It has been big news lately, so I thought I would lead off with a few quotes on the "news" that Condi, Ashcroft, Rumsfeld, etc. had classified briefings from George Tenet in Mid July of 2001 on Al Qaeda's threat to U.S. targets. It's not really news, though, since Time magazine reported on it back in 2002.
In mid-July, Tenet sat down for a special meeting with Rice and aides. "George briefed Condi that there was going to be a major attack," says an official; another, who was present at the meeting, says Tenet broke out a huge wall chart ("They always have wall charts") with dozens of threats. source archive
It's just in the news ATM.
More below the fold:
For all that it is hardly news, it seems to be news to some and to be making some waves here and elsewhere. It didn't make it into the 9/11 Ommission report.
Ben-Veniste confirmed to McClatchy Newspapers that Tenet outlined for the 9/11 commission the July 10 briefing to Rice in secret testimony in January 2004. He referred questions about why the commission omitted any mention of the briefing in its report to Zelikow, the report's main author. Zelikow didn't respond to e-mail and telephone queries from McClatchy Newspapers. source archive
Yet, we read in the Washington Post the following:
Jamie S. Gorelick, a member of the Sept. 11 commission, said she checked with commission staff members who told her investigators were never told about a July 10 meeting. "We didn't know about the meeting itself," she said. "I can assure you it would have been in our report if we had known to ask about it." source archive
How fitting, then, that the title of the book that has made this into such a stink is "State of Denial". Because that omission is just the tip of a much larger iceberg which no one in the media seems willing to look at just yet.
Let's take a look at a few examples of our stellar Ommission report. Don't worry, I'll stick to sources you can "trust" for this information. I wouldn't want you to think I was some kind of tinfoil hatter, right?
No doubt you are all familiar with the FAA's post of hijack coordinator, whose duty was to liase between the FAA and the NMCC in the event of a hijacking, right? Do you know who had that duty on 9/11? No? Neither do I. Let's see what the 9/11 Ommission has to tell us...
MR. GORTON: Mr. Belger, I want to go back to one of Commissioner Gorelick's subjects. You very clearly describe the protocol with respect to hijacking that was in effect on 9/11. But we have a rather troubling note from the staff that I will share with you and ask you to comment on. Most managers at FAA headquarters have little or no recollection of the protocols in place on 9/11 with respect to their roles and responsibilities on a hijacking. With the exception of a few individuals from the Security Division, there appear to be little or no training at FAA headquarters or Command Center regarding hijacking procedures. Indeed, when asked to identify who the hijack coordinator was on 9/11, it was difficult to find two witnesses who identified the same individual. source archive
Let's see what the FAA can tell us about that position in order to see whether we can determine who might have had that role on 9/11.
The FAA hijack coordinator (the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security) on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft to:
a. Assure positive flight following.
b. Report unusual observances.
c. Aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.
7-1-2. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE
The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit. When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will coordinate through the appropriate SOCC/ROCC. archived source
.
Which kind of blows out of the water the myth that only NORAD assets were available in this type of situation. But anyway...
According to FAA Civil Aviation Security Division employee Jackson Smith, he and his boss, the Director of Civil Aviation Security for FAA (who he identifies as Mike Canavan) were in Puerto Rico on the morning of 9/11.
On the morning of 9/11, I was traveling in SJU with my boss, Major General Mike Canavan, ACS-1, Director of Civil Aviation Security for FAA. Upon learning of the attack on the WTC in NY, we rushed to the SJU Airport where I had made arrangements for him to immediately depart SJU via military jet to Washington. source archive
Who was the designate? The 9/11 Ommission interviewed Mike Canavan in
May of 2003, but must not have thought it worth calling him back to ask him this.
So what were we really looking at on 9/11? Ben Sliney was on his first day on the job as the person with the authority to order every plane in the country to land, according to USA Today. Navy captain Charles Leidig was at the helm at the NMCC during the key period (having been asked to fill in the day before by Montague Winfield) after only qualifying to be in that position in August 2001, according to his testimony to the 9/11 Ommission. Air Force chief of staff John Jumper was also in his first day on the job. Mike Canavan was in Puerto Rico. General Myers, according to his testimony, was on Capitol Hill and only arrived back at the Pentagon after it had been hit. The NMCC only periodically monitored the FAA's teleconference.
At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacking teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department. The NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only periodically because the information was sporadic, it was of little value, and there were other important tasks. The FAA manager of the teleconference also remembered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was hit. Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinating a response to the attacks of 9/11.Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was frustrated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.188 source
also left out-
the Mineta testimony
mention of WTC 7
George Tenet's, Porter Goss's and Bob Graham's meetings with Pakistani ISI chief Mahmoud Ahmad in the week prior to 9/11
most of the wargames and exercises taking place on 9/11- and accepted the story that they helped the response. So that must mean that things would have been even worse on 9/11 without all those exercises and wargames, right?
etc.
Yet this old news meeting is what is making such a big stir?
A blast from the past... from someone who cared on bradblog