Since I first heard that
James H. Webb, Jr. was
considering challenging George Allen next year, as a Democrat, I've had a chance to read a good deal of what he has written on defense and foreign policy issues in recent years. Admittedly, it's a bit counterintuitive to think of someone who resigned his post as Secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration due to differences over budget cuts running for elected office as a Democrat, but I think Webb could become a key voice on defense and foreign policy issues in the party, and bring in some much-needed new thinking.
Webb is a hard-nosed 'realist' when it comes to foreign policy - and believes in a global strategy for defending our interests and national security that plays to our inherent strengths, rather than exacerbating our weaknesses. Some of his views, which I will outline briefly here, may cause some debate and controversy in the party - but I think such a debate is healthy, and he's someone who has a lot to contribute, as well as a lot of credibility on these issues. Democrats need to establish a better level of trust with the public on national security, and show that we can both project American power when necessary to protect ourselves and our vital interests and avoid costly strategic blunders (like the invasion of Iraq) which waste resources and sap our strength.
A Strong Resume
Webb has served in a number of positions in government dealing with national security, having started his career leading a platoon of Marines in Vietnam, after attending the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis. Afterward, he earned a law degree at Georgetown Law School, and served as counsel to the House Committee on Veterans Affairs. In the Reagan administration, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs from 1984-87, and then as Secretary of the Navy. He's written a half-dozen novels, one of which - Rules of Engagement - became a major movie, and also a non-fiction book on the history of the Scots-Irish community in the United States. If elected, he would also be one of a very few members of Congress who have actual experience living in the Middle East - he was in Beirut in the early 1980s as a television journalist covering the Lebanese civil war.
Webb "Got It" on Iraq, and Early
Clearly, the issue which was the proximate cause for Webb's decision to go "off the reservation" vis-à-vis the Bush administration and the Republican Party was the rush to war in Iraq. Webb "got it" on Iraq, early on, and published an op-ed in the Washington Post - titled "Heading for Trouble: Do We Really Want to Occupy Iraq for the Next 30 Years?" - in early September 2002, just as the Bush administration began the campaign to sell the idea of invading Iraq to the American public.
He observed that:
"Other than the flippant criticisms of our "failure" to take Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War, one sees little discussion of an occupation of Iraq, but it is the key element of the current debate. The issue before us is not simply whether the United States should end the regime of Saddam Hussein, but whether we as a nation are prepared to physically occupy territory in the Middle East for the next 30 to 50 years. Those who are pushing for a unilateral war in Iraq know full well that there is no exit strategy if we invade and stay. This reality was the genesis of a rift that goes back to the Gulf War itself, when neoconservatives were vocal in their calls for "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad." Their expectation is that the United States would not only change Iraq's regime but also remain as a long-term occupation force in an attempt to reconstruct Iraqi society itself."
Webb also realized that an occupation of Iraq would sap our strength, to the detriment of other, more important, interests:
"Nations such as China can only view the prospect of an American military consumed for the next generation by the turmoil of the Middle East as a glorious windfall. Indeed, if one gives the Chinese credit for having a long-term strategy -- and those who love to quote Sun Tzu might consider his nationality -- it lends credence to their insistent cultivation of the Muslim world. One should not take lightly the fact that China previously supported Libya, that Pakistan developed its nuclear capability with China's unrelenting assistance and that the Chinese sponsored a coup attempt in Indonesia in 1965. An "American war" with the Muslims, occupying the very seat of their civilization, would allow the Chinese to isolate the United States diplomatically as they furthered their own ambitions in South and Southeast Asia.
These concerns, and others like them, are the reasons that many with long experience in U.S. national security issues remain unconvinced by the arguments for a unilateral invasion of Iraq. Unilateral wars designed to bring about regime change and a long-term occupation should be undertaken only when a nation's existence is clearly at stake. It is true that Saddam Hussein might try to assist international terrorist organizations in their desire to attack America. It is also true that if we invade and occupy Iraq without broad-based international support, others in the Muslim world might be encouraged to intensify the same sort of efforts. And it is crucial that our national leaders consider the impact of this proposed action on our long-term ability to deter aggression elsewhere."
In hindsight, this may seem obvious, but few prominent observers, of either political party, had the courage to point this out in the fall of 2002.
"A New Doctrine for New Wars"
Probably the best concise statement of Webb's recent thinking on U.S. national security strategy is an op-ed he wrote in the Wall Street Journal, "A New Doctrine for New Wars," a couple of months after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
A couple of key passages:
"...the grand strategy of the British in the decades leading up to World War I is a relevant precedent. Britain's diplomacy and strategy were based on a desire to maintain world-wide stability and to protect its commercial interests. Similarly, Britain was a dominant maritime power that made minimum use of its own ground forces. In Asia, it counterbalanced the maritime interests of other nations in part by developing an alliance with Japan. Despite an empire that required a military presence in hot spots that spanned the globe, at the start of World War I the British Army had only six active divisions. The U.S. has 13 today, including the Marine Corps, with a far wider spectrum of responsibilities than had the British a century ago..."
"The key elements of a new doctrine seem obvious. We must retain our position as the dominant guarantor of world-wide stability through strategic and conventional forces that deter potentially aggressive nations. We must be willing to retaliate fiercely against nations that participate in or condone aggressive acts, as well as non-national purveyors of asymmetric warfare. But we should take great care when it comes to committing large numbers of ground forces to open-ended combat, and we should especially avoid using them as long-term occupation troops."
Again, that is an observation which may seem obvious in hindsight, given our experience in Iraq, but Webb was saying that in late 2001. The key point is a strategy of "fighting smart," and avoiding occupation of large swaths of territory with hostile populations, which tends to tie down resources and sap our strength:
"If we remain focused on the twin goals of deterring cross-border aggression and eliminating international terrorism we will prevail. If we move beyond these clear objectives, we risk running out of people, equipment, and the kind of clarity that maintains the national spirit."
Sea Power
The analogy to Britain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries cited above indicates that Webb is a strong advocate of sea power. While we need high quality land forces, we are, as Britain was, primarily a naval power. Webb also has been a strong advocate of maintaining our fleet of aircraft carriers, opposing those who had argued in the 1990s that the carrier navy was obsolete. Given the difficulties of securing bases in important regions such as the Middle East and Asia, this makes a lot of sense, in my opinion.
[Apart from issues of strategy, support for a strong navy implies support for a strong economy in the Tidewater region of Virginia, where Navy contractors are the major high-skill/high-wage employers.]
A "Scowcroft" of Our Own?
In setting out to write this post, I was reminded of a very cogent comment that Nikolas Gvosdev, the editor of The National Interest, made in response to a comment I had posted on his blog, on the subject of Democrats and national security:
"The problem is that there has been no Democratic equivalent of Scowcroft, someone who opposed the military operation yet had impeccable national security credentials and whose opposition arose out of a real commitment to a sound foreign policy strategy. As I had once said on Steve Clemons' blog, the Democrats have been stuck between the (perceived) antiwar, antimilitary stance of Dean and the 'all but indistinguishable from Bush' stance of Lieberman."
I don't mean to imply that Scowcroft and Webb have completely overlapping views, but I think that encapsulates the key challenge for Democrats - how do you argue that Iraq was a strategic blunder, without being perceived as "antiwar" or "weak" in general? Even with the dissatisfaction felt by the majority of Americans with Bush's policy in Iraq, Democrats still face the hurdle of demonstrating "strength" on national security - an issue area where Republicans have traditionally held a big advantage.
For all of the reasons cited above, I think James Webb could play a key role - if he decides to challenge George Allen as a Democrat - in helping Democrats craft and articulate a better national security strategy and overcome the "weak on defense" meme with the American public.
Crossposted from my blog, RealistDem