In May of 2003 DHS performed simulated terrorist attacks in Seattle and Chicago. Using a mock "dirty Bomb" in Seattle and a Bio-Terror attack in Chicago, it was the first test of the goverments disaster response plans since 9/11. The 16 million dollar drill used emergency responders from the local, state, and federal government and 100's of actors to simulate the wounded. It was widely declared a sucess. Sadly, it was a dark omen....
The test was called, Topoff2 (electric boogaloo- couldn't resist) because it involved many top officials in the government. The idea was to test U.S. preparedness for a worst case scenario terrorist attack. This drill was directly responsible for creating the
Initial National Response Plan (INRP) which was supposed to be an improvement to the system that failed in Seattle and chicago. The Department of Homeland Security listed the goals of the drill as
Identify vulnerabilities in the response system;
Improve the nation's capacity to manage extreme events;
Create frameworks for the operation of expert crisis and consequence management systems;
Validate authorities, strategies, plans, policies, procedures, and protocols; and
Build a sustainable, systematic national exercise program to support the national strategy for homeland security.
After the drill and the reports of it's sucess died down the WSJ printed an article in October 2003 that shed some light on exactly how bad the experiment really was.
When Washington unleashed 8,000 emergency workers, federal agents and scientists on Chicago and Seattle in May to conduct the largest mock terrorist attack ever organized, officials expected some gaps in America's emergency-response capabilities.
Turns out those gaps are more like craters.
An internal government report of the five-day, $16 million Topoff2 drill says the U.S.'s emergency-response system is hampered by government agencies' failures to share information; uncertainty over the chain of command; and confusing new government procedures. The upshot: America may be not much better prepared to deal with a big terrorist attack than it was before 9/11. "Fortunately, this was only a test," said the report, compiled by the Federal Emergency Management Agency, now part of the Department of Homeland Security. "However, if a real incident occurs before final procedures are established, such unnecessary confusion will be unacceptable."
Well that's exactly what happened this time too. Nice work from the "won't get fooled again" administration. It goes on.
According to the FEMA internal report, at some point during the simulated radiological dirty-bomb attack in Seattle and bioterror strike in Chicago, medical-emergency teams couldn't get vital equipment such as ventilators because no one knew which federal agency was responsible for them. In other cases, officials deployed equipment and personnel without telling anyone in charge.
Federal agents did not pass on vital intelligence because the intended recipients didn't have security clearances or secure telephone lines. And almost no one understood the Department of Homeland Security's color-coded threat-warning system. "Throughout the first two days of the exercise, disagreement (and confusion) resulted between local, state and federal agencies over whether DHS has implemented 'Orange' or 'Red,' and whether the level was applicable nationally or locally," the report said.
Substitute bickering over "orange" and "red" terror alerts, with declarations of emergency, and the confusion/disagreement between local, state and federal agencies, and this is no different than what we just witnessed.
In Seattle, officials knew weeks in advance the exact time and location of the "dirty bomb." President Bush, his chief of staff and his press secretary made their decisions about the simulated attack ahead of time, and surrogates stood in for them during the simulation, issuing "decisions" that had been prepared in advance.
One government observer at the exercise said that the confusion in Topoff2 was significant, considering the level of planning and prior notification that had gone into it. "The criticisms are among the worst I've ever heard, especially when you take into account the scope of this drill," this observer said.
O.K., so they screwed the pooch on the drill. Big woop, it was only a test and nobody got hurt right? And I guess that's why Bush stayed on vacation for so long because surrogates had stood in for him the first time. More importantly, it gave DHS and FEMA an idea of what they needed to fix and come up with plan on what they would do differently in a similar scenario right? You betcha.
This month, the Homeland Security Department released its initial National Response Plan, designed to unify emergency management. The plan was greeted with enthusiasm by some local police and firefighter organizations. But some management positions whose efficacy was questioned by the FEMA report -- for example, the post of principal federal officer, who represents the homeland-security secretary on the ground -- are at the center of the new plan. After seeing the Topoff2 analysis, James Lee Witt, the respected former head of FEMA, expressed concern. "It's my experience that any time you add more layers of bureaucrats into emergency plans, it's a hindrance," he said.
Well, we all know how that plan worked. I don't know what else to say, so I'll paraphrase Rumsfeld, "Sometimes you respond to disasters not with the head of FEMA you want, but with his old college rommate who was fired from the Internation Arabian Horse Association."
In November 2003 Joe Lieberman demanded to see the internal report after reading that article.
Dear Secretary Ridge:
I am writing to call for the immediate release of the report on the TOPOFF II exercises last spring. This $16 million national simulation was designed to test the ability of government officials and first responders to deal with a severe terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. Yet the vital lessons from this exercise remain locked within the Department of Homeland Security - with the exception of some disturbing conclusions that surfaced recently in The Wall Street Journal. Congress and other decisionmakers have a right to, and a need for, that information, and I insist that the report be made available immediately.
The TOPOFF II exercise was conducted last May, and involved a simulated bioterror attack in Chicago and radiological attack in Seattle. This elaborate exercise - which was mandated by Congress - involved thousands of governmental officials and first responders, including high ranking Federal officials. In the immediate aftermath, you gave a relatively upbeat assessment of the drill. You also acknowledged, correctly in my view, that identifying strengths and weaknesses in our national preparedness is an essential step toward improving our response capabilities.
I haven't been able to find the internal report that Joementum was asking for, but they did issue a press release. Here are some of the findings, you can decide how effective they've been in implementing them into the INRP we have now.
Since TOPOFF 2, DHS and the interagency team have responded to and managed complex natural or no-notice domestic incidents, including Hurricane Isabel and the Northeast U. S. blackout. The teamwork demonstrated by authorities during these difficult incidents gave other decision-makers the facts and information they needed to organize and deploy federal and other assistance.....
Post-TOPOFF 2: DHS has led an intensive interagency effort that has resulted in the creation of an interagency incident communications strategy, emergency communications protocols, and vastly improved federal, state, and local coordination. This process has further been used to coordinate interagency homeland security incident communications activity during a number of recent incidents including ricin and anthrax scares.....
Post-TOPOFF 2: To enhance communications, coordination, and connectivity, DHS and state and local authorities are working on a range of improvements. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and interoperability communications grants program administered by DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has made a total of $81million available in FY 2002-2003 to improve state and local emergency preparedness by ensuring that EOCs have the support and telecommunications capabilities; which provide flexibility, sustainability, security, survivability and interoperability.....
Post-TOPOFF 2: Jurisdiction, this issue is being addressed through the recent adoption of a National Exercise Program (NEP). The NEP was developed by DHS's Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) and an interagency team to ensure coordination for all of the numerous exercises planned at the federal level. The NEP will facilitate the development of homeland security exercises that test and refine jurisdictional issues at the federal, state, and local level and employ the new organizational guidelines of the INRP, as our nation's single response plan.....
Post-TOPOFF 2: The DHS Homeland Security Operations Center, in conjunction with FEMA's National Emergency Operations Center, tracks the deployment of federal resources across the government. To improve that process, FEMA is establishing a standardized, automated tracking system, which is the first step to electronically tracking the resources and making that status available to state and local governments. As part of NIMS, DHS is working collaboratively with state and local governments to categorize resources and establish a catalog of capabilities and availability.