At the close of Campaign 2000, I traced three different speculative histories of Bush43's tenure and aftermath.
In Scenario 1, Bush succeeds modestly, and of necessity, moderately. Florida goes into the books as the cautionary tale of a brush with constitutional calamity.
In respect of the election's peculiar outcome, both sides steer clear of ideological showdowns. The budget surplus affords bipartisan (i.e., limited) tax cuts and program spending. We pay down federal debt by default, so the next party to win clear voter approval will inherit a fiscal position suited to major policy initiatives.
In Scenario 2, Bush fails big time. The Scalia Gambit is discredited, and history discounts Bush as the presidential analog of a False Pope.
Scenario 3 is worst case. Bush stumbles without falling flat. His legacy of real problems and false understandings divides us for generations to come. [Scope and magnitude of the fault lines? Anywhere from the Hiss case to the Civil War.] With cooperation impossible, things go from bad to worse on every front. The Florida model of judicial chicanery gains acceptance on both sides. Courts and elections lose legitimacy in tandem.
Today, we're seeing a Scenario 3 reaction to a Scenario 2 reality. Bush's governance is catastrophic, but public reaction is ambivalent. Democrats might reasonably aspire to a rout and realignment of New Deal proportions ... but we're bidding only for a change of possession, not a reversal of momentum.
No doubt Kerry
can capture the White House by issuing a generic call for change, prevailing in debates, and mobilizing just enough voters in selected state/issue/demographic segments. Should we be satisfied to play for a thin win? Consider the downside(s).
- Key segments may receive issue-oriented spot treatment, but the national campaign is scripted as a personality contest. No central issue. No big ideas. No defining philosophy. Regardless of margin, a personality contest gives the winner no programmatic mandate, and makes few lasting impressions.
- We've neglected persuasion in favor of mobilization (registration, identification and GOTV). We'll turn out the faithful ... and score with indie/undie/grumpy "impulse voters" ... but we won't sew new party labels on anybody. We have not built the party base.
- Our prime target -- new voters -- is the group least likely to vote next time ... most likely to forget or change loyalties between cycles ... most likely to nurse resentments based on unrealistic expectations ... most susceptible to Rove's whole bag of tricks.
- With a shifting, shrinking target matrix, state/national linkage is simply not feasible. We can't hitch House/Senate challengers to Kerry's star, or incumbents to Bush's anchor chain. Our GOTV is coordinated, but our candidates and messages are isolated.
- We can easily lose. Playing it this tight makes every tactical move -- several decisions per day re location, message, and target audience -- a potential losing call. And the playing field isn't level. They control the news cycle and have an edge in the courts.
----- So what do we get if we win? -----
If Kerry wins, it's by narrow margins on limited turf, with a thin Senate majority and marginal gains in the House. He gets a chilly reception in Congress -- from both parties in both houses. Nobody owes him any favors. Republicans can block legislation, stall appointments and play "gotcha!" ... if factional Democratic kamikaze's don't get him first. (Losing the popular vote would further erode his stature.)
Kerry hits the 2006 midterms with a record of legislative defeat, internecine sniping, a depleted base, a more polarized body politic, alienated independents, and a plate full of disasters.
Disasters? Kerry talks like he'll inherit a clean slate, but the previous occupant left a mailbox full of unopened reality checks.
Instability in the oil states, nuclear proliferation, failing states, fragile superstates, real terrorists, overextended military, gonzo deficits, entitlement timebombs, and the risk of credit crunch, capital flight, labor market collapse, housing bubble collapse.
Corporate governance failures run unchecked, we're noncompetitive in global markets, we're addicted to foreign debt and behind the curve in information age infrastructure.
Program vulnerabilities of lesser magnitude -- e.g., the flu vaccine problem -- are piling up in scores of politicized agencies where nobody has been minding the store.
The time bombs won't all go off on Kerry's watch, but one or more can insist on attention at any time. Kerry will have to play the hand he's dealt -- without money, without troops, and without cooperation or clout.
How will the media play him? Unknown. Herd instinct forces them to settle on either the teflon treatment or the pin-cushion treatment. The last guy got teflon ... 50/50 or worse Kerry gets pin-cushion.
If the VRWC can't turn Kerry into a conspicuous failure, they're not trying hard enough.
----- A lost opportunity of historic proportion -----
Bush fouled up national security AND employment AND the budget ... failed to deliver a single program success ... got caught peddling transparent hokum ... and promised more. Turnaround opportunities this big don't come along every cycle ... or every century.
We need the win a lot more than they do, and we really need a big win. If we lose, we face a GOP-dominated judiciary for the rest of our lives. If they lose, they can undermine Kerry and reap big gains in 2006 and 2008 -- UNLESS we win big.
In contrast, suppose we had won decisively ... with geographic breadth ... issue linkage ... leverage in congressional races ... building our base instead of just milking it. We could have replenished the reservoirs of Democratic incumbents and Democratic voters for decades to come. We could have ripped opened continuing seams of popular debate against neocon mythology. We could have broken the legislative and polemic impasse between flocks of red parrots and blue parrots. We could have slapped big media awake, and held them accountable for their part in sleep-walking America to the brink.
We didn't do it.
We didn't try.
----- What's the problem? -----
Public policy issues -- and the underlying concepts -- are slippery. Voters need help picking them up.
Issues are slippery. "Product differentiators" are difficult to discern, easy to obfuscate. The Bush campaign-administration-campaign's disdain for reality is infectious. Policies are designed with cost concealment in mind. Principled differences are alien to our culture. America celebrates rivalry, assumes self-interest, and frames politics as more of the same.
Issues are slippery. Voters need a little help. The campaign has to put some handles on the package -- or nobody will.
Part of the problem is that Kerry's campaign is like "Seinfeld" -- it's a show about nothing. It has no unifying theme. We can move messages and pitch points, but nothing sticks. [Seinfeld at least established a familiar set of transitional bass riffs.]
----- What? A theme? -----
In generic terms, what would a campaign theme sound like?
It would be memorable, yet distinctive. It would be ours, not theirs -- resisting blur-the-difference counterplay. It would speak to voters of varied backgrounds, persuasions, locations and demographics. It would weave together our points of emphasis on a wide range of specific issues -- both foreign and domestic. It would be conformable to down-ballot candidates and local priority issues. It would echo deep and ring true.
Is it too late to "theme up"? It's very, very, very late ... but it's not absolutely too late. You might be able to stamp a resonant theme on a campaign in just one high-profile appearance. The candidate can create high-profile opportunities in the last week of the campaign, and have a couple of days left over to advance the debate on specific issues.
In specific terms, what would a campaign theme look like? I'll toss out a half-dozen possibilities in comments under this post.