One of the many problems facing the "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" is the praise bestowed upon John Kerry by his commanding officers. Some of those commanding officers, like George Elliott and Grant Hibbard, have now joined the "SBVT" in attacking Kerry's service in Vietnam during his second tour of duty. To explain away Elliott's change of mind and to support their current charges, they've produced a web page in which they analyze Kerry's fitness reports. Even I, no expert on Navy fitness reports, could tell that the page contains a few big errors and a slew of smaller ones. In this article I'll detail them.
Introduction to Kerry's Fitness Reports
All quotes in this article are from the aforementioned page, titled "Analysis of John Kerry's Fitness Reports", unless I state otherwise. Kerry's fitness reports, to which I reference frequently, can be found here.
Now, let's get the show on the road:
John Kerry's campaign representatives quote a few words from one of his best Navy fitness reports to support their misleading claim that Kerry's military evaluations were those of a top-flight officer. They carefully ignore the existence of several other reports that range from mediocre to substandard, thereby presenting an inaccurate picture of Kerry's service record.
The Kerry campaign has posted every fitness report from his time in Vietnam on Kerry's website—the very act that has allowed the "SBVT" to attack Kerry's fitness reports. According to whose definition does that constitute "carefully ignoring"? There would be little reason in carefully ignoring them, anyway, since none of the reports can accurately be described as substandard. As for those selective quotes, we're about to find that they're a bit more important than the "SBVT" are willing to admit.
There are also gaps in the documentation made public to date by the Kerry campaign, where no fitness reports are provided at all.
This is nominally true, but would give anyone not familiar with the reports the wrong idea. Here's a list of the fitness reports provided by the Kerry campaign:
- Naval Schools Command:
- "from 17 Dec 66 to 10 Mar 67" (by E D Spruance)
- U.S. Fleet Anti-Air Warfare Training Center:
- "from 22 MAR 67 to 14 APR 67" (by A F Fischer, Jr)
- U.S.S. Gridley:
- "from 8 JUN 67 to 31 AUG 67" (by Allen W Slifer)
- "from 1 SEP 1967 to 22 MAR 1968" (by Allen W Slifer)
- "from 23 MAR 1968 to 20 JUL 1968" (by W E Harper, Jr)
- Coastal Division Fourteen:
- "from 8 Nov 1968 to 6 Dec 1968" (by Grant W Hibbard)
- Coastal Division Eleven:
- "from 6 DEC 68 to 13 DEC 68" (by George M Elliott)
- "from 14 DEC 68 to 26 MAR 69" (by George M Elliott and J W Streuli)
- Military Sea Transportation Service:
- "27 Mar 69 to 31 Jul 69" (by Walter F Schlech, Jr)
- "1 Aug 69 to 2 Jan 70" (by Walter F Schlech, Jr)
As we can see the fitness reports offer a continuous picture of Kerry's service from June 8th, 1967, to August 1st, 1970. This covers the entirety of period about which the "SBVT" have chosen to make allegations. There are precisely two gaps: from March 11th, 1967 to March 21st, 1967, and April 15th, 1967, to June 7th, 1967. The gaps are of about two and three weeks, respectively, and occur when Kerry is moving from one command post to another. Furthermore, the fitness reports from the Anti-Air Warfare Training Center and the USS Gridley pick up on the same dates Kerry reported for duty at those stations.
Analyzing Fitness Reports in General
Navy officer fitness reports ("FITREPs") are of vital importance. Selection boards use them to promote the officer. Assignment officers use them to "sell" the officer into his or her next assignment. Only truly outstanding officers get the best jobs (or "billets"). Officers with adverse or spotty records are unsalable for anything but the most backwater assignments.
The "SBVT" are trying to raise expectations. The dichotomy is between "truly outstanding officers" and the average ones, with nothing in between.
(They're also thinking like Navy careerists, but Kerry never intended to make the Navy a career for himself. He enlisted out of duty to his country—or out of desire to improve his biography, if you listen to the "SBVT"—and never intended to stay in the Navy for good. Thus, what sort of billet he qualified for was of very little, if no importance to him, which may show in his fitness reports. For example, he often scores worse on "military bearing" than he does on average. Having never given a flying fig-leaf about military bearing during my brief, uneventful stint in the army, I find this endearing, whereas a Navy careerist probably won't.)
First and foremost, a FITREP is a relative picture. You are not reading absolutes. If an officer is graded, say, as "outstanding," it is meaningful only if he is ranked ahead of his contemporaries and the rest of the FITREP contains no glaring negatives.
Since Kerry consistently scored as "excellent", "one of the top few", and so forth, the "SBVT" argue that the name of the category isn't really important. This is actually a good point, but, as we shall see, Kerry was rated by Elliott as above average when compared to other officers in his unit.
Second, what matters most are marks or grades above and especially below the norm. Marks below the norm may fall under a very positive word (e.g., "excellent") and appear positive to the casual reader, but no matter: any mark to the right of the norm is a strong, clear sign to both promotion boards and assignment officers (e.g., "detailers") that there is a performance shortfall. A mark to the right is a "ding." You don't want a ding in your FITREP.
The downplaying of the language of the fitness reports continues, but now the "SBVT" are sailing into more dangerous waters. We're told there's a "norm", which the "SBVT" (based on the rest of their critique) appear to define as "the best mark possible". They repeatedly treat the second or third best grade—out of nine—as a "ding". While inflation is often rampant in this type of evaluation systems, I'm certainly not going to take the "SBVT's" word that it was this bad, especially as they don't offer any supporting evidence.
Third, what is not said in the narrative section is just as important as what is said. The truly superlative officer should be "RAPped," meaning "Recommended for accelerated promotion." If Block 21 says only "Recommended for promotion" this is faint praise. It means that the officer should be considered for promotion along with the rest of his year group (all those commissioned in a given fiscal year constitute a "year group"). In the context of other marks and remarks, a "Recommended for promotion" mark means that the officer may just be average, called a "pack player."
This appears to be rubbish. The fitness reports from Elliott and Hibbert provide statistics on their overall rating of officers, in order that the Navy could determine what their rating scheme really was—remember the inflation. Out of 11 fitness reports, Hibbert recommended no one in his unit for accelerated promotion. He ranked six men in the second best category ("one of the top few") and five in the third best category ("an excellent officer"). Elliott was even stingier. He recommended no one out of 15 for accelerated promotion, ranked seven out of fifteen, including Kerry, in the second best category and the rest in the third best category. According to the "SBVT", not one of Kerry's peers received anything better than "faint praise", yet they want us to think less of Kerry's fitness reports because of this criterion.
What follows then on the "SBVT" page are a bunch of claims, which I'm mainly going to skip, about the importance of different parts of a fitness report. Given the outfit's reputation, I'd like to see some evidence or at least independent verification for these claims—something other than proof by assertion. No other type of proof is offered. However, this bit did strike me as interesting:
Seventh, it's the operational tours that count. As long as the officer passes the school and stays out trouble, FITREPs from school commands don't matter much.
Given that the only gaps in Kerry's fitness reports, if you can call two periods of few weeks that, are from his training period, it's peculiar that the "SBVT" would make so much of them.
Kerry's FITREPs are awash in dings, and some of the reports border on the adverse, particularly his combat FITREPs. The FITREPs convey significant performance problems and suggest problems in conduct, so much so that it is surprising that the campaign chose to release them. This may suggest that the FITREPs held from public view are even more adverse.
This all hinges on one's acceptance of the "SBVT" claim that the second best mark in any category is a "ding", a "slam", or even a "blast". Another reference to missing fitness reports is made; you'd never guess that they're talking about two short time periods, of three and two weeks, during Kerry's training. Again, it's far from clear that it's uncommon for a few weeks to go unevaluated when someone is moved between command stations.
Final USS Gridley Fitness Report
In what would customarily be an opportunity for a glowing "swan song" FITREP, the Commanding Officer of USS Gridley (DLG-21) tacitly blasts Kerry on his departure for Swift Boat duty by ranking him significantly below the norm in desirability for virtually every Navy assignment possible -- command, staff, whatever. He is a ship handler who is dinged in ship handling. He is in line for command, but his CO doesn't want him near the bridge. He is slammed in all performance areas -- most notably and significantly in initiative and reliability. The "nice" narrative emphasizes performance in collateral duties, but in the grades and marks, the CO is telling the selection board and detailer loud and clear that this officer is lazy, unreliable and not suited for command. 3 SEP 68 (W.E. HARPER).
That's serious stuff—and utterly misleading. Captain W E Harper, Jr, gave Kerry the second best mark in his overall evaluation, ranking Kerry as a "very fine officer with great value to the service". Out of three officers of Kerry's grade he ranked, no one got the best mark and only Kerry got the second best (assuming that Kerry is included in the statistics, which is something the "SBVT" also do). Two others got the third highest mark, "a dependable and typically effective officer." If Harper was "blasting" Kerry with this evaluation, what unspeakable acts was he performing on those two poor sods?
The "SBVT" note how Kerry is praised for his performance of collateral duties in the narrative, but not for, say, his ship-handling skills. This is true, but their interpretation is anything but. Harper wrote:
LTJG KERRY is an intelligent and competent young naval officer who has performed his duties in an excellent to outstanding manner. He is industrious and eager to learn and applies himself with vigor to assigned tasks. He presents a very neat appearance and meets people well. For his age and experience he writes and speaks exceedingly well. His performance as ships PAO has been outstanding. He has great potential and should develop into an outstanding officer in a minimum amount of time. His performance of duty significantly contributed to GRIDLEY receiving the attached commendatory messages and correspondence. He is recommended for promotion.
"PAO" stands for "Public Affairs Officer". In other words, the very things Kerry was doing on the ship are the things for which his commanding officer praises him. Why do the "SBVT" leave out this piece of information? Don't they, as Navy veterans, understand how important it is to understanding the fitness report in question? Why do they instead emphasize Harper's ratings of Kerry in areas in which a public affairs officer can hardly be expected to shine? One can't help but to come to the conclusion that they're being dishonest here.
Final Aide Fitness Report
The "SBVT" are also being less than honest in this paragraph:
Another "swan song" opportunity is lost when Kerry departs a brief tour of duty as an Aide. Kerry is dinged in staff desirability, management and military bearing by Rear Admiral Walter Schlech (2 MAR 70 Schlech) while Kerry served as Schlech's Aide. The Admiral makes considerable mention in the narrative section about Kerry's ambition to run for Congress, and no doubt the glowing words were meant as a parting gift to someone who might become a member of Congress. The narrative notwithstanding, any detailer or selection board would consider the FITREP a bad one. Had Kerry remained in the Navy, it would be difficult to "sell" him to a new Aide assignment when his last boss, an Admiral, had dinged him in precisely those attributes indispensable for Aides.
Here the "SBVT" veer from leaving out relevant information to out-and-out lies. Rear Admiral Schlech gives Kerry the best mark possible in staff desirability. That can in no way be construed as a "ding". In fact, in every category he gives Kerry the best or second best mark—usually the best. His comments are full of praise:
LTJG KERRY is one of the finest young officers with whom I have served in a long naval career. His combat record prior to becoming my personal aide speaks for itself and is testimony to his competance and courage at sea.
As my personal aide he could not have been more effective. In every instance he has displayed tact, judgment, foresight and energy. He is particularly adept in his relations with people both military and civilians from all strata. I have given him personal speaking assignments which he has performed in an outstanding manner to the credit of the Navy and himself.
This young man is detached at his own request to run for high political office to whit the Congress of the United States. The detachment of this officer will be a definite loss to the service. He is the dedicated type that we should retain and it is hoped that he will of further perhaps earlier greater service to his country, which is his aim in life at this time.
"His combat record ... speaks for itself", wrote Rear Admiral Schlech. Apparently the "SBVT" don't agree.
First Vietnam Fitness Report
The real performance problems are evidenced in FITREPs for his operational tours.
Because it is a FITREP that only covers about a month, LCDR Grant Hibbard's first FITREP on Kerry should simply be marked "not observed" all the way down the line -- no grades, marks or narrative. Significantly, LCDR Hibbard chooses otherwise. Hibbard detects a personal behavior problem -- a conduct problem -- and smacks him for it in the report. He also dings Kerry on initiative and cooperation, just like his last CO in Gridley. 17 DEC 68 (HIBBARD).
Hibbard gives Kerry the second best mark in personal behavior, cooperation, and initiative, and the third best mark in military bearing. That he shouldn't have rated Kerry at all based on an about a month's worth of observation is left unsupported, as is the underlying implication that receiving the second best mark from Hibbard was a sign of a problem. The statistics of Hibbard's overall evaluations show that he wasn't shy of giving the second and third best marks for his officers. Are we to assume that the five men out of 11 who he rated as "excellent officers"—the best grade was "recommended for promotion", the second best "one of the top few"—were all having big problems?
Final Vietnam Fitness Report
Now we come to the most important piece of the "SBVT's" argument, in which they attempt to negate Elliott's glowing words about Kerry. It should be noted that Elliott wrote two fitness reports, those Kerry received in Coastal Division 11. The first is based on five days of observation and naturally contains no grades, but the second covers over three months worth of Kerry's four month stay in Vietnam. It is, as the "SVBT" assert, arguably the most important of Kerry's fitness reports. This is what the "SVBT" have to say about it:
In his FITREP for his combat tour as Officer in Charge of a SWIFT Boat -- arguably the most important FITREP among those released by the Kerry campaign -- Kerry is not dinged but slammed in command, seamanship and ship handling and in all major leadership traits (28 JAN 69 ELLIOTT). To Kerry and perhaps to other junior officers, it is an okay FITREP. To detailers and selection boards, it is a negative fitness report that borders on the adverse. LCDR Elliott ranks him well below the norm in traits essential for command: force, industry, analytical ability, judgment and more.
This paragraph is riddled with erroneous claims. There's the obviously false claim that this one fitness report is for his combat tour—it's just for the last three months or so. According to the "SBVT", Kerry is "not dinged but slammed" in two areas of performance in which he receives the second best mark. If the second best is a "slam", are the "SBVT" then claiming that even the best mark would have been a "ding"? The assertion that Elliott "ranks [Kerry] well below the norm" in industry and judgment is unquestionably wrong. Kerry received the best mark possible in both those categories.
It is also claimed that Kerry is also slammed "in all major leadership traits". Elliott, however, gives Kerry the best mark in moral courage, loyalty, initiative, industry, imagination, judgment, decisiveness, reliability, personal behavior, military bearing, and self-expression (oral). Kerry receives the second best mark only in professional knowledge, force, analytical ability, cooperation, and self-expression (written). Are the "SBVT" really claiming that the second list contains all or even most major leadership traits and the first none?
The PCF squadron commander, LCDR Elliott has 15 officers in his command, and his report (28 JAN 69) offers an excellent breakout. Elliott ranks his officers in two groups, the top and the bottom, and Elliott ranks Kerry among the top group. Or does he? Just like Hibbard, Elliott "red flags" Kerry in conduct by downgrading him significantly in judgment and personal behavior. When viewed in the context of the total FITREP, it is very clear to a detailer or selection board that Kerry probably ranks 7 of 15. He's a "pack player" at best, but this is a worrisome FITREP to detailers and selection boards, because the significant flaws Elliott finds are in two critical areas: leadership traits and personal conduct. Moreover, because personal conduct issues have been raised by past commanders, detailers and selection boards would certainly conclude that the officer has exhibited major flaws in leadership and conduct over a sustained period of time that limit both his promotability and his salability to positions of responsibility. None of Kerry's evaluators had access to his previous FITREPS -- his commanders observed the same flaws independently.
The claim that Elliott downgrades Kerry significantly in judgment and personal behavior is false. Elliott gives Kerry the best mark in both categories. Based on this falsehood and the multitude of falsehoods documented above, the "SBVT" claim Elliott finds flaws in leadership traits and personal conduct. Well, when the premise is off by this much, then the conclusions are worthless. (We'll learn what Elliott really thought of Kerry soon.)
Most importantly, the "SBVT" analysis leaves out a key fact that can be noticed by studying this fitness report in detail. Namely, this is the very fitness report from which the Elliott quotes that have been highlighted in public have been culled—the quotes the "SBVT" say come from one of Kerry's best fitness reports. Elliott's final rating of Kerry as his commanding officer is, unfortunately for the "SBVT", this document. It is dated December 18th, 1969, the latest of any Kerry fitness report from Vietnam.
So why are the "SBVT" claiming that the Kerry campaign both ignores this report (which they say is the most important of Kerry's Vietnam tour) and pulls misleading quotes from it? Why are they wrong about so many rankings? Simply put, I strongly suspect that they're mixing up Elliott's final evaluation with a January evaluation written by Joseph W Streuli. You can also view Streuli's evaluation on-line. As you can see, first it has been dated January 28th, 1969 ("date forwarded"), and signed by J W Streuli. Then G H Elliott has signed it again on March 17th ("date noted and forwarded"). Obviously, because the second Elliott fitness report covers Kerry's service up to March 26th, 1969, a document dated January 28th couldn't possibly be the fitness report for that period.
This theory is further supported by the nature of the comments. The second Elliott fitness report mentions all of Kerry's medals won while with Coastal Division Eleven: a Bronze Star on March 13th, Purple Hearts on February 20th and March 13th, and a Silver Star on February 28th, 1969. The earlier Streuli report, having been written two months before Kerry departed Vietnam, naturally mentions none of these honors.
Finally, I'll quote the words the "SBVT" wish they could take back. Here's George Elliott's assessment of young John Kerry's conduct in Vietnam:
In a combat environment often requiring independent, decisive action LTJG Kerry was unsurpassed. He constantly reviewed tactics and lessons learned in river operations and applied his experience at every opportunity. On one occasion while in tactical command of a three boat operation his units were taken under fire from ambush. LTJG Kerry rapidly assessed the situation and ordered his units to turn directly into the ambush. This decision resulted in routing the attackers with several enemy KIA.
LTJG Kerry emerges as the acknowledged leader in his peer group. His bearing and appearance are above reproach. He has of his own volition learned the Vietnamese language and is instrumental in the successful Vietnamese training program.
During the period of this report LTJG Kerry has been awarded the Silver Star medal, the Bronze Star medal, the Purple Heart medal (2nd and 3rd awards).
The evaluation is certainly glowing, but didn't quite turn out to be Kerry's "swan song", did it?