Brian Beutler at TPMDC raises the specter of a compromise negotiated by the bipartisan leadership that would water down the popular reform proposals:
A handful of junior Democrats, including Sens. Tom Udall (D-NM) and Jeff Merkley (D-OR), have done an impressive job building momentum for a package of modest, but meaningful, changes to the Senate's filibuster rules. But their plan could be completely upended and replaced by even more modest reforms, if Democratic and Republican leaders successfully negotiate a bipartisan rules reform compromise.
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A Senate Democratic aide confirms that those discussions are ongoing, and haven't yet yielded consensus. But if they do, that consensus would serve as a stand-in for Udall's approach, not as an endorsement of it, as previous reporting has suggested.
Could it happen? Sure. The history of Senate rules reform, and filibuster reform in particular, is replete with negotiated settlements -- some better than others.
In 1975 -- the last successful reform effort to lower the cloture threshold (from 2/3 of those voting) -- the protracted battle that began with a vote that cleared the way for majority cloture on a proposed change (lowering the threshold to 3/5 of those voting) ended with a negotiated settlement setting the threshold instead at 3/5 of all Senators in office.
In 2005, the "nuclear option" stand-off over the filibuster of judicial nominations ended with the "Gang of 14" compromise, in which Republican Senators agreed not to vote to eliminate such filibusters during the 109th Congress, so long as Democrats basically agreed not to use them (except in undefined "extraordinary circumstances").
In today's situation, it's possible that some sort of negotiated settlement -- either a change in the Standing Rules, or some sort of working agreement that operates outside of or alongside the Rules -- could avoid what might become a difficult and drawn-out floor fight over reform. Whether that's a good thing or a bad thing will of course depend on what the outcome is. And, I suppose, where you stand in terms of willingness to engage in a fight. From the outside, it's always easier to cheer for the fight, naturally.
But one good reason to caution against a Gang of 14-style settlement, at least, is that it's both impermanent and cuts against the grain of Sen. Tom Udall's motivation in undertaking this fight in the first place. At least part of Udall's interest in his preferred path to reform is that he thinks the Senate as a body ought to be allowed -- even expected -- to give its rules a review on a regular basis. In some years Senators may find that the rules are working well enough to be renewed without change. In others, they'll want to make some adjustments. But the point would be that every sitting Senator would have the opportunity to contribute to the discussion about the rules under which the body operates, as opposed to the current situation, in which only two sitting Senators have been able to participate in a successful redefinition of cloture rules.
A Gang of 14-style settlement denies that important opportunity to most Senators, and instead substitutes the judgment of as few as eight of them for that of the entire body. (Eight Senators -- four from each side -- would be the number required to prevent the exercise of either majority cloture or systematic filibusters.) That's essentially a filibuster in itself -- a small minority of Senators substituting their judgment about what should get voted on for the judgment of all the rest.
That would work -- in the rawest, most power-driven sense of the word -- to force a settlement. But it would only last for as long as the new "gang" held together (or stayed in office), and it would leave the Senate back at square one in terms of allowing the members to have a voice in adopting their own rules. That'd be no help at all.
So what might it mean that the party leaders are discussing a compromise? Keep in mind that the 1975 reform fight ended that way. Reform proponents won three votes over the span of several days, affirming a clear pathway to a vote on majority cloture for their proposal. It was only after that third victory that reform opponents saw the writing on the wall. They'd either continue to lose, eventually running out of valid objections to make, and then have to concede to a simple majority, yes-or-no vote on a 3/5 present and voting cloture threshold, or they'd instead have to come up with a compromise that was more popular than the one they were staring at. And that's what they did.
Knowing that history, and knowing that the first part of it could very well repeat itself come January, I suppose it's only prudent to start thinking about giving the Senate other options, if you think it'd present a smoother resolution. But it'd have to be one that satisfies the reformers, too. If they've patched together their majority, they'll by definition be holding most of the cards.