The Senate minority leader:
"We worked very hard to keep our fingerprints off [legislation advanced by Democrats]," McConnell says. "Because we thought -- correctly, I think -- that the only way the American people would know that a great debate was going on was if the measures were not bipartisan. When you hang the 'bipartisan' tag on something, the perception is that differences have been worked out, and there's a broad agreement that that's the way forward."
Benen:
The way McConnell sees it, for much of the American mainstream, "bipartisan support" is akin to a seal of approval. That's true. But by ensuring that Democratic ideas, even popular ones, didn't receive Republican backing, McConnell wasn't bucking public attitudes, he was changing public attitudes. Voters assume there must be something wrong with partisan ideas -- after all, if they were moderate, sensible proposals, negotiated in good faith, then there'd be more Republican support for them.
As such, GOP opposition to popular ideas necessarily makes them less popular.
It's why McConnell wouldn't allow Republicans to compromise, emphasized party unity above all, and even rejected the GOP's own ideas when Democrats embraced them. The goal was to defeat Democratic proposals, even ones with broad national support that were good for the country, while undermining their popularity.
There may be something to what Benen says, but I think there's more going on.
The administration wanted bipartisanship at all costs, to the point that they repeatedly watered down legislation in the hopes of getting some of that bipartisan support. But instead of pulling back all those concessions when they got no votes, they went to a final vote with the legislation they had, not the legislation they should've had.
McConnell and pretty much the entire GOP knew that they had to steer clear of any Democratic initiative. From the beginning, I argued that it would be stupid for them to give Dems bipartisan cover. This way, they could create stark distinctions between the two parties heading into the 2010 elections.
In that case, it was up to the Democrats to craft GOOD and popular legislation, and implement it in a way that would be quickly felt by voters. Instead, stuff was watered down and progressive elements stripped out, and implementation oftentimes delayed by years.
And suddenly, you have people like William Daley blabbing about how Dems overstepped by offering up legislation that was too liberal, when the last thing we saw the last two years was truly progressive legislation. A national clone of Mitt Romney's Massachusetts' health care plan, negotiated with big pharma and big insurance doesn't count.
Had Democrats noted GOP intransigence from day one and ditched the pathological desire for bipartisanship, the resulting legislation may have looked far different. And had Democrats actually passed popular legislation before these last election, perhaps things would've turned out differently.
The problem the last two years wasn't the GOP's lack of bipartisanship. They were smart enough to play the right cards.
The problem was the Democrats' inability to adjust their game plan as a result. Trying to be unilaterally bipartisan is a proven recipe for heartache and disaster.