 article and that he learned of their identities between Pincus' June 12 and June 22 articles. As a reminder, here's a lengthy excerpt from Pincus' June 12 article.
A key component of President Bush's claim in his State of the Union address last January that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program -- its alleged attempt to buy uranium in Niger -- was disputed by a CIA-directed mission to the central African nation in early 2002, according to senior administration officials and a former government official. But the CIA did not pass on the detailed results of its investigation to the White House or other government agencies, the officials said.
The CIA's failure to share what it knew, which has not been disclosed previously, was one of a number of steps in the Bush administration that helped keep the uranium story alive until the eve of the war in Iraq, when the United Nations' chief nuclear inspector told the Security Council that the claim was based on fabricated evidence.
A senior intelligence official said the CIA's action was the result of "extremely sloppy" handling of a central piece of evidence in the administration's case against then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. But, the official added, "It is only one fact and not the reason we went to war. There was a lot more."
However, a senior CIA analyst said the case "is indicative of larger problems" involving the handling of intelligence about Iraq's alleged chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs and its links to al Qaeda, which the administration cited as justification for war. "Information not consistent with the administration agenda was discarded and information that was [consistent] was not seriously scrutinized," the analyst said.
[snip]
After returning to the United States, the envoy reported to the CIA that the uranium-purchase story was false, the sources said. Among the envoy's conclusions was that the documents may have been forged because the "dates were wrong and the names were wrong," the former U.S. government official said.
However, the CIA did not include details of the former ambassador's report and his identity as the source, which would have added to the credibility of his findings, in its intelligence reports that were shared with other government agencies. Instead, the CIA only said that Niger government officials had denied the attempted deal had taken place, a senior administration said.
Imagine you're Mr. Insider Woodward and you read that passage in your colleague's article. You've got an interview scheduled with your good friend and great source, Richard Armitage. I can imagine the following exchange taking place:
Dick, Pincus' article said the CIA envoy was an Ambassador. Do you know who it is?
Yeah, Bob, it's Joe Wilson, the guy who took on Saddam during the Gulf War. He used to be stationed in Niger--facilitated the transition from military rule in 1999, too--so he's got a great relationship with the people named in the Niger documents. And he knows a lot about the uranium business.
Oh geez. He would know better than anyone. So how did Cheney's office manage to bury the intelligence?
Well, they're saying that Wilson's wife, who works at the CIA as a WMD analyst, suggested him for the trip. They're trying to suggest he wasn't qualified.
Pincus' article, after all, provides enough detail for Woodward to ask the salient questions about the trip. And given the relationship between Armitage and Woodward, I can imagine that Armitage would respond. And the nature of this--the fact that Armitage was supporting Wilson's perspective, would explain why Woodward believed (knowing just a bit of the story) that the leak wasn't malicious.
Remember, the investigation and the allegations that people have printed about this story is that there's some vast conspiracy to slime Joe Wilson and his wife, really attack him in an ugly way that is outside of the boundaries of political hardball.
The evidence I had firsthand, small piece of the puzzle I acknowledge, is that that was not the case.
This imagined exchange raises two questions, though. Woodward claims that his first source only told him that,
Wilson's wife worked for the CIA on weapons of mass destruction as a WMD analyst.
Did Armitage know that Plame had been a NOC? Did he know the name, Plame? In other words, did he know when he told Woodward that he was leaking highly protected information? Did he say Plame was an analyst to give his friend some valuable background without revealing Plame's real status? Perhaps Armitage thought it'd be okay to say that much, since Woodward was famously discreet with background information, and since he wasn't revealing the full extent of what he knew.
In any case, if Woodward raised the questions about Wilson in response to Pincus' June 12 article, it might explain why Woodward would tell Pincus (though Pincus doesn't remember this) of Plame's role at CIA.
Here's where things get interesting. Pincus publishes an article on June 22 that is largely about the NIE. For example, Pincus' article makes the following assertion.
A still-classified national intelligence report circulating within the Bush administration at the time, however, portrayed a far less clear picture about the link between Iraq and al Qaeda than the one presented by the president, according to U.S. intelligence analysts and congressional sources who have read the report.
The National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which represented the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community, contained cautionary language about Iraq's connections with al Qaeda and warnings about the reliability of conflicting reports by Iraqi defectors and captured al Qaeda members about the ties, the sources said.
Then Woodward calls Libby on June 23 to arrange for his interview with Libby. Then meets with Libby on June 27. Here is Woodward's description of his interview with Libby:
I testified that on June 27, 2003, I met with Libby at 5:10 p.m. in his office adjacent to the White House. I took the 18-page list of questions with the Page-5 reference to "yellowcake" to this interview and I believe I also had the other question list from June 20, which had the "Joe Wilson's wife" reference.
I have four pages of typed notes from this interview, and I testified that there is no reference in them to Wilson or his wife. A portion of the typed notes shows that Libby discussed the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction, mentioned "yellowcake" and said there was an "effort by the Iraqis to get it from Africa. It goes back to February '02." This was the time of Wilson's trip to Niger.
When asked by Fitzgerald if it was possible I told Libby I knew Wilson's wife worked for the CIA and was involved in his assignment, I testified that it was possible I asked a question about Wilson or his wife, but that I had no recollection of doing so. My notes do not include all the questions I asked, but I testified that if Libby had said anything on the subject, I would have recorded it in my notes. [my emphasis]
I highlighted the NIE materials for two reasons. Libby, recall, testified that he had leaked NIE information to journalists in July and June. So he may well have admitted he leaked to Woodward (which would mean he raised this Woodward interview himself). But this also raises the possibility that Libby was trying to use Woodward to push back against Pincus. After Woodward's conversation with Libby, did Woodward say anything to Pincus about the NIE?
Then there's the legalese parsing regarding the question of whether Woodward asked or Libby said anything about Wilson. "It was possible I asked a question about Wilson ... but ... I had no recollection of doing so." This leaves open any number of possibilities, including:
- Woodward did ask but he wants to not recall because he doesn't want to be found responsible for playing a key link in this game of telephone
- Woodward didn't ask, but he will say he does not recall to leave Libby an out, the possibility that Libby did hear of Plame from one journalist before he spoke to Russert
- Woodward really doesn't think it came up, but he knows this issue will be scrutinized meticulously in court so he wants to leave himself an out
Any of those are possibilities. One thing I want to know, though, is did Woodward say anything that might tip Libby to the fact that he (Woodward) had talked to Armitage about this? For example, did Woodward say something as simple as, "yeah, Armitage told me about that" in response to Libby's comment about Niger and uranium?
Because if he did, it might explain the second leak to Novak. As with my Fleischer scenario, I think it highly likely that, during a conversation with Novak about Frances Fragos Townsend, Libby may have spurred Novak to start asking questions about who sent Wilson. And if he knew, from Woodward, that Armitage knew of Plame's role and had leaked it once, then he might be able to offer Novak some really specific coaching. Libby's instructions might go something like this:
One of the questions you need to be asking, Bob, is who decided to send Wilson. Now, I can't answer that for you. But if you ask Armitage, mention you've heard he knows, he may tell you.
Novak's approach with Armitage would be the exact opposite of Woodward's. It might go something like this:
So Libby tells me you know why the CIA sent Wilson. Why did they? I mean, he's a Democrat.
Bob, I don't know of anyone more qualified to investigate an issue relating to uranium in Niger. Wilson was stationed there, has good relations with the people named in the Niger documents, going back to when he helped ease the transition from military to cilvian rule in 1999. He knows the uranium business, from his time in Gabon as well as his time in Niger. And he knows Saddam, from dealing with him directly during the Gulf War.
But Libby says there's another reason he got sent.
Well, yeah, they say his wife, who works at CIA as an analyst in WMD, sent him. But that doesn't mean he's not qualified.
I suspect Armitage gave Novak enough to say what he did to Wilson's friend on July 8. "Wilson's an asshole. The CIA sent him. His wife, Valerie, works for the CIA. She's a weapons of mass destruction specialist. She sent him." But not enough for what he wrote in his column.
One question I've got, though, is whether Armitage was speaking on deep background or not. With Woodward, he clearly was. Did Novak publish something Armitage had only told him on background? It would certainly explain why Fitzgerald isn't pursuing charges against Armitage. If Armitage told him something on background, expecting him not to publish the information, then he can't be accused of trying to expose Plame's identity. In fact, if this conversation were on background, it would almost certainly take any IIPA charges against Armitage off the table, because it would clearly rule out an intent to leak Plame's status.
For now, though, I''m going to assume one more thing. I'm going to assume Armitage told Novak that Plame was involved in sending Wilson. But that Armitage didn't tell Novak Plame was covert and Armitage didn't tell Novak Plame's name.
Because, if Rove, not Armitage, leaked the truly incriminating details of Plame's status, it would answer some of the excellent objections raised by commentor KM the other day:
Again, I could see the cabal steering journalists to Armitage in the
hopes that he spills the beans at some point, thereby giving the cabal the break it needed. But then why does the cabal wait so damn long to out Armitage? This is a serious problem for anyone making a case for Armitage's role in this case whereby (a) Armitage and the cabal aren't on the same page (e.g. Armitage leaks "casually" or accidentally) and (b) the cabal knows or very strongly suspects that Armitage leaked.
Consider. If Armitage is immune from prosecution on IIPA charges and knows he didn't tell Novak of Plame's status, then he effectively knows that Rove is guilty of the IIPA charge. That Rove is the one who told Novak she was covert.
I suspect that, if Armitage ever goes public with his own role in this leak, then it will make it clear that Rove is the one who is guilty of violating the IIPA.
Up until Libby's indictment, it is in everyone's best interest in keeping Armitage's role silent. Armitage doesn't want to be implicated at all, so he'd just as soon keep quiet. Fitzgerald wants him to keep quiet because if he goes public, it may close off some angles for prosecution, and it will tell the cabal how much Fitzgerald has on them. Libby wants Armitage to stay silent because he knows Armitage will point right back to Libby. And Rove, especially, wants Armitage to keep quiet, because Armitage could single-handedly and publicly counter Rove's lies.
Of course, things have changed, because now that Libby is facing a perjury indictment and not a conspiracy to out Plame indictment, Armitage's involvement--particularly his earlier leaking to Woodward--can only help Libby. Armitage's earlier leak to Woodward is about the only hope that Libby can plausibly claim that all the journalists were talking about this.
Woodward tried to get Armitage to release him twice. Once in 2004, I speculate, when Pincus was forced to talk, Woodward was worried that Pincus would say that Woodward had told him of Plame's identity. And once in 2005 when it became clear that Libby and Rove were implicating journalists in the leak--Woodward wanted to come clean to make sure he wasn't incriminated by Libby and Rove. Both times, Armitage assured Woodward that his leak wasn't really relevant, particularly since Armitage hadn't passed word of Plame's covert status to Woodward.
But then two things made Woodward get really worried. First, he learned the week before Fitzmas that Armitage had also been a source for Novak, which made him doubt Armitage's reassurances (and tell Len Downie he was involved). Second, when he saw the chronology in the indictment, he realized that Libby would likely raise the June 27 interview, that Libby would try to suggest that Armitage had told him of Plame's identity.
So Armitage and Woodward came forward, largely in an attempt to pre-empt Libby's expected claim that Woodward told him of Plame's identity.
Answering Questions
This scenario would answer some questions about the things Woodward has said. For example, it would really clarify why, in this exchange, Woodward said he "wished" Libby were the leaker:
Ms. BROWN: Well I think Andrea hit the nail on the head, meaning that everyone on the inside, with the exception of Armitage, was a Cheney guy. Now there is a hitch, and--and we've been talking about this, but Joe Wilson, Ambassador Joe Wilson, has a book that's out now, which goes after Cheney's top guy: Scooter Libby, his chief of staff, who is--also has a long history with many of the other people who have been advising the president. And it--there's an ongoing investigation into who leaked Wilson's wife's name, an undercover CIA agent, to reporters and made it public. And his is pointing the finger at Scooter Libby in his book.
Mr. WOODWARD: Does--does he have any evidence, though? Or is this just a guess, surmised?
Ms. BROWN: It is--he...
Mr. WOODWARD: I wish it was Scooter Libby.
After all, Armitage is a friend, Libby is more manipulative and closed. If Libby were the leaker, it would absolve Armitage--and his leakee, Woodward--of their involvement in this.
This scenario would expain, too, why Woodward never believed that there was damage done, that Plame was covert. As he described to Wolf, his source presented Plame's role as that of an analyst, someone who wasn't covert.
WOODWARD: Good question. And specifically said that -- the source did -- that she was a WMD, weapons of mass destruction, analyst. Now, I've been covering the CIA for over three decades, and analysts, except -- in fact, I don't even know of a case. Maybe there are cases. But they're not undercover. They are people who take other information and analyze it.
And so -- and if you were there at this moment in mid-June when this was said, there was no suggestion that it was sensitive, that it was secret.
It would also explain why Woodward was so credulous as to believe Novak's backtracking off the word "operative."
MATTHEWS: Well, was this, then, a crime? We`re talking about a crime.
WOODWARD: I don`t think there`s any crime.
MATTHEWS: There is a crime on the books now. Just so we know what -- there is a statute that punishes someone who gives away the undercover identity of an FBI agent.
WOODWARD: Intentionally, and a law written because Philip Agee back in the `80s was listing all the people who were undercover agents.
Novak has explained this, Bob Novak, who wrote the original story, and said, he was told this woman, Joe Wilson`s wife, was a weapons of mass destruction analyst in the CIA. He called her an operative because that`s one of the terms he uses in his column. He didn`t know. And...
After all, Woodward knows he was told Plame was an analyst. Which might make him more likely to believe that Novak was told exactly the same thing.
What I don't get, though, is Viveca Novak's role. I think it highly likely that Luskin was involved in her reporting on Woodward. But in this scenario, I suggest Rove has a huge disincentive for Armitage's identity to be exposed. Why would Luskin have gotten Vivnovka involved in the Woodward story if Armitage were the source?