This is an absolutely terrific little book about Iraq, and the impossibility of "defending" it as conceived by Rumsfeld and the other geniuses behind the planning for occupation. The author, British former paratrooper Mark Etherington, isn't just another one of us pointy-headed liberals, but the former governor of Wasit province, a senior CPA official, an expert in international relations, a veteran of the Middle East, and a highly regarded civilian veteran of Kosovo and Northern Ireland.
Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris, Cornell University Press
Etherington is quite objective, self-effacing, and comes across to my somewhat jaundiced eye as very reliable. He has great respect and affection for the Iraqi people, a grudging appreciation of Paul Bremer and the higher echelons of the CPA staff, tremendous respect for the American and coalition military forces (including the Ukrainians with whom he worked for months). On the other hand, he has little respect for the Iraqi police and absolutely none for the idiots at Kellogg Brown and Root, who apparently became something of personal demons for him during his time in Wasit, with their constant whining, refusal to perform the most simple of tasks, consistent failure to provide the most basic of supplies, and rank and arrant cowardice. (Interestingly, Etherington recalls being quite impressed with the Halliburton personnel he worked with in Kosovo.) Etherington writes that, despite the sincere efforts of most of those involved in the CPA and military efforts to administer Iraq after the invasion and try to bring democracy to the country, the only reason the country hasn't yet descended into a complete hellpit of revolt and anarchy is "the resilience of the 'ordinary' Iraqi citizen." Like so many others, he predicts, indirectly, that the longer the US involves itself with Iraq's internal affairs, the longer it will take for Iraq to settle itself, the more damage will have been inflicted on the Iraqi body politic, and the stronger the likelihood that Iraq will inflict upon itself a tyrannical Islamic autocracy.
His description of his final days as governor of Wasit, when he and his staff were forced to evacuate from Kut during the so-called Sadr uprising, is riveting, both as a story and from a military history viewpoint.
Oddly enough, the only review on BN.com is a scorched-earth effort from someone who apparently took personal offense to Etherington's memoir. I'll have to post a rejoinder. Maybe it's from a KBR employee. Let me know if you like the book. I can't recommend it highly enough.