Yesterday I posted a brief diary linking to information on the McGovern-Polk plan for withdrawal from Iraq. Today I found a much more subsantantive article at Harper's , written by McGovern & Polk. My notes and excerpts are below.
Folks, I urge you to take the time to read the plan as it appears at Harpers. This plan was presented to the Congressional Progressive Caucus recently, and the Caucus will re-visit the plan in January.
Kossities, this plan will not get the media attention of other plans -- unless it gets netroots support.
Key concepts and excerpts from McGovern & Polk's article,'The Way Out of War' , Harper's Nov 8 2006 --
phased withdrawal should begin on or before December 31, 2006, with the promise to make every effort to complete it by June 30, 2007.
[ . . .]
Let us be clear: there will be some damage. This is inevitable no matter what we do. At the end of every insurgency we have studied, there was a certain amount of chaos as the participants sought to establish a new civic order. . . . We are as powerless to prevent the turmoil that will ensue when we withdraw as we have been to stop the insurgency. But we will have removed a major cause of the insurgency once we have withdrawn. Moreover, there are ways in which we can be helpful to the Iraqis—and protect our own interests—by ameliorating the underlying conditions and smoothing the edges of conflict.The first of these would be a "bridging" effort between the occupation and complete independence.
To manage security during and after the phased withdrawal, McGovern & Polk suggest that the Iraqi government request "the temporary services of an international stabilization force" that would have a firm removal date, probably two years. This would be a police force, not a military force. It would have only light equipment, not tanks or aircraft, and its goal would be improving public security, not battling insurgents.
Regarding the composition of this security force, McGovern & Polk state --
We imagine that the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi people, would find the composition of such a force most acceptable if it were drawn from Arab or Muslim countries. Specifically, it should be possible under the aegis of the United Nations to obtain, say, five contingents of 3,000 men each from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt. Jordan and Syria might also be asked to contribute personnel. If additional troops were required, or if any of these governments were deemed unacceptable to Iraq or unwilling to serve, application could be made to such Muslim countries as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Other countries might be included if the Iraqi government so wished.
It would benefit both Iraq and the United States if we were to pay for this force. Assuming that a ballpark figure would be $500 per man per day, and that 15,000 men would be required for two years, the overall cost would be $5.5 billion. That is approximately 3 percent of what it would cost to continue the war, with American troops, for the next two years. Not only would this represent a great monetary saving to us but it would spare countless American lives and would give Iraq the breathing space it needs to recover from the trauma of the occupation in a way that does not violate national and religious sensibilities.
America would give the funds to the Iraqi government, who would ‘hire’ police services from other countries; American military equipment currently in Iraq would be turned over to the international security forces. The international security forces would become, in effect, a national police force, which would involve local leaders in neighborhoods and villages. Over time, this involvement of local leaders would diminish ‘warlordism’ and other local divisions. (IMO, this also gets around the Catch-22 of ‘when the Iraqis stand up’, a failed plan.)
If the international police force is successful during its brief tenure, Iraq must then create a national police force. McGovern & Polk estimate that creating an effective force would take four to five years. To fund this, McGovern & Polk suggest --
the American withdrawal package should include provision of $1 billion to help the Iraqi government create, train, and equip such a force, which is roughly the cost of four days of the present American occupation.
To summarize, the article continues with considerations of neighborhood and local ‘home guards’, future possibilities for an Iraqi army, and the creation of a reconstruction corps (with America assisting by funding some reconstruction). Work on US permanent military bases must cease immediately as American forces withdraw. Mercenaries, which have been paid for by the US, should also be withdrawn, by stopping payment. The US will help fund removal of land mines and other dangerous unexploded ordinance. Ths US should proved finaicial assistance for property damage, which some will regard as ‘reparatons’.
Other suggestions include: an independent accounting of misappropriated funds by CPA, KBR, etc; the Iraqi government shold be allowed to void and/or renegotiate all oil contracts made during the occupation; reparations to Iraqi citizens for family deaths, imprisonment, and/or torture.
There are many more excellent suggestions for helping Iraq rebuild not just its infrastructure, but its society -- as, for example, helping to repatriate and/or train doctors, lawyers, and other professional people.
The McGovern-Polk plan, IMO, shows depth of research and thoughtful consideration of all aspects of withdrawal from Iraq.