I just finished with
"Chapter 8 -- The System Was Blinking Red, or How They Fucked Up by Missing Obvious Opportunities to Stop the Plot". Some have accused the commission of being a whitewash. But it's not entirely so. There are enough details buried in the report to paint a very clear picture of the failures. These weren't just "institutional failures." There are several specific individuals, e.g. John Ashcroft, whose failures should lead to banishment from any significant position with responsibility for the safety of the U.S. public.
Below are a few "highlights" from Chapter 8.
A terrorist threat advisory distributed in late June indicated
a high probablility of near-term "spectacular" terrorist attacks resulting in numerous casualties. Other reports' titles warned, "Bin Ladin Attacks May be Imminent" and "Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats." The latter reported multiple attacks planned over the coming days, including a "severe blow" against U.S. and Israeli "interests" during the next two weeks.
page 257
One June 25, Clarke warned Rice and Hadley that six separate inelligence reports showed al Qaeda personnel warning of a pending attack. ... The intelligence reporting consistently described the upcoming attacks as occurring on a calamitous level, indicating that
they would cause the world to be in turmoil and that they would consist of possible multiple -- but not necessarily simultaneous -- attacks.
page 257
Acting FBI Director Thomas Pickard told us he had one of his periodic conference calls with all special agents in charge on July 19. He said one of the items he mentioned was the need,
in light of increased threat reporting, to have evidence response teams ready to move at a moment's notice, in case of an attack. He did not task field offices to try to determine whether any plots were being considered within the United States or to take any actions to disrupt any such plots.
page 259
From the Presidential Daily Brief received by President George W. Bush on August 6, 2001.
<center>Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S.</center>
Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fighting to America."
page 261
Clarke mentioned to National Security Adviser Rice at least twice that
al Qaeda sleeper cells were likely in the United States. In January of 2001, Clarke forwared a strategy paper to Rice warning that al Qaeda had a presence in the United States. He noted that two key al Qaeda members in the Jordanian cell involved in the millenium plot were naturalized U.S. citizens and that one jihadist suspected in the East Africa bombings had "informed the FBI that an extensive network of al Qida 'sleeper agents' currently exists in the US." He added that Ressam's abortive December 1999 attack revealed al Qaeda supporters in the United States. His analysis, however, was based not on new threat reporting but on past experience.
page 263
Although the FAA had authority to issue security directives mandating new security procedures,
none the of the few that were released during the summer of 2001 increased security at checkpoints or on board aircraft.
page 264
Rice told us she understood that the FBI had tasked its 56 U.S. field offices to increase surveillance of suspected terrorists and to reach out to informants who might have information about terrorist plots. An NSC staff document at the time describes such a tasking as having occurred in late June but does not indicate whether it was generated by the NSC or FBI. Other than the previously described April 13 communication sent to all FBI field offices, however, the FBI could not find any record of having received such a directive. The April 13 document asking field offices to on Sunni extremism did not mention any possible threats within the United States and did not order the surveillance of suspected operatives. The NSC did not specify what the FBI's directives should contain and did not review what had been issued earlier.
page 264
Attorney General Ashcroft was briefed by the CIA in May and by [acting FBI Director] Pickard in early July about the danger. Pickard said he met with Ashcroft once a week in late June, through July, and twice in August. There is a dispute regarding Ashcroft's interest in Pickard's briefings about the terrorist threat situation.
Pickard told us that after two such briefings Ashcroft told him that he did not want to hear about the threats anymore. Ashcroft denies Pickard's charge. Pickard says he continued to present terrorism information during further briefings that summer, but nothing further about the "chatter" the U.S. government was receiving.
The Attorney General told us that he asked Pickard whether there was intelligence about attacks in the United States and that Pickard said no. Pickard said he replied that he could not assure Ashcroft that there would be no attacks in the United States, although the reports of threats were related to overseas targets. Ashcroft said he therefore assumed the FBI was doing what it needed to do. He acknowledged that in retrospect, this was a dangerous assumption. He did not ask the FBI what it was doing in response to the threats, and did not task it to take any specific action. He also did not direct the INS, then still part of the Department of Justice, to take any specific action.
In sum, the domestice agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State and local law enforcement were no marshalled to augment the FBI's efforts. The public was not warned.
page 265
In July 2001, an FBI agent in the Phoenix field office sent a memo to FBI headquarters and to two agents on international terrorism squads in the New York Field Office, advising of the
"possibility of a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Ladin" to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation schools.
page 272
There was substantial disagreement between Minneapolis agents and FBI headquarters as to what Moussaoui was planning to do. In one conversation between a Minneapolis supervisor and a headquarters agent, the latter complained that the Minneapolis's FISA request [note: a special warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act] was couched in a manner intended to get people "spun up." The supervisor replied that was precisely the intent.
He said he was "trying to keep someone from taking a plane and crashing into the World Trade Center." The headquarters agent replied that this was not going to happen and that they did not know if Moussaoui was a terrorist.
page 275
Emphasis added.
If John Ashcroft
wasn't keeping the country safe in the summer of 2001, just
what the fuck was he doing?
Cross-posted at my blog.